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Yes, this is a thread on TL that involves religion, but I hate to think that our policy should be to blindly close every such thread. Sam Harris is a writer whose books are both insightful and have sparked many good discussions in the past and as long as the thread doesn't derail I'd like to leave it open. This should be the basic premise for every such thread, no matter how high the odds of it derailing. In that light, these posts that just predict the downfall of this thread (whether it be pre-determined or not) are 1) Not contributing to the discussion 2) Backseat moderating 3) Annoying 4) Actually contributing towards derailing it. I'll keep 2 daying people for this. |
On March 13 2012 03:06 liberal wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 02:52 DoubleReed wrote:On March 13 2012 02:25 liberal wrote:It's really not as complex as you are making it out to be. An event is either caused or uncaused. And therefore either determined or arbitrary. Free will is defined as neither. There are no alternatives to these in the known universe, and so free will is nonsensical. But our desire to believe something is often stronger than our sense. It's called rationalization. In psychology and logic, rationalization (also known as making excuses[1]) is an unconscious defense mechanism in which perceived controversial behaviors or feelings are logically justified and explained in a rational or logical manner in order to avoid any true explanation, and are made consciously tolerable – or even admirable and superior – by plausible means.[2] According to the DSM-IV, rationalization occurs "when the individual deals with emotional conflict or internal or external stressors by concealing the true motivations for his or her own thoughts, actions, or feelings through the elaboration of reassuring or self serving but incorrect explanations." That doesn't really hold. Determined and arbitrary aren't necessarily the only options. That could be a false dilemma. There could be a third "chosen" or simply "neither." Free will is obviously poorly defined, but I don't consider this a good argument. Poorly defined? An event which is neither caused nor uncaused is IMPOSSIBLE to define. It goes outside the bounds of language or sense or logic.
Where did get caused or uncaused from? Clearly free will is caused by the agent with the will. That's not the same as determined vs arbitrary though. Unless I don't understand what you're saying.
Either way, why are disagreeing with something that is impossible to define? There's nothing to even disagree with. It's just completely useless.
I mean I could just say free will is the ability of conscious minds to do what they want, which is perfectly consistent in a deterministic or indeterministic world.
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On March 13 2012 04:45 DoubleReed wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 03:06 liberal wrote:On March 13 2012 02:52 DoubleReed wrote:On March 13 2012 02:25 liberal wrote:It's really not as complex as you are making it out to be. An event is either caused or uncaused. And therefore either determined or arbitrary. Free will is defined as neither. There are no alternatives to these in the known universe, and so free will is nonsensical. But our desire to believe something is often stronger than our sense. It's called rationalization. In psychology and logic, rationalization (also known as making excuses[1]) is an unconscious defense mechanism in which perceived controversial behaviors or feelings are logically justified and explained in a rational or logical manner in order to avoid any true explanation, and are made consciously tolerable – or even admirable and superior – by plausible means.[2] According to the DSM-IV, rationalization occurs "when the individual deals with emotional conflict or internal or external stressors by concealing the true motivations for his or her own thoughts, actions, or feelings through the elaboration of reassuring or self serving but incorrect explanations." That doesn't really hold. Determined and arbitrary aren't necessarily the only options. That could be a false dilemma. There could be a third "chosen" or simply "neither." Free will is obviously poorly defined, but I don't consider this a good argument. Poorly defined? An event which is neither caused nor uncaused is IMPOSSIBLE to define. It goes outside the bounds of language or sense or logic. Where did get caused or uncaused from? Clearly free will is caused by the agent with the will. That's not the same as determined vs arbitrary though. Unless I don't understand what you're saying. Either way, why are disagreeing with something that is impossible to define? There's nothing to even disagree with. It's just completely useless. I mean I could just say free will is the ability of conscious minds to do what they want, which is perfectly consistent in a deterministic or indeterministic world. Yes, conscious minds always do what they want to do, and that is consistent with determinism, because their want is determined. However, that's not what people mean when they talk about free will. It's not about want, it's about being somehow independent from both causality and randomness, it's about believing that the mind is a force of nature which controls matter, instead of matter controlling mind.
I agree, the term is completely useless. What we are arguing against is not so much the term, as the general propensity to deny that we live in a universe governed by predictable laws, and that the human body cannot violate those laws.
The human mind does not determine the outside world, it's the other way around. Free will is like saying the cake bakes the oven, it's a reversal of causality.
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On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought.
This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight).
Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion.
People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that.
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On March 13 2012 03:24 Nevermind86 wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 03:13 liberal wrote: No, what I did was find the critical flaw in your deductive reasoning, and explain why it is an incorrect premise. You're good man. You 'almost' convince me of your political views. Liberal found the, yes, FLAW, in your reasoning. You are admittedly undereducated about this and yet you treat your opinion with the same weight as someone who knows what they are talking about, why? Have you ever read about the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning–Kruger_effect ?
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On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. Would imaginary numbers satisfy those conditions? They don't physically exist in any representable form and yet they are used to affect the physical (therefore existing).
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On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that.
A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible.
Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff.
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On March 13 2012 08:04 seppolevne wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. Would imaginary numbers satisfy those conditions? They don't physically exist in any representable form and yet they are used to affect the physical (therefore existing).
Why did you go for imaginary when you simply could have gone for negative numbers? And in this case, you could just go for numbers themselves.
Anyway, as mathematics is all abstract representations of things I don't really know if that's much of an argument. I suppose it could be. That gets more into "what is a concept" kind of discussion though which seems irrelevant.
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On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I appreciate your contribution frog, you are always a beacon of calm and authoritative exposition in a sea of petty disagreements. I also give credence to swede's critique. In my opinion your hierarchy of modes of the possible is a meaningless partition of systems with "laws" that share constituents which we casually take to be the same. More precisely each system you named should be thought of as separate with convenient points of similarity that bear the same name. However, I gather it's not controversial and I don't want to contest it seriously because that's just another fencing match over semantics.
Which is so often how, it seems, I reframe things to correct them. I would hope you grant that there is reality, and we are a part of it. The distinction between the physical and "higher up" (aka metaphysical) seems meaningless. There are other directions to go, but let's assume we perceive physical reality correctly and our science is accurate with ever increasing depth and acumen. If we can think of things, those thoughts are built in "physical" existence because our brains are made of atoms, yada yada. Is not the conception of a logical statement a physical phenomenon? Moreover, regardless of what you want to call it, the various constituents of reality must be interactive with one another and homogeneously comprised at some level. Otherwise a hypothetical counterexample would not be a part of reality. So I don't see the necessity of ordering possibilities as it pertains to this discussion. In fact the same line of reasoning I just explained goes to, I would hope, elucidate the decidability of free will as a defined concept. If not that, then it is a meaningless phrase. You said this yourself in so many words while leaving wiggle room for different viewpoints to cling to equivocal validity, but I don't see why. Of course you will see I go on to speak in these distinctions below, because they are natural shorthand, so only take the above as seriously as you might care to.
I will reiterate what I hastily spit out in my earlier post in this thread because I think it could make an impression on those of you who are following the real discussion here. (Presently let me point out my own thinly veiled elitism. Ahem.)
What I would say to you I say from the standpoint that the question of free will is clearly decided, but what I have to say would apply if you still have your doubts. It has to do with what we are able to know -- in other words, information. Disregarding problems of epistemology, there is a limit on what we can learn about the universe (which you can take to mean reality, if you prefer). To argue this in the broadest sense, imagine if that were not the case. It would mean you have perfect knowledge of all constituents of reality. This is tantamount to monism. I will return to this point later, but for now I hope we can agree that attributing agency capable of universal comprehension to a subset of the universe is either contradictory or pointless or both. (To elaborate about the pointlessness, given that were true, things like the passage of time, spatial displacement, any sort of identity due to distinction with a hypothetical other, would not mean anything.)
It seems more natural to me (and surely more practical) to deal with information in terms of our current scientific knowledge of the physical universe than to bother with higher philosophical problems you might incur (because they would have no bearing on results scientific). To wit, my assertion above can be understood readily by thinking of physical properties of matter and energy as data storage. If we know anything it is because some subset of matter (which I'll call brain for convenience without laboring the definition) can hold information because of a configuration of constituents' properties, or some ongoing process of interaction among them (based on those properties... same thing). There is a terribly large but finite number of states the brain can be in, potentially representing a lot of information, though in my conception most of that potentially relevant data is just randomness, or overhead. In any case that terribly large number of states could not possibly be sufficient to cover all possible states of the entirety of the universe.
By extension, if we want to arbitrarily attribute agency to any subset of the universe, it cannot know the universe.
This is what prevents a fated universe from being a disaster of meaninglessness. It doesn't matter that things are deterministic, or may be, or whatever you want to believe, because your access to actionable knowledge is constrained. I would even argue that self-examination leads to no better ratio of information (namely less than perfect), but that's not important here. The thing to see is that even in a deterministic environment, fate is a meaningless notion because existence itself is a constant process of discovery by and among its constituents. Put casually, any person lives in a world where anything can happen and can act freely in that world, because it is impossible to dictate otherwise.
Now, we arrive at an interesting thing to ponder. You may think of a neuron in your brain. It is a complex entity and we might some day ascribe some measure of "awareness" to it, and delineate what that even means and how it contributes to our own awareness. However we would naturally believe that the neuron cannot become aware of the being of which it is a part. In the same way, are we perhaps just a part of an aware universe? That would be one conclusion not difficult to reach if you believe that our "inert" constituents interact somehow to result in our awareness yet themselves seem not meaningfully aware. (Indeed, how could they be when the "laws" that govern their existence don't allow any freedom from their inert, predictable states. So to speak.) So, in the end I think monism is the only available conclusion but strangely we have only a partial awareness. I don't know what to make of that.
The paradigm I am hoping to share here really has less to say about free will than about consciousness in general. Backing up for a moment, it seems to me at the outset that the question of consciousness is intimately related to any question of free will. Therefore in addressing the nature of consciousness one could reasonably expect you might be able to decide about free will. Free will has to do with what leads to your choices. Consciousness is your awareness of those causes as well as the outcome, the choice. I have seen some posters discussing ideas about unconscious entities and their free will or lack thereof. My line of thought is motivated from a similar place. That sort of question is really asking about what leads to a given event. I think the only suitable answer is "everything". Lacking awareness of everything, I can't see how it's a person's choice, even though we have a consciousness that shortcuts that logical conclusion with the de facto experience of free will. We are a machine whose inputs are everything and whose output is the only action it could be, but that process is represented by the idea of decision-making.
On the topic of responsibility of agents (punishment for crime, etc), it's worth thinking about, but I would immediately try to build some kind of infrastructure around this same idea of unknowableness and discovery which functions as the familiar concepts on which much of our social philosophy is based like self-determination, choice, and will and action. This way we don't lose out on meaning or morality simply by accepting determinism. Personally I find those concepts to be antiquated but I concede they are nonetheless still useful in the wider world and there's no reason to let them fall by the wayside, because, for example, you could never explain any of this to a child, but it's very useful to tell a child "it's bad to harm other people".
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dont lie to yourself children love harming people unless they're girls and only even some girls dnt love harming people children are evil
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On March 13 2012 11:52 SpiritoftheTunA wrote: dont lie to yourself children love harming people unless they're girls and only even some girls dnt love harming people children are evil
you got me ><
lol
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On March 13 2012 01:01 Nevermind86 wrote:+ Show Spoiler + I don't understand why physic laws is a key element for people arguing against free will. Because since we are talking about 'we' as a biological being or thing (isn't it the same 'thing'), then it's biology as a science that will explain free will, of course as beings or things we are subject to physics but it is irrelevant.
Through history 'we' have explained unknown things through poetry or philosophy, because there was nothing better for us at hand, back in the days the earth was flat because through 'our' eyes it cannot be otherwise, the notion that we could live in the 'south' part of a sphere and not fall seemed impossible. In modern times with our knowledge of science, gravity, etc, we know better, the world is a sort of sphere.
The brain is a complex thing, certain animals do feel emotions because their brain allows them to, as long as those emotions are very basic. Because the brain is so complex maybe at some point for an evolutionary reason we ended up having free will. It is restricted by the environment but everything is restricted by the envionment, that doesn't mean it doesn't exist, and no, there is no need to bring a dual body/mind religious thing to support the notion of free will.
The brain is the complex structure that made possible for us to take complex choises, all that we have built is because the brain made it possible, 'creating' 'ideas' out of nothing created the technology possible to discuss these matters in this fashion. Evolution creating free will to take survival of the fittest to the next level seems like a good evolutionary tool, after all there is over 6 billions of us and we keep reproducing, isn't that the whole point of evolution? Have more offsprings than other species.
'Free will' just because it cannot be explained at the moment, doesn't mean it cannot exist. Biology one day will be able to explain what is it that causes free will to exist, maybe the brain got so complex at some point that all those things that long ago 'we' could only explain through philosophy, like ideas, creativity, free will, conscience, logic, morals will be explained. But look how all those concepts are good to our survival, actually is the difference between us as a superior species to the rest. Sheer brain complexity, honestly, made it all possible.
Determinism trying to explain the Mona Lisa, Jules Vernes, Michael Angelo and a bunch of other things is lacking, because at some point a decisition out of nothing was made. Out of their own choise.
The greeks argued that a minimum particle existed and that the whole world was made of it, I'm sure back then a lot of people argued that it didn't exist because it couldn't be proved. But the atom exists, it just took a long time for science to prove it. To them it made sense through simple observation that that particle existed, to us through observation makes sense for something like free will to exist. It is my decisition to move my leg, if "the brain took the decisition before... you moved... the leg..." I am my brain, since it is a part of my body.
That I posted it earlier but I'm reposting it. ...
Honestly people like to jump into a bandwagon and it seems to me that one of the new cool things to say it's claiming that free will doesn't exist. Of course we are influenced by our environments profoundly some more than others... but, it reminds me a little bit of people supporting communism in my country (Venezuela, where communism is still cool) it doesn't matter how many examples you give them or how much logic do you use because they have the books to prove you are wrong no matter what.
I say this because in one of the videos posted in this thread showed as proof that there is no free will a scientist gives an example about a young guy that worked on railroads who had an accident losing part of his brain, after that he says that people used to say the guy wasn't the same anymore, that he just wasted his money on gambling and prostitutes... but put yourself in that guy's place. You are young, muscular, probably good looking and you lose part of your brain and face, people will look at you like you were some kind of monster it is like it is. I know this because it happened to me, I had an accident and a few surgeries where I ended up wearing external metal nails in a broken arm, my friends had a hard hard time looking at it... (I promised that if surgery went wrong I would commit suicide, I was lucky but it was pretty close, nothing wrong with my brain though), people on the street even took pictures or all looked at me and said things like "Oh gross!", now imagine losing part of your face... it is the end of the world for you, why not use all your hard earned money on prostitutes (trust me you won't get in a healthy relationship with only half your face, unless it's a daughter of Gandhi with infinite love, and even she likes normal guys), and gambling, things you wouldn't do otherwise but it doesn't matter to you anymore, because you will start thinking you are DONE.
I could see that being (part of) the truth. Sure removals of part of the brain can influence people's behavior, but to claim that especifically removing a part will make you 'waste' money on prostitutes and gambling it's stretching your argument too much.
In that same video, the scientist talks about a guy who had a brain tumor and suddenly started to like watching naked kids... his wife said he knew him all his life and that he wasn't like that 'before'. He had a surgery and the tumor removed, suddenly the desire to watch naked kids went away... but then the tumor grew again and the desire came back. A tumor is not a part of the brain, the part of the brain that was removed didn't grew back, the whole thing seems like a silly excuse to me, how the hell does your wife find out you like watching naked kids, maybe she got him watching child pornography or something then blamed everything on the tumor, started crying saying it wasn't his fault and after surgery... with a straigh face says (hey I'm not a monster, I'm just ahead of the curve) the desire in him is no more... good excuse for both of them to sleep at night.
My conclusion of this wall of text is: Removing a part of the brain sure can change a person, but to claim that a specific conduct is born because of it, it's stretching reality to fit your argument.
If you take the butterfly effect.. you know, this idea that a butterfly flaps it's wings on one side of the world and somehow, it could trigger a hurricane on the other side of the planet.
Well, please bear with me while I illustrate the following example. In this example, there is no free will in the universe.
Consider a jar of air. Its sitting there on a table doing nothing. Now, consider an oxygen atom inside the jar of air. Its chemically bound to another oxygen atom. This oxygen atom has an electron spinning around it's nucleus. Now, composing this electron are subatomic particles. All these particles, like all subatomic particles should follow it's laws.
Now, 1 particle decides --i dont know the mechanism how, but suddenly behaves different to what it's environment is dictating it to do so. For a brief second, it had free will.-- it decided to move a certain way.
This in turn makes the electron of the oxygen atom move slightly different. Which makes the oxygen atom itself slightly different. Maybe it angles slightly to the left. In turn, its pair oxygen atom angles slightly to the left as well.
This oxygen atom has now decided the final arrangement of the air inside the jar. Remember that all gas essentially are atoms bouncing around because there is too much energy for them to settle into a liquid or a solid. But, this one atom with free will has influenced every particle in the jar. Supposedly, these atoms are flailing about a certain way, but one atom decided to move away from that and completely changed the final positions of all the other atoms.
But wait. It does not stop there. Since all air in the jar is in contact with the jar itself, even if it's completely air tight the atoms of the jar will undoubtedly be affected as well. Maybe its a nano-vibration different.
And the jar of air is in contact with the air around it. So lets say at least 1 atom of the wind passing by the jar is shifted lightly eastward. Well, if just 1 atom is shifted, then it should affect some other atoms. Lets say it shifts 1 stray nitrogen atom. Of course, many other atoms could have been shifted, but lets follow this nitrogen atom.
Well, this nitrogen atom fell to the soil. And being a gas, permeated the soil. On this soil is planted a seed. This seed is growing into a plant. Lets say its a sunflower. This sunflower will take nutrients from the soil and grow, so this nitrogen atom becomes part of the plant. In a few months, it a full plant.. and it's feeding butterflies.
Now, remember the butterfly I talked about in my first sentence, well it's one of them. It just fed on nectar on the plant with one of the chemical compounds having the nitrogen atom. Now, for the next hundred wing flaps that nitrogen atom does not matter. But, in one of the flaps it does. Lets say it part of a muscle or a neuron. It either takes up or gives energy to this one flap. Now the flap is finished. 5 years later, it triggers rain on your city.
Now, I know you had surgery and all. But think of how much a day of rain would affect how you would think for a week. I mean right now, how different would your day be if it was raining? The decisions you made on your clothes? Now, imagine that this was the day of your accident. How different would your life be?
All this because of a particle in a jar suddenly not doing what it's supposed to. It does not even have to involve biology. Everything is connected to physics. If a person is for free will, he has to argue how it becomes physically possible.
Now think of the jar of air as a human brain. It's now bounds more complex than a jar of air, but I don't think it can be more complex than say the biological process that made it. Imagine that that the same oxygen atom is in it. Imagine the same electron. Imagine the same particle. How did that particle decide to move on its own, independent of what it's environment of other particles dictates?
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On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff.
I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)").
Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot.
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On March 13 2012 11:45 EatThePath wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. So, in the end I think monism is the only available conclusion but strangely we have only a partial awareness.
Just wanted to say that this post is frickin' awesome. There is one part which I don't completely understand though, which I've quoted here. Could you first of all elaborate on your definition of 'monism'? And also on what you mean by the part which I've bolded, specifically the use of 'strangely'?
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On March 13 2012 13:18 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)"). Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot.
By "actual possibility" do you mean it being true of the actual world? Because I thought I was pretty clear about not believing that libertarian free will exists in the actual world. The conceivability thing was meant to indicate that the concept was at least coherent, not that it was instantiated.
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On March 13 2012 14:55 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 13:18 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)"). Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot. By "actual possibility" do you mean it being true of the actual world? Because I thought I was pretty clear about not believing that libertarian free will exists in the actual world. The conceivability thing was meant to indicate that the concept was at least coherent, not that it was instantiated.
No. I mean actual possibility in any way, the actual world or not. My point was that any coherence that a concept might have is related directly to the 'how' of that concept. Without giving some sort of 'how' it's impossible to assign any given concept a probability (which is exactly what saying 'it's possible' is doing).
So my question to you would be how do you know that Free Will is possible at all, in any other way? Because if you don't know then it's a guess at best, and a guess which can be tagged onto any other concept you can name with just as much justification (hence why I called it fallacious).
Like I said, I may have misinterpreted your original point, in which case I'm sorry for using you as an example. Either way, I've made the point I wanted to now (I think).
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On March 13 2012 11:45 EatThePath wrote:+ Show Spoiler +On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I appreciate your contribution frog, you are always a beacon of calm and authoritative exposition in a sea of petty disagreements. I also give credence to swede's critique. In my opinion your hierarchy of modes of the possible is a meaningless partition of systems with "laws" that share constituents which we casually take to be the same. More precisely each system you named should be thought of as separate with convenient points of similarity that bear the same name. However, I gather it's not controversial and I don't want to contest it seriously because that's just another fencing match over semantics. Which is so often how, it seems, I reframe things to correct them. I would hope you grant that there is reality, and we are a part of it. The distinction between the physical and "higher up" (aka metaphysical) seems meaningless. There are other directions to go, but let's assume we perceive physical reality correctly and our science is accurate with ever increasing depth and acumen. If we can think of things, those thoughts are built in "physical" existence because our brains are made of atoms, yada yada. Is not the conception of a logical statement a physical phenomenon? Moreover, regardless of what you want to call it, the various constituents of reality must be interactive with one another and homogeneously comprised at some level. Otherwise a hypothetical counterexample would not be a part of reality. So I don't see the necessity of ordering possibilities as it pertains to this discussion. In fact the same line of reasoning I just explained goes to, I would hope, elucidate the decidability of free will as a defined concept. If not that, then it is a meaningless phrase. You said this yourself in so many words while leaving wiggle room for different viewpoints to cling to equivocal validity, but I don't see why. Of course you will see I go on to speak in these distinctions below, because they are natural shorthand, so only take the above as seriously as you might care to. I will reiterate what I hastily spit out in my earlier post in this thread because I think it could make an impression on those of you who are following the real discussion here. (Presently let me point out my own thinly veiled elitism. Ahem.) What I would say to you I say from the standpoint that the question of free will is clearly decided, but what I have to say would apply if you still have your doubts. It has to do with what we are able to know -- in other words, information. Disregarding problems of epistemology, there is a limit on what we can learn about the universe (which you can take to mean reality, if you prefer). To argue this in the broadest sense, imagine if that were not the case. It would mean you have perfect knowledge of all constituents of reality. This is tantamount to monism. I will return to this point later, but for now I hope we can agree that attributing agency capable of universal comprehension to a subset of the universe is either contradictory or pointless or both. (To elaborate about the pointlessness, given that were true, things like the passage of time, spatial displacement, any sort of identity due to distinction with a hypothetical other, would not mean anything.) It seems more natural to me (and surely more practical) to deal with information in terms of our current scientific knowledge of the physical universe than to bother with higher philosophical problems you might incur (because they would have no bearing on results scientific). To wit, my assertion above can be understood readily by thinking of physical properties of matter and energy as data storage. If we know anything it is because some subset of matter (which I'll call brain for convenience without laboring the definition) can hold information because of a configuration of constituents' properties, or some ongoing process of interaction among them (based on those properties... same thing). There is a terribly large but finite number of states the brain can be in, potentially representing a lot of information, though in my conception most of that potentially relevant data is just randomness, or overhead. In any case that terribly large number of states could not possibly be sufficient to cover all possible states of the entirety of the universe. By extension, if we want to arbitrarily attribute agency to any subset of the universe, it cannot know the universe. This is what prevents a fated universe from being a disaster of meaninglessness. It doesn't matter that things are deterministic, or may be, or whatever you want to believe, because your access to actionable knowledge is constrained. I would even argue that self-examination leads to no better ratio of information (namely less than perfect), but that's not important here. The thing to see is that even in a deterministic environment, fate is a meaningless notion because existence itself is a constant process of discovery by and among its constituents. Put casually, any person lives in a world where anything can happen and can act freely in that world, because it is impossible to dictate otherwise. Now, we arrive at an interesting thing to ponder. You may think of a neuron in your brain. It is a complex entity and we might some day ascribe some measure of "awareness" to it, and delineate what that even means and how it contributes to our own awareness. However we would naturally believe that the neuron cannot become aware of the being of which it is a part. In the same way, are we perhaps just a part of an aware universe? That would be one conclusion not difficult to reach if you believe that our "inert" constituents interact somehow to result in our awareness yet themselves seem not meaningfully aware. (Indeed, how could they be when the "laws" that govern their existence don't allow any freedom from their inert, predictable states. So to speak.) So, in the end I think monism is the only available conclusion but strangely we have only a partial awareness. I don't know what to make of that. The paradigm I am hoping to share here really has less to say about free will than about consciousness in general. Backing up for a moment, it seems to me at the outset that the question of consciousness is intimately related to any question of free will. Therefore in addressing the nature of consciousness one could reasonably expect you might be able to decide about free will. Free will has to do with what leads to your choices. Consciousness is your awareness of those causes as well as the outcome, the choice. I have seen some posters discussing ideas about unconscious entities and their free will or lack thereof. My line of thought is motivated from a similar place. That sort of question is really asking about what leads to a given event. I think the only suitable answer is "everything". Lacking awareness of everything, I can't see how it's a person's choice, even though we have a consciousness that shortcuts that logical conclusion with the de facto experience of free will. We are a machine whose inputs are everything and whose output is the only action it could be, but that process is represented by the idea of decision-making. On the topic of responsibility of agents (punishment for crime, etc), it's worth thinking about, but I would immediately try to build some kind of infrastructure around this same idea of unknowableness and discovery which functions as the familiar concepts on which much of our social philosophy is based like self-determination, choice, and will and action. This way we don't lose out on meaning or morality simply by accepting determinism. Personally I find those concepts to be antiquated but I concede they are nonetheless still useful in the wider world and there's no reason to let them fall by the wayside, because, for example, you could never explain any of this to a child, but it's very useful to tell a child "it's bad to harm other people".
Thanks. A couple notes.
You claim that the notions of possibility I invoke are meaningless while admitting that that debate is a verbal dispute. The second part sounds about right to me. But as I said in my earlier post, sometimes verbal disputes have clear winners and I think I'm on the right side here.
The categorization of possibilities I listed is given meaning both by its use in systems of modal logic and its basis in ordinary discourse. Here are some ordinary discourse examples. It's a psychological law that we can only keep track of about seven objects in working memory at any given moment. This fact is naturally expressed by saying, "People are not able to keep track of 13 objects at a time," or "It's impossible to process information about 20 objects in working memory at a time." These statements are true and they contain clear markers of modality ('able' in the first, 'impossible' in the second).
But it's clear that it must be a very restricted notion of modality. For if we were talking about biological laws, these statements would be false since the way that information is processed biologically allows for systems of working memory superior to our own.
Modal terms represent the canonical way of expressing the claims of each science, and in each case we have to interpret the terms on the basis of the laws of that science. In these contexts, 'necessarily x' or 'it has to be the case that x' will express that x holds in every possibility compatible with the laws (I'm using 'x' as a propositional variable). But to even make sense of what's going on here, you have to recognize the broader types of possibility these are based in.
A final example. A chemist might explain why perpetual motion is impossible by claiming that the entropy of a closed system can never increase. Again, this must be a case of restricted possibility because according to the more fundamental laws of statistical mechanics this is only a probabilistic fact.
I think I'll add a few more comments later when I have time. One other quick thing to address is that when I speak of metaphysics I'm not speaking of something "higher up" than physics. I'm merely thinking of the most general or most fundamental features of reality. So, for instance, if only the physical exists that would be a metaphysical fact rather than a physical one. But it clearly does not require going higher up than physics in a particularly mysterious way.
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can someone plan to make a random choice consciously? if you argue the choices with yourself the outcome will propably not be random. so the question is: how do i get to a choice if i do not want to think consciously about the outcomes?
lets say you want to choose between 2 choices. do the following in your mind: pick a rather large number (say over 100). pick a second lower number (under 20 or so). calculate first number modulo second number. if the result is even, pick choice 1, if the result is uneven, pick choice 2.
this whole thing should work, because: 1. this calculation is chosen to be difficult enough that you can not predict the outcome before hand. 2. picking two unrelated numbers big enough to don't have any meaning otherwise, wont give you any predictability about it.
this should work better, the bigger the numbers you pick are, because both points are strengthened by it. if the math is too hard to do in your mind, use a calculator, but pick the numbers by yourself.
i'd say: this shows you can not be predicted. i'm not sure if it means, the decision was made by your free will
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On March 13 2012 15:36 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 14:55 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 13:18 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)"). Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot. By "actual possibility" do you mean it being true of the actual world? Because I thought I was pretty clear about not believing that libertarian free will exists in the actual world. The conceivability thing was meant to indicate that the concept was at least coherent, not that it was instantiated. No. I mean actual possibility in any way, the actual world or not. My point was that any coherence that a concept might have is related directly to the 'how' of that concept. Without giving some sort of 'how' it's impossible to assign any given concept a probability (which is exactly what saying 'it's possible' is doing). So my question to you would be how do you know that Free Will is possible at all, in any other way? Because if you don't know then it's a guess at best, and a guess which can be tagged onto any other concept you can name with just as much justification (hence why I called it fallacious). Like I said, I may have misinterpreted your original point, in which case I'm sorry for using you as an example. Either way, I've made the point I wanted to now (I think).
I think that conceivability represents a defeasible method of attaining knowledge of what is metaphysically possible. It does sometimes lead one astray, but it's often the best that we have. If you can provide a compelling argument against a conceivable thing's possibility, then that's fine, but I think that its being conceivable at minimum puts the burden of proof on those who would claim it is impossible.
Imagine church officials in Galileo's time telling him that the earth moving is not only false but impossible. Would it not be appropriate to appeal to the fact that it is conceivable to rebut that claim?
That said, libertarian free will might be metaphysically impossible despite its conceivability, and I'm open to that. But that would still not be enough to establish that the very idea is incoherent. Lots of impossible things are at least coherently imaginable, though in this case I'll admit that we don't have anything close to a clear imagining.
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On March 13 2012 15:47 frogrubdown wrote:Show nested quote +On March 13 2012 15:36 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 14:55 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 13:18 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 08:20 frogrubdown wrote:On March 13 2012 07:42 Swede wrote:On March 13 2012 00:34 frogrubdown wrote:This thread has predominantly featured three debates: does libertarian free will exist; does 'free will' express a libertarian or a compatibilist concept; does morality/moral responsibility require libertarian free will? I'll address each in turn. (1) Does Libertarian Free Will Exist?I won't define 'libertarian free will', but suffice it to say that it requires one's actions to be independent of the fundamental physical laws of the universe (I'm using it to speak of the highest grade variety discussed here). Some in this thread have accused this idea of being incoherent, but that's a confused outlook. It is physically impossible for this type of free will to exist, but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for it to exist. There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws). If libertarian free will exists, then it would simply turn out that physical possibility is a narrower type of possibility than was thought. This doesn't make sense. We've never seen anything which existed and was 'physically impossible' (or at least nothing which wasn't later discovered to be perfectly possible under physical laws, a la the bee and its 'impossible' flight). Our ability to conceive of something is not evidence that that thing can exist. In fact, our conception of a world with different physical laws is incomplete anyway. Surely in order to truly 'conceive' of something you must understand the necessary mechanisms which allow it to be. But just 'conceiving of something' is not evidence of anything. It's like writing the conclusion without all of the necessary reasoning to reach that conclusion. People have actually used this as an argument against me in different situations. It basically simplifies to this: 'I can imagine you being wrong (but not how you would be wrong), therefore I will disagree/withhold judgment'. As far as I know, that isn't a formal fallacy... But I certainly wouldn't hesitate to call it fallacious given the uselessness of an argument like that. A cursory study of modality will reveal that there is an absurdly wide array of types of possibility. Ignoring outliers such as deontic and epistemic possibility, we can construct an ordering based in part on which sciences supervene on which other sciences. Science possibilities are just metaphysical possibilities with the added restriction that the laws of the relevant science have to hold. There are biologically possible things that are not psychologically possible, chemically possible things that aren't biologically possible, and physically possible things that are not chemically possible. Moving further up, there are metaphysically possible things that are not physically possible. If you don't think a world in which a single particle accelerates away from another is possible in any sense (that is all there is in that world), then you likely do not possess the every day concept of possibility. Even higher up than that is logical possibility, which makes the fewest restrictions. It is logically, though not metaphysically, possible for an object to be both red all over and green all over. The only logical impossibilities are explicit logical contradictions. This is all pretty basic stuff. I don't think you understood what I meant. I'm not saying that, for example, a world with different physical laws is impossible, I'm saying that simply 'conceiving' of it is not a reflection of it's actual possibility (which is what you seemed to suggest in the post I originally replied to with "There are broader notions of possibility than physical possibility (hence our ability to conceive of worlds with different physical laws)"). Maybe that wasn't the intended implication of what you originally said, but I thought it was worth saying either way since it's a line of reasoning I see a lot. By "actual possibility" do you mean it being true of the actual world? Because I thought I was pretty clear about not believing that libertarian free will exists in the actual world. The conceivability thing was meant to indicate that the concept was at least coherent, not that it was instantiated. No. I mean actual possibility in any way, the actual world or not. My point was that any coherence that a concept might have is related directly to the 'how' of that concept. Without giving some sort of 'how' it's impossible to assign any given concept a probability (which is exactly what saying 'it's possible' is doing). So my question to you would be how do you know that Free Will is possible at all, in any other way? Because if you don't know then it's a guess at best, and a guess which can be tagged onto any other concept you can name with just as much justification (hence why I called it fallacious). Like I said, I may have misinterpreted your original point, in which case I'm sorry for using you as an example. Either way, I've made the point I wanted to now (I think). I think that conceivability represents a defeasible method of attaining knowledge of what is metaphysically possible. It does sometimes lead one astray, but it's often the best that we have. If you can provide a compelling argument against a conceivable things possibility, then that's fine, but I think that its being conceivable at minimum puts the burden of proof on those who would claim it is impossible. Imagine church officials in Galileo's time telling him that the earth moving is not only false but impossible. Would it not be appropriate to appeal to the fact that it is conceivable to rebut that claim? That said, libertarian free will might be metaphysically impossible despite its conceivability, and I'm open to that. But that would still not be enough to establish that the very idea is incoherent. Lots of impossible things are at least coherently imaginable, though in this case I'll admit that we don't have anything close to a clear imagining.
Like I said earlier, in my opinion truly conceiving of something includes having some understanding of how that thing might come to be. In short, the 'how'. So while you say you can conceive of libertarian free will being metaphysically possible, I say you can't until you provide a coherent explanation of how libertarian free will might exist.
I really can't be bothered laboring the point. To me your definition of conceivability amounts to empty words if it doesn't include some explanation of mechanism. My earlier comparison was good I think: it's like filling in the conclusion without any of the reasoning required to get there. What's the point?
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