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Decided to write a short essay on the hedonistic philosophy of Epicurus. Just a quick little write up for fun.
A Response to Epicurean Hedonism
One of the most prominent philosophical questions throughout the ages has always been about the nature of happiness and the good life. What does it mean to be happy? What is the best way to go about attaining happiness, and what does it mean to live a good or complete life? Ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus suggests a unique form of hedonism as an answer to this question. The ideal Epicurean life is one in which the most pain is avoided and the greatest pleasure is experienced. Put simply, the goal of an Epicurean life and all actions within it is to maximize pleasure and to minimize pain. Epicurus thinks that happiness is essential derived from pleasure. I intend to argue, though, that the idea which says that pleasure is the end of every action and pain is always bad is hard to support, and that there is more to a good life and to achieving happiness than Epicurus' hedonism has to offer.
On paper, the Epicurean way of life may seem quite attractive. According to Epicurus, "every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial [to us]. . . Just as every pain too is a bad thing" (Epicurus 4.129) . Thus the good life is one filled with good things (pleasure) in the absence of bad things (pain). In fact, Epicurus defines pleasure itself as the "lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul" (Epicurus 4.131). So despite the common misunderstanding of the Epicurean lifestyle as one of pleasure-seeking and extravagance, for Epicurus, pleasure as an innate good is not the kind of pleasure one gets from "drinking bouts and continuous partying and enjoying boys and women" (Epicurus 4.132). Instead, it is negatively defined as the absence of pain. So in a sense happiness is the avoidance of pain. Intuitively, this makes sense. Pain is bad because it hurts, and pleasure is good because it feels good. Feeling pain or anxiety invariably makes us unhappy, so if we manage to avoid pain and live a life of pleasure, it would seem that we have lived a good life.
In order to hold this view, Epicurus is forced to admit, as he does, that "all good and bad consists in sense-experience" (Epicurus 4.124). He is forced to admit this because if living a good life means living a pleasant one, and if everything that is to be considered good must be pleasurable, then it stands to reason that everything good or bad must appeal to our sense-experiences since pleasure and pain are ultimately derived from our senses. Again, on paper, this seems reasonable. Human beings experience the world through their senses, so it would seem that the only things which we can confirm to be good or bad are those which we can sense to be good or bad. This is why Epicurus goes as far as to say that "what has no sense-experience is nothing to us" (Epicurus 5.II). If it could be shown, however, that there exist good and bad things beyond what can be detected by our sense-experience, then Epicurus' argument would be less convincing since such things would no longer be tied to pleasure or pain. Indeed, this is the most relied upon method for decisively refuting hedonism.
Robert Nozick attempts to do this in his 1974 book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, with a clever thought experiment. He asks us to imagine a machine which could simulate all of the experiences and sensible feelings of life for a person plugged into it. The person plugged into the machine would feel only good things and never experience pain, and he would be able to live out his dreams of writing novels or making friends, and he would never even know that he was plugged into a machine. Nozick then asks, "Would you plug in?" From this, Nozick argues, "we learn that something matters to us in addition to experience by imagining an experience machine and then realizing that we would not use it" (Nozick 44) . Although Nozick's thought experiment does not actually tell us what it is that "matters to us" outside of our sense-experience, it does somewhat convincingly show that Epicurus may be wrong when he says that "what has no sense-experience is nothing to us."
Our intuition tells us that we would not want to plug into such a machine because we do not desire fake experiences, even if we do not know that they are fake. One objection to this argument, given by Matthew Silverstein in his paper titled, In Defense of Happiness: A Response to the Experience Machine, is that "any appeal to our desires in the search for prudential value will ultimately gesture towards the truth of hedonism" (Silverstein 299). What he means by this is that we cannot try to construct an argument against hedonism based on our desires or feelings because such an argument would only confirm that our feelings are the only important factors in our lives, which is what hedonism ultimately argues for. The statements, "my feelings tell me that feelings are not important", or "my desires indicate that desires do not matter" do seem a bit funny, after all.
This is a reasonable objection. However, although it is very true that a simple appeal to our intuitions and desires is never enough to constitute an argument, it is also true that our intuitions can at least get us pointed in the right direction. That is to say that our intuitions tell us when something is not right, since we are not comfortable with it. Now this is still in the realm of the sensible. However, what our intuitions are often unable to tell us is why we feel them. Such information is usually left in the intelligible realm. In other words, although our feelings may indicate what is good to us, they do not always give us the full story. Feelings, in this case, are simply indicators, whereas what is actually good or bad lies outside of the sensible realm and in the realm of the intelligible.
When I refer to the intelligible realm, what I am referring to is all of the things that we can know. The things that we can know are not necessarily tied to things that we can sense. In other words, there are things that are intelligible, that we can have knowledge of, which are independent of our senses, feelings, and intuitions. That is to say that there exist a priori concepts which can only be known and not directly felt. How is this possible, one might ask, when the only means we have of experiencing things and of gaining knowledge seems to be to rely on our sense-experience? The answer is that reason tells us these things. Logic, which is entirely separate from our sensible experience, is what derives a priori concepts. For example, consider the Pythagorean Theorem for right triangles. Logic tells us that this theorem is objectively true. We know with certainty that a2 + b2 = c2, and no matter what our sensible experiences might make us think, the truth of this statement is indisputable. Such a truth could not possibly be derived from mere feeling or intuition, and it is not possible for our feelings or intuitions to either agree with or disagree the truth of the Pythagorean Theorem, since the truth of the theorem exists independent of our sense-experiences.
The idea of a priori concepts which exist only in the intelligible realm is crucial in refuting hedonism. Recall that we were looking for something that could be good or bad which exists (and can be detected) outside of mere sense-experience in order to refute Epicurus' statement, "what has no sense-experience is nothing to us." One of example of this could be knowledge for its own sake, and achievement for its own sake. Nozick's experience machine could never actually give us genuine achievements or real knowledge. Perhaps this is why our intuition tells us that we would not plug in to such a machine. In order to be happy, perhaps we desire real genuine achievement and wisdom.
Epicurus might object though, that things like knowledge/wisdom and achievement only serve to bring us more pleasure. So when we strive for these things, though they exist only in the intelligible realm, what we are really after is the sensible pleasure that follows from it. The sense of achievement in becoming wise is our actual goal, rather than the wisdom itself. Thus the actual wisdom and knowledge we strive for are "nothing to us", but the sense of having gained them pleases us and have value only for that reason. Instead of mathematics, for example, being useful for its own sake, Epicurus is more interested in "the pleasures which come from mathematics" (Epicurus 127). It would seem that Epicurus has no interest in things like virtue and honor when they offer no pleasurable pay-off, as he has been quoted as having said "I spit upon the honorable and on those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure" (Epicurus 151).
However, the idea that the end of every human action is pleasure, and that even ends which are only intelligibly good are strived for out of a desire for the pleasurable satisfaction from having achieved them, is problematic. It seems like such an argument would not be particularly convincing for the firefighter who, for the sake of duty, dives into a burning building to save a child but loses his own life in the process. How could it be argued that his sacrifice, or sacrifice in general, has pleasure as its end? On that note, what motivation could anyone have for helping others at their own expense if pleasure is always to be our end? What pleasure does a mother receive in return for the immense pain of childbirth? Should women avoid giving birth in order to avoid the pain? What end does a woman have for giving birth? Needless to say it would be strange if pleasure were her end. It must be something else. Bringing another human life into the world is what is gained through childbirth. Perhaps then, as Kant would argue, humanity is an end in itself. Humanity might be an end so worthwhile that it is worth the pain of childbirth to promote its development. So not only are there things which are done for their own sake rather than for pleasure, but it would seem that some things are so worthwhile that they are worth suffering some pain in order to achieve them.
Epicurus may not be entirely correct, then, when he says that "every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial [to us]. . . Just as every pain too is a bad thing" (Epicurus 4.129). Could there be times when pain itself is a good thing, at least insofar as it may be useful to us to feel it? There exists a medical condition which causes the afflicted to feel no pain at all. To Epicurus, a person afflicted with such a condition would be the luckiest in the world, since the only pain he/she would have to contend with would be emotional pain. But this disease is actually more disadvantageous than it might sound. The person could have a terrible infection which is spreading throughout his/her body, but he/she may never actually feel the pain necessary for detecting it until it is too late to save his/her life. How are we supposed know when we have sustained injuries in need of attention if we do not feel the pain necessary for detecting it?
Even emotional pain may be useful in some ways, as Sharon Hewitt argues in her paper, What do our Intuitions About the Experience Machine Really Tell us About Hedonism?, "pain is not only useful in motivating us to attend to the state of our bodies; it also helps motivate us to take care of our social lives. . . For instance, it’s important that, when we hurt a friend’s feelings, we feel emotional pain" (Hewitt 336). This is of course because if we felt no remorse from hurting our friend's feelings, our friendships would break down very quickly after just one such mistake. In order to maintain good relationships with others it may be necessary to feel emotional pains or discomforts. This is why, as Hewitt contends, "we are also benefited by our ability to experience shame, embarrassment, and discomfort at the disapproval of others" (Hewitt 336). It is never considered a good thing to be shameless, since one who knows no shame feels little motivation to restrict his or her actions to meet the standards set by his community or to be polite with his or her words. One who is despised by his/her community as a result may find difficulty with such a life, not simply because being despised leads to displeasure, but because being despised is bad by nature. I say this because one who is despised has probably done something wrong, and to do something wrong is a bad thing by definition. Knowing that one has done something bad means knowing that one has failed as a human being. Failing as a human being means not succeeding as one, and to not succeed as a human being means one has not lived the best life possible.
Since Epicurus defines pleasure negatively as the absence of pain, a life without pain would be a life of pure pleasure. But in such a world, one would still find difficulty. Without pain, one might walk through flames, or eat a bowl of nails for breakfast, or cut off his/her own hands and turn them into puppets for the pleasure of enjoying a real hand puppet show. What would stop one from doing this? The answer is that knowledge and wisdom would stop one from harming his/herself. Therefore, even in a life of pure pleasure, one would still require wisdom for self-preservation, if not for its own sake. Thus a good life requires more than mere pleasure in order to be complete.
Defining pleasure as the absence of pain has its own problems as well. As Stephen Rosenbaum mentions in his paper, Epicurus on pleasure and the Complete Life, "Such a definition fails to yield easily any positive impression of what living a good life would be like or to give any clues about how to lead it" (Rosenbaum 21). If one looks to Epicurean hedonism for advice on how to live one's life, the advice one gets is simply to avoid pain and to be prudent. This kind of hedonism tells us what to avoid, but it does not tell us what to do or what to strive for. In an Epicurean world, one might wonder if it even matters what we do, so long as we avoid unnecessary pains.
While Epicurus may be correct when he argues that pleasure is important, pleasure is not enough to satisfy a rational being. It is certainly difficult to imagine living a good life without any pleasure at all. However, a life of pure pleasure is not perfect. This is because we, as rational beings, are by nature different from animals. An dog is perfectly happy to lay around all day, eat good food, and feel good feelings. Is a dog's happiness enough for a human being? I argue that it is not. If one were given the choice to become a dog and live under the care of a human owner who would feed him all the nicest foods and rub his belly all day, to live without a care in the world, chances are most people would not choose that path. We could not choose such a life because we would fear the loss of our rational capacity. Reason tells us that we would not want to lose reason, because reason is good for its own sake, not for the pleasure it would bring.
Indeed, human beings are not content with simply being content. We do require something more than simple pleasure or the absence of pain in order to live a complete and happy life. What are these things that we require? Achievement, wisdom, a goal to strive for; these are all possible examples of what we might need for a complete life and to be happy, since they are good for their own sake. The need for these things can be derived a priori from reason, though doing so is outside the scope of this argument. I simply contend that there exist some things outside of our sensible experience which are good for their own sake and not for the pleasure we might gain from them. Thus a good life must contain those things in order to be complete.
Works Cited
Hewitt, Sharon. "What Do Our Intuitions About The Experience Machine Really Tell Us About Hedonism?." Philosophical Studies: An International Journal For Philosophy In The Analytic Tradition 151.3 (2010): 331-349. Philosopher's Index. Web. 25 May 2013.
Inwood, Brad, L.P. Gerson, and D.S. Hutchinson. The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994. Print.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New Jersey: Basic Books (AZ), 1974. Web.
Rosenbaum, Stephen E. "Epicurus On Pleasure And The Complete Life." Monist: An International Quarterly Journal Of General Philosophical Inquiry 73.1 (1990): 21-41. Philosopher's Index. Web. 25 May 2013.
Silverstein, Matthew. "In Defense Of Happiness: A Response To The Experience Machine." Social Theory And Practice: An International And Interdisciplinary Journal Of Social Philosophy 26.2 (2000): 279-300. Philosopher's Index. Web. 25 May 2013.
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It is never considered a good thing to be shameless, since one who knows no shame feels little motivation to restrict his or her actions to meet the standards set by his community or to be polite with his or her words.
Surely Epicurus agrees and avoiding pain encompasses this. In other words, his hedonism includes treating others well to avoid guilt etc.
The sense of achievement in becoming wise is our actual goal, rather than the wisdom itself.
I think you can apply this to most of your counterexamples. A firefighter can easily justify his sacrifice based on his perception of himself as a good person. The pleasure of being a good person means more to him than the risk of pain.
What pleasure does a mother receive in return for the immense pain of childbirth? Should women avoid giving birth in order to avoid the pain? What end does a woman have for giving birth? Needless to say it would be strange if pleasure were her end.
I think the same applies here. There is obviously a massive amount of pleasure to be gained through parenting (and perhaps you can imagine the depression of being childless in a person who wants children - and humans are hardcoded to want children; those who don't (in the appropriate phases of their lives) are exceptions to the rule). In this sense raising children definitely 'has a nature congenial [to us]' and women endure the pain to allow for the pleasures of sex and motherhood.
I do think limiting the pleasures to sense-experiences is far too narrow, but I'm not convinced that Epicurus doesn't include the emotional pleasures that accompany these sensual pleasures. For example, there's not necessarily any pleasure in simply seeing a newborn baby, but knowing that the child is your own, is healthy, etc, turns the medley of colours into something with actual human meaning.
To add to Epicurus' ideas, I'd like to suggest that there is no choice in this lifestyle. That whatever choices you make, you make because they seem to offer the most benefit. If you choose not to eat your favourite food, you're probably doing so a) to avoid the cost (pain) b) to avoid getting fat (pain) c) to avoid looking bad in front of people (pain)
Try to think of a decision in your life where you choose something that isn't the best option. There won't be one, because it is impossible for you to make such a decision (as I see it). If you choose to donate all your money to charity, you do so because you value a generous personality more than you value your money. Even self sacrifice can be justified in this way.
Hope you see this as some interesting input and not a hijacking of your post which I found interesting .
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Epicur and Titus Lucretius Carus are among my favourite philosophers out there Try and read "De rerum natura" of the latter... the way he treats concepts like love as a source of sorrow, the inevitability of death, his "cosmological" thesis and (my favourite) the existential boredom are absolutely staggering.
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On May 27 2013 06:07 bardtown wrote:Show nested quote +It is never considered a good thing to be shameless, since one who knows no shame feels little motivation to restrict his or her actions to meet the standards set by his community or to be polite with his or her words. Surely Epicurus agrees and avoiding pain encompasses this. In other words, his hedonism includes treating others well to avoid guilt etc. Show nested quote +The sense of achievement in becoming wise is our actual goal, rather than the wisdom itself. I think you can apply this to most of your counterexamples. A firefighter can easily justify his sacrifice based on his perception of himself as a good person. The pleasure of being a good person means more to him than the risk of pain. Show nested quote +What pleasure does a mother receive in return for the immense pain of childbirth? Should women avoid giving birth in order to avoid the pain? What end does a woman have for giving birth? Needless to say it would be strange if pleasure were her end. I think the same applies here. There is obviously a massive amount of pleasure to be gained through parenting (and perhaps you can imagine the depression of being childless in a person who wants children - and humans are hardcoded to want children; those who don't (in the appropriate phases of their lives) are exceptions to the rule). In this sense raising children definitely 'has a nature congenial [to us]' and women endure the pain to allow for the pleasures of sex and motherhood. I do think limiting the pleasures to sense-experiences is far too narrow, but I'm not convinced that Epicurus doesn't include the emotional pleasures that accompany these sensual pleasures. For example, there's not necessarily any pleasure in simply seeing a newborn baby, but knowing that the child is your own, is healthy, etc, turns the medley of colours into something with actual human meaning. To add to Epicurus' ideas, I'd like to suggest that there is no choice in this lifestyle. That whatever choices you make, you make because they seem to offer the most benefit. If you choose not to eat your favourite food, you're probably doing so a) to avoid the cost (pain) b) to avoid getting fat (pain) c) to avoid looking bad in front of people (pain) Try to think of a decision in your life where you choose something that isn't the best option. There won't be one, because it is impossible for you to make such a decision (as I see it). If you choose to donate all your money to charity, you do so because you value a generous personality more than you value your money. Even self sacrifice can be justified in this way. Hope you see this as some interesting input and not a hijacking of your post which I found interesting . Of course! Arguing with a philosopher should never be considered a hijacking of his post haha.
So... To your first point: Yes, Epicurus' hedonism does involve treating others well in order to avoid the pain of guilt/shame etc. What I was trying to get across with this, though, is that without feeling that pain of guilt or shame, one might not know if they have accidentally offended somebody. Without knowing that I have offended my friend, I might continue to offend him without knowing it. So pain is useful as a sort of failure detection device, I guess. Since pains like these can be useful, it means that such pains should not be written off as essentially bad, as Epicurus does when he says that "every pain is a bad thing." That whole section of my argument was just to show that pains are not entirely bad by nature since they can be useful to us.
Of course, Epicurus does account for this. I don't have the quote right in front of me, but he does say something to the effect of "not all pains are to be avoided, since feeling small pain now may lead to a pleasure of greater magnitude in the future." Something like that.
As for your second point, I would just say that it is difficult to imagine somebody sacrificing their life for the sake of pleasure. You cannot feel the pleasure of being a good person after having sacrificed yourself for others if you are dead. One might choose to experience physical pain in exchange for emotional pleasure gained by the sense of being a good person, but that argument is not as convincing in the case where you die since you would not feel anything.
This is why I say that the firefighter does not sacrifice his life for the pleasure of doing a good thing. He sacrifices his life for the sake of the good thing since it is good in itself. It is the good that he is after, not the pleasure from sensing the good.
Your third objection is reasonable. I suppose that a mother might endure childbirth for the pleasure gained from parenting, as you say. However, what if we consider a different scenario where the mother dies in childbirth. Perhaps the mother goes into childbirth knowing that she is likely to die (because of some medical condition, perhaps), but she goes through with it anyway. Here, I think I can refer back to my firefighter argument.
For the cases of the firefighter and the mother's death in childbirth, I think it would be important to consider Epicurus' view on the fear of death. This could be a short essay on its own, so I'll just keep it simple to avoid that. Basically, Epicurus thinks that people should not fear death because once you are dead, you feel nothing. You feel no pain from death. He says that death,
while present causes no distress [but] causes unnecessary pain when merely anticipated. So death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist.
So basically he thinks that the fear of death is just a pain that is unnecessary. However, he does say that the wise man "neither rejects life nor fears death." He believes that the best life is the one with the most pleasure, and not necessarily the longest life.
But Epicurus' views on death actually support my position, I think. The supposed pleasure a man gets from sacrificing his life for something good does not exist according to Epicurus, since we feel nothing in death. How can one enjoy the pleasure of being a good person if he does not exist? He does also say that "He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide." Though, this is just a sort of floating maxim of his for which I have no context.
As for your last point, I think I agree that all choices should aim to choose "the best option", as you say. However, I do not agree that what defines "the best option" is the amount of pleasure/pain the choice would involve. While pain/pleasure may be good indicators of what the best option is, in the end, it is reason which ultimately tells us what the best option is, and reason sometimes tells us to do things which our animal nature might disagree with. It is our animal nature which tells us to avoid pain and seek pleasure. It is reason which tells us to seek things outside of our sense-experience. Epicurus tells us that what is not tied to our sense-experience "is nothing to us." Reason is not tied to our sense-experience, but as I say in my write-up, reason is good for its own sake.
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On May 27 2013 07:09 MichaelDonovan wrote:Show nested quote +On May 27 2013 06:07 bardtown wrote:It is never considered a good thing to be shameless, since one who knows no shame feels little motivation to restrict his or her actions to meet the standards set by his community or to be polite with his or her words. Surely Epicurus agrees and avoiding pain encompasses this. In other words, his hedonism includes treating others well to avoid guilt etc. The sense of achievement in becoming wise is our actual goal, rather than the wisdom itself. I think you can apply this to most of your counterexamples. A firefighter can easily justify his sacrifice based on his perception of himself as a good person. The pleasure of being a good person means more to him than the risk of pain. What pleasure does a mother receive in return for the immense pain of childbirth? Should women avoid giving birth in order to avoid the pain? What end does a woman have for giving birth? Needless to say it would be strange if pleasure were her end. I think the same applies here. There is obviously a massive amount of pleasure to be gained through parenting (and perhaps you can imagine the depression of being childless in a person who wants children - and humans are hardcoded to want children; those who don't (in the appropriate phases of their lives) are exceptions to the rule). In this sense raising children definitely 'has a nature congenial [to us]' and women endure the pain to allow for the pleasures of sex and motherhood. I do think limiting the pleasures to sense-experiences is far too narrow, but I'm not convinced that Epicurus doesn't include the emotional pleasures that accompany these sensual pleasures. For example, there's not necessarily any pleasure in simply seeing a newborn baby, but knowing that the child is your own, is healthy, etc, turns the medley of colours into something with actual human meaning. To add to Epicurus' ideas, I'd like to suggest that there is no choice in this lifestyle. That whatever choices you make, you make because they seem to offer the most benefit. If you choose not to eat your favourite food, you're probably doing so a) to avoid the cost (pain) b) to avoid getting fat (pain) c) to avoid looking bad in front of people (pain) Try to think of a decision in your life where you choose something that isn't the best option. There won't be one, because it is impossible for you to make such a decision (as I see it). If you choose to donate all your money to charity, you do so because you value a generous personality more than you value your money. Even self sacrifice can be justified in this way. Hope you see this as some interesting input and not a hijacking of your post which I found interesting . Of course! Arguing with a philosopher should never be considered a hijacking of his post haha. So... To your first point: Yes, Epicurus' hedonism does involve treating others well in order to avoid the pain of guilt/shame etc. What I was trying to get across with this, though, is that without feeling that pain of guilt or shame, one might not know if they have accidentally offended somebody. Without knowing that I have offended my friend, I might continue to offend him without knowing it. So pain is useful as a sort of failure detection device, I guess. Since pains like these can be useful, it means that such pains should not be written off as essentially bad, as Epicurus does when he says that "every pain is a bad thing." That whole section of my argument was just to show that pains are not entirely bad by nature since they can be useful to us. Of course, Epicurus does account for this. I don't have the quote right in front of me, but he does say something to the effect of "not all pains are to be avoided, since feeling small pain now may lead to a pleasure of greater magnitude in the future." Something like that. As for your second point, I would just say that it is difficult to imagine somebody sacrificing their life for the sake of pleasure. You cannot feel the pleasure of being a good person after having sacrificed yourself for others if you are dead. One might choose to experience physical pain in exchange for emotional pleasure gained by the sense of being a good person, but that argument is not as convincing in the case where you die since you would not feel anything. This is why I say that the firefighter does not sacrifice his life for the pleasure of doing a good thing. He sacrifices his life for the sake of the good thing since it is good in itself. It is the good that he is after, not the pleasure from sensing the good. Your third objection is reasonable. I suppose that a mother might endure childbirth for the pleasure gained from parenting, as you say. However, what if we consider a different scenario where the mother dies in childbirth. Perhaps the mother goes into childbirth knowing that she is likely to die (because of some medical condition, perhaps), but she goes through with it anyway. Here, I think I can refer back to my firefighter argument. For the cases of the firefighter and the mother's death in childbirth, I think it would be important to consider Epicurus' view on the fear of death. This could be a short essay on its own, so I'll just keep it simple to avoid that. Basically, Epicurus thinks that people should not fear death because once you are dead, you feel nothing. You feel no pain from death. He says that death, Show nested quote +while present causes no distress [but] causes unnecessary pain when merely anticipated. So death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. So basically he thinks that the fear of death is just a pain that is unnecessary. However, he does say that the wise man "neither rejects life nor fears death." He believes that the best life is the one with the most pleasure, and not necessarily the longest life. But Epicurus' views on death actually support my position, I think. The supposed pleasure a man gets from sacrificing his life for something good does not exist according to Epicurus, since we feel nothing in death. How can one enjoy the pleasure of being a good person if he does not exist? He does also say that "He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide." Though, this is just a sort of floating maxim of his for which I have no context. As for your last point, I think I agree that all choices should aim to choose "the best option", as you say. However, I do not agree that what defines "the best option" is the amount of pleasure/pain the choice would involve. While pain/pleasure may be good indicators of what the best option is, in the end, it is reason which ultimately tells us what the best option is, and reason sometimes tells us to do things which our animal nature might disagree with. It is our animal nature which tells us to avoid pain and seek pleasure. It is reason which tells us to seek things outside of our sense-experience. Epicurus tells us that what is not tied to our sense-experience "is nothing to us." Reason is not tied to our sense-experience, but as I say in my write-up, reason is good for its own sake.
I don't have time to write a long response, but just to make a couple of points. The pleasure of being a good person (in the case of the firefighter) would be experienced prior to and during the act of sacrifice. For example, if you went into the job knowing that if that situation arose you would be happy to give your own life to protect somebody else, then you can take pleasure from that knowledge. Should you then, in that situation, choose to save your own life and let the person in the fire die, you will live the rest of your life with guilt, shame, dishonour - whatever it may be ('pain'). So he indulges in the pleasure of considering himself a good man whilst he is alive, and avoids the pain of living with shame.
I think pleasure/pain are somewhat misleading words because of their regular use. If you included sensations such as cognitive dissonance in your definition of pain, then would you accept the reason chooses based on pleasure/pain? I personally don't think there is anything good in and of itself. Rather, those things which my mind labels 'good' are the things it seeks to attain, and in some cases I will sacrifice one 'good' thing in favour of another (food -> health, money -> gifts and social bonding (life -> honour?)). To do something that isn't 'good' by my minds definition would cause me displeasure, to do something that is good would make me all warm and fuzzy.
Our mind likely has an innate distinction between right and wrong, and the conscience acts to encourage one over the other (pleasure from doing right, pain from doing wrong), with what falls on either side of that distinction being culturally defined. I'm losing my train of thought very rapidly. I'll try and come back tomorrow when I'm not so distracted :p
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Good essay. Well sourced and everything! I will try to make my comments concise.
I think there are a mixture of motivations for "heroic" types, which I think we could also extend to daredevil type people.
Daredevils, I think, do everything purely for the thrill. They aren't thinking long into the future - a lot like teenagers, they perform dangerous pranks because they want fun *now* - conservative, rational thinking about their future is generally not part of their thought process. So in that sense, you could say that many of these people are simply being irrational, and caring more for immediate thrills.
About heros in general: In many interviews with local town heros, you often hear about how these people didn't think at all - they just acted, without any fear for their own personal safety. That is, they care so much about other people that in that immediate moment they don't have time to evaluate the risks, or whether its worth it - all they want to do is save a loved one or an innocent. Given that there is no real time to think at all, I'm not sure this counts as a good example against Epicurean hedonism; again, it seems to be another example of irrationality - except in this form, there is a complete lack of thinking at all.
I think this extends to firefighters as well - except we also have to note that in many cases, firefighters are only risking their lives - maybe to them there is a 10% risk, or maybe a 20 to 30% risk - but even in those cases, they may still value the incredibly gratifying feeling of saving others more than the risk of death. They are well-trained after all, and have protection and comrades who will help them if they get stuck.
In cases where you see firefighters take enormous risk though...just like with the hometown hero who charges into a blazing building without any fire equipment, I think we could say that they are acting irrationally.
If you could objectively show a fireman/hero, in a snapshot moment, all of the lives that they could save from other burning buildings if they stayed alive, combined with all of the amazing things that they could do, and compare that with the few lives they might save by going into an extremely dangerous area - I think they would choose the latter. Assuming that there aren't firefighters to replace him/her - who would want to save less lives? Its like if you have a lever that either kills one person or ten people...if you had to pull it, you would opt for one.
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On your other points...such as deciding on whether or not to be a dog. I think rational capacity is, as you noted earlier, something which we desire because its necessary for us to enjoy the finer parts of life. As you put it: Epicurus might object though, that things like knowledge/wisdom and achievement only serve to bring us more pleasure
So then this reasoning also applies to things like achievement, wisdom, a goal to strive for, as all of these bring us more pleasure, and are therefore important. Now I also have some real issues with the idea that the Pythagorean Theorem is formulated completely a priori. To say that before *all* experience, we could know these mathematical truths is a stretch to me. We must think what "a priori" truly means here - before any and all experience. If you were born as a baby, and were completed deprived of any sense experience, would you be able to formulate the concept of a "line"? Of "distance", or "space"? Hume is very convincing in arguing that a man who is blind from birth would have no notion of colour.
But anyway, I agree with Kant in that there must exist certain a priori "Categories of the Understanding" which enable us to experience the world - some foundational rules that determine how we can, at the very foundation of our mind, *experience reality*. This is beyond sense experience. And THIS you could argue, is something which is good and necessary, but does not arise from sense-perceptions.
But I'm not sure if you can really say you've defeated Epicurean hedonism - at most you would require epicurus to modify his thesis. He could very easily say that there exist other things beyond our sense-perceptions, but ultimately, the only thing that matters is that we feel pleasure from them, directly OR indirectly. So then the categories of the understanding, and similar a priori concepts, are necessarily good because they allow us to feel pleasure in experience by allowing us to experience things in the first place. So then the hedonistic argument works as before...but modified slightly.
But besides this I'm not sure that the ending of your essay holds; it seems as if you just postulated that "knowledge for its own sake" is good without really backing up why, so I'm not sure if there is really any argument there! Certainly you seem convinced that it is possible, but I think you could make a very reasonable argument that the only motivation we have for wanting to maintain our reason, our freedom, our knowledge, is because all of those things in turn allow us to feel good in various ways by making it possible to feel good.
Edit: If you're reading this I finished my last edit. They were mostly small though! Edit2: Going to play some natural selection 2. I hope I posted good food for thought, may be back much later!
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On May 27 2013 08:34 bardtown wrote:Show nested quote +On May 27 2013 07:09 MichaelDonovan wrote:On May 27 2013 06:07 bardtown wrote:It is never considered a good thing to be shameless, since one who knows no shame feels little motivation to restrict his or her actions to meet the standards set by his community or to be polite with his or her words. Surely Epicurus agrees and avoiding pain encompasses this. In other words, his hedonism includes treating others well to avoid guilt etc. The sense of achievement in becoming wise is our actual goal, rather than the wisdom itself. I think you can apply this to most of your counterexamples. A firefighter can easily justify his sacrifice based on his perception of himself as a good person. The pleasure of being a good person means more to him than the risk of pain. What pleasure does a mother receive in return for the immense pain of childbirth? Should women avoid giving birth in order to avoid the pain? What end does a woman have for giving birth? Needless to say it would be strange if pleasure were her end. I think the same applies here. There is obviously a massive amount of pleasure to be gained through parenting (and perhaps you can imagine the depression of being childless in a person who wants children - and humans are hardcoded to want children; those who don't (in the appropriate phases of their lives) are exceptions to the rule). In this sense raising children definitely 'has a nature congenial [to us]' and women endure the pain to allow for the pleasures of sex and motherhood. I do think limiting the pleasures to sense-experiences is far too narrow, but I'm not convinced that Epicurus doesn't include the emotional pleasures that accompany these sensual pleasures. For example, there's not necessarily any pleasure in simply seeing a newborn baby, but knowing that the child is your own, is healthy, etc, turns the medley of colours into something with actual human meaning. To add to Epicurus' ideas, I'd like to suggest that there is no choice in this lifestyle. That whatever choices you make, you make because they seem to offer the most benefit. If you choose not to eat your favourite food, you're probably doing so a) to avoid the cost (pain) b) to avoid getting fat (pain) c) to avoid looking bad in front of people (pain) Try to think of a decision in your life where you choose something that isn't the best option. There won't be one, because it is impossible for you to make such a decision (as I see it). If you choose to donate all your money to charity, you do so because you value a generous personality more than you value your money. Even self sacrifice can be justified in this way. Hope you see this as some interesting input and not a hijacking of your post which I found interesting . Of course! Arguing with a philosopher should never be considered a hijacking of his post haha. So... To your first point: Yes, Epicurus' hedonism does involve treating others well in order to avoid the pain of guilt/shame etc. What I was trying to get across with this, though, is that without feeling that pain of guilt or shame, one might not know if they have accidentally offended somebody. Without knowing that I have offended my friend, I might continue to offend him without knowing it. So pain is useful as a sort of failure detection device, I guess. Since pains like these can be useful, it means that such pains should not be written off as essentially bad, as Epicurus does when he says that "every pain is a bad thing." That whole section of my argument was just to show that pains are not entirely bad by nature since they can be useful to us. Of course, Epicurus does account for this. I don't have the quote right in front of me, but he does say something to the effect of "not all pains are to be avoided, since feeling small pain now may lead to a pleasure of greater magnitude in the future." Something like that. As for your second point, I would just say that it is difficult to imagine somebody sacrificing their life for the sake of pleasure. You cannot feel the pleasure of being a good person after having sacrificed yourself for others if you are dead. One might choose to experience physical pain in exchange for emotional pleasure gained by the sense of being a good person, but that argument is not as convincing in the case where you die since you would not feel anything. This is why I say that the firefighter does not sacrifice his life for the pleasure of doing a good thing. He sacrifices his life for the sake of the good thing since it is good in itself. It is the good that he is after, not the pleasure from sensing the good. Your third objection is reasonable. I suppose that a mother might endure childbirth for the pleasure gained from parenting, as you say. However, what if we consider a different scenario where the mother dies in childbirth. Perhaps the mother goes into childbirth knowing that she is likely to die (because of some medical condition, perhaps), but she goes through with it anyway. Here, I think I can refer back to my firefighter argument. For the cases of the firefighter and the mother's death in childbirth, I think it would be important to consider Epicurus' view on the fear of death. This could be a short essay on its own, so I'll just keep it simple to avoid that. Basically, Epicurus thinks that people should not fear death because once you are dead, you feel nothing. You feel no pain from death. He says that death, while present causes no distress [but] causes unnecessary pain when merely anticipated. So death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. So basically he thinks that the fear of death is just a pain that is unnecessary. However, he does say that the wise man "neither rejects life nor fears death." He believes that the best life is the one with the most pleasure, and not necessarily the longest life. But Epicurus' views on death actually support my position, I think. The supposed pleasure a man gets from sacrificing his life for something good does not exist according to Epicurus, since we feel nothing in death. How can one enjoy the pleasure of being a good person if he does not exist? He does also say that "He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide." Though, this is just a sort of floating maxim of his for which I have no context. As for your last point, I think I agree that all choices should aim to choose "the best option", as you say. However, I do not agree that what defines "the best option" is the amount of pleasure/pain the choice would involve. While pain/pleasure may be good indicators of what the best option is, in the end, it is reason which ultimately tells us what the best option is, and reason sometimes tells us to do things which our animal nature might disagree with. It is our animal nature which tells us to avoid pain and seek pleasure. It is reason which tells us to seek things outside of our sense-experience. Epicurus tells us that what is not tied to our sense-experience "is nothing to us." Reason is not tied to our sense-experience, but as I say in my write-up, reason is good for its own sake. I don't have time to write a long response, but just to make a couple of points. The pleasure of being a good person (in the case of the firefighter) would be experienced prior to and during the act of sacrifice. For example, if you went into the job knowing that if that situation arose you would be happy to give your own life to protect somebody else, then you can take pleasure from that knowledge. Should you then, in that situation, choose to save your own life and let the person in the fire die, you will live the rest of your life with guilt, shame, dishonour - whatever it may be ('pain'). So he indulges in the pleasure of considering himself a good man whilst he is alive, and avoids the pain of living with shame. I think pleasure/pain are somewhat misleading words because of their regular use. If you included sensations such as cognitive dissonance in your definition of pain, then would you accept the reason chooses based on pleasure/pain? I personally don't think there is anything good in and of itself. Rather, those things which my mind labels 'good' are the things it seeks to attain, and in some cases I will sacrifice one 'good' thing in favour of another (food -> health, money -> gifts and social bonding (life -> honour?)). To do something that isn't 'good' by my minds definition would cause me displeasure, to do something that is good would make me all warm and fuzzy. Our mind likely has an innate distinction between right and wrong, and the conscience acts to encourage one over the other (pleasure from doing right, pain from doing wrong), with what falls on either side of that distinction being culturally defined. I'm losing my train of thought very rapidly. I'll try and come back tomorrow when I'm not so distracted :p
Hmm I feel we might be starting to stray away from Epicurus now. The kind of hedonism you are describing is different from the Epicurean variety, I think. Remember that Epicurus defines pleasure simply as the absence of pain. Pleasure itself has no positive value for Epicurus because it has this negative definition. Also recall that Epicurus believes that all good and bad consists in our sense experience, and what has no sense-experience "is nothing to us." Also, Epicurus has famously been quoted as having said "I spit upon the honorable and on those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure." Sacrificing your life for honor or something like that would be a prime target for the spit of Epicurus, it seems.
When you say that doing something good "makes you feel warm and fuzzy", I think you are no longer talking about the Epicurean definition of pleasure.
Also I see a possible contradiction in your last paragraph there. You say that our mind has and "innate" distinction between right and wrong, but then you say that what falls on either side of that distinction is "culturally defined." The idea of a priori morality is really not compatible with cultural relativism, since things that are innate are innate to all. I feel your last paragraph probably just needs to be explained further, but again, we would be drifting away from Epicurean hedonism.
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On May 27 2013 08:52 radscorpion9 wrote:Good essay. Well sourced and everything! I will try to make my comments concise. I think there are a mixture of motivations for "heroic" types, which I think we could also extend to daredevil type people. Daredevils, I think, do everything purely for the thrill. They aren't thinking long into the future - a lot like teenagers, they perform dangerous pranks because they want fun *now* - conservative, rational thinking about their future is generally not part of their thought process. So in that sense, you could say that many of these people are simply being irrational, and caring more for immediate thrills. About heros in general: In many interviews with local town heros, you often hear about how these people didn't think at all - they just acted, without any fear for their own personal safety. That is, they care so much about other people that in that immediate moment they don't have time to evaluate the risks, or whether its worth it - all they want to do is save a loved one or an innocent. Given that there is no real time to think at all, I'm not sure this counts as a good example against Epicurean hedonism; again, it seems to be another example of irrationality - except in this form, there is a complete lack of thinking at all. I think this extends to firefighters as well - except we also have to note that in many cases, firefighters are only risking their lives - maybe to them there is a 10% risk, or maybe a 20 to 30% risk - but even in those cases, they may still value the incredibly gratifying feeling of saving others more than the risk of death. They are well-trained after all, and have protection and comrades who will help them if they get stuck. In cases where you see firefighters take enormous risk though...just like with the hometown hero who charges into a blazing building without any fire equipment, I think we could say that they are acting irrationally. If you could objectively show a fireman/hero, in a snapshot moment, all of the lives that they could save from other burning buildings if they stayed alive, combined with all of the amazing things that they could do, and compare that with the few lives they might save by going into an extremely dangerous area - I think they would choose the latter. Assuming that there aren't firefighters to replace him/her - who would want to save less lives? Its like if you have a lever that either kills one person or ten people...if you had to pull it, you would opt for one. - - - On your other points...such as deciding on whether or not to be a dog. I think rational capacity is, as you noted earlier, something which we desire because its necessary for us to enjoy the finer parts of life. As you put it: Show nested quote +Epicurus might object though, that things like knowledge/wisdom and achievement only serve to bring us more pleasure So then this reasoning also applies to things like achievement, wisdom, a goal to strive for, as all of these bring us more pleasure, and are therefore important. Now I also have some real issues with the idea that the Pythagorean Theorem is formulated completely a priori. To say that before *all* experience, we could know these mathematical truths is a stretch to me. We must think what "a priori" truly means here - before any and all experience. If you were born as a baby, and were completed deprived of any sense experience, would you be able to formulate the concept of a "line"? Of "distance", or "space"? Hume is very convincing in arguing that a man who is blind from birth would have no notion of colour. But anyway, I agree with Kant in that there must exist certain a priori "Categories of the Understanding" which enable us to experience the world - some foundational rules that determine how we can, at the very foundation of our mind, *experience reality*. This is beyond sense experience. And THIS you could argue, is something which is good and necessary, but does not arise from sense-perceptions. But I'm not sure if you can really say you've defeated Epicurean hedonism - at most you would require epicurus to modify his thesis. He could very easily say that there exist other things beyond our sense-perceptions, but ultimately, the only thing that matters is that we feel pleasure from them, directly OR indirectly. So then the categories of the understanding, and similar a priori concepts, are necessarily good because they allow us to feel pleasure in experience by allowing us to experience things in the first place. So then the hedonistic argument works as before...but modified slightly. So thus the ending of your essay doesn't really hold; and to be frank it seems as if you just postulated that "knowledge for its own sake" is good without really backing up why, so I'm not sure if there is really any argument there! Certainly you seem convinced that it is possible, but I think you could make a very reasonable argument that the only motivation we have for wanting to maintain our reason, our freedom, our knowledge, is because all of those things in turn allow us to feel good in various ways by making it possible to feel good.
Ahh yes I should say that I was not trying to decisively defeat Epicurean hedonism with this essay. It's just a commentary really. I do have an argument, but it's not a super strong one. Just kind of poking at the topic a bit for fun.
You say that I just made the claim that knowledge for its own sake is good without supporting that claim. You would be right! I believe I did mention that actually proving that knowledge is good for its own sake is outside the scope of my discussion at some point in there... It's mostly out of laziness, since I would have to write a whole book about it probably.
I did give a tiny argument for why I think reason is good for its own sake, though, but it really just appeals to our sensibilities, so it's not any more conclusive than Nozick's argument. I said that we would not choose to be a dog because it would mean giving up our rationality. Even if being a dog meant living a life of pure pleasure without a care in the world, we would not do it because we would not want to lose our rational capacity. This is why I say that reason is good for its own sake and not for the sake of pleasure.
Of course, this isn't a sufficient argument since it hinges on people actually not choosing to be a dog. It wouldn't convince anyone who would choose to become a dog. And, as I said of Nozick's argument, simply appealing to our feelings about things is never enough to constitute an argument.
As for the whole Pythagorean theorem bit... The truth of the theorem IS a priori. It does not matter how it was formulated, and it does not matter if we could not understand it without some kind of picture of it (sense-experience). Whether we actually know the theorem or not, it is true. Whether we even have a concept of triangles or not, the theorem is true. This is what I mean when I say that the Pythagorean theorem is a priori. Things which are a priori can only be derived from reason. We cannot derive anything from experience, since experience is merely phenomenal. That's the way I'm looking at it anyway. Does that make sense?
Edit: Also I'm sorry I posted this response before your final edit! If there's any inconsistencies as a result, then I hope you'll forgive me. Thanks for the response too. This stuff is fun to think about.
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I thought the essay was quite ok. Curious as to why you would pick on poor Epicurus (whose views come attached to all sorts of funkiness, including his definition of pleasure as the absence of pain) instead of more modern forms of hedonism, which are imo a bit more relevant and come with fewer strings attached. In fact, I think one could even interpret Epicurus in a way critical to the modern conception, but that's just a sidebar.
The minor issues about the essay revolve mostly around the fact that you have Epicurus define pleasure as the absence of pain, but then go on to devote a lot of space to a discussion of pleasure as such, i.e. that positive state of mind and so forth. Besides that, there is one issue with your essay that is a bit more significant though:
However, the idea that the end of every human action is pleasure, and that even ends which are only intelligibly good are strived for out of a desire for the pleasurable satisfaction from having achieved them, is problematic
This statement doesn't follow from what you said in the previous paragraph and is also not what Epicurus is trying to say. He's not saying that we always -do- go for pleasure (i.e. the end of every action is pleasure), he says that we -ought to- do that; with other words, Epicurus is about ethical hedonism (what we ought to do, namely go for pleasure) rather than psychological hedonism (what we always do, which might or might not be going for pleasure).
Incidentally, the discussion that follows, namely the one about the firefighter undergoing suffering to save a child, can actually be used to argue against ethical hedonism, even though it wasn't formulated as such: The issue here is what role morality plays within an Epicurean account of the good life, i.e. suffering might in certain circumstances be morally (not just instrumentally) valuable or necessary. So if those two things clash, which one ought we to pursue?
I believe Epicurus would probably have an answer for that, but that would require me to go through his works, which I honestly do not really have the time for. Kant and the utilitarians at least do go for somesort of account that prioritizes morality over personal well-being, with the two things, namely personal well-being and morality, seemingly distinct. Aristotle would say morality and well-being are coextensive with one another, which I believe to be a virtue of his account, but that's a bit off-topic as well.
As for an actual objection to what you wrote: You say that there might be non-mental conditions that are valuable to us, i.e. whether or not an experience is real, but what if I claim that the world determines my mental content (externalism in philosophy of mind) and thus the experience of really doing x and apparently doing x are quite different, even though they seem the same 'from the inside'? That would bypass the experience machine quite well.
The other answer to the experience machine, namely propositional hedonism, doesn't quite work within an Epicurean account because of the way Epicurus defines pleasure. But so be it.
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On May 27 2013 17:04 Sauwelios wrote:I thought the essay was quite ok. Curious as to why you would pick on poor Epicurus (whose views come attached to all sorts of funkiness, including his definition of pleasure as the absence of pain) instead of more modern forms of hedonism, which are imo a bit more relevant and come with fewer strings attached. In fact, I think one could even interpret Epicurus in a way critical to the modern conception, but that's just a sidebar. The minor issues about the essay revolve mostly around the fact that you have Epicurus define pleasure as the absence of pain, but then go on to devote a lot of space to a discussion of pleasure as such, i.e. that positive state of mind and so forth. Besides that, there is one issue with your essay that is a bit more significant though: Show nested quote +However, the idea that the end of every human action is pleasure, and that even ends which are only intelligibly good are strived for out of a desire for the pleasurable satisfaction from having achieved them, is problematic This statement doesn't follow from what you said in the previous paragraph and is also not what Epicurus is trying to say. He's not saying that we always -do- go for pleasure (i.e. the end of every action is pleasure), he says that we -ought to- do that; with other words, Epicurus is about ethical hedonism (what we ought to do, namely go for pleasure) rather than psychological hedonism (what we always do, which might or might not be going for pleasure). Incidentally, the discussion that follows, namely the one about the firefighter undergoing suffering to save a child, can actually be used to argue against ethical hedonism, even though it wasn't formulated as such: The issue here is what role morality plays within an Epicurean account of the good life, i.e. suffering might in certain circumstances be morally (not just instrumentally) valuable or necessary. So if those two things clash, which one ought we to pursue? I believe Epicurus would probably have an answer for that, but that would require me to go through his works, which I honestly do not really have the time for. Kant and the utilitarians at least do go for somesort of account that prioritizes morality over personal well-being, with the two things, namely personal well-being and morality, seemingly distinct. Aristotle would say morality and well-being are coextensive with one another, which I believe to be a virtue of his account, but that's a bit off-topic as well. As for an actual objection to what you wrote: You say that there might be non-mental conditions that are valuable to us, i.e. whether or not an experience is real, but what if I claim that the world determines my mental content (externalism in philosophy of mind) and thus the experience of really doing x and apparently doing x are quite different, even though they seem the same 'from the inside'? That would bypass the experience machine quite well. The other answer to the experience machine, namely propositional hedonism, doesn't quite work within an Epicurean account because of the way Epicurus defines pleasure. But so be it.
Thanks for your response.
It is actually a matter of debate as to what type of hedonist Epicurus was. This is something that I looked at briefly. Again, I just kind of whipped this essay up for the fun of it, so I didn't spend a whole lot of time researching all the little things. This is also why I chose to pick on Epicurus instead of a more modern hedonist, too. He seemed like the most fun to play with.
I think that there is a reasonable amount of evidence for both psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism in the writings of Epicurus. You may be interested in this discussion:
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4182759?uid=3739960&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102260514911
In any case, I'm not entirely convinced that Epicurus was an ethical hedonist, though I should say that I'm also not entirely convinced that he was a psychological hedonist. I would have to spend more time on it to really be sure about it. But you are right. If indeed Epicurus was an ethical hedonist, then some of my statements may have been unfair to him.
As for your objection to the experience machine, I think that is one of many reasonable objections to Nozick's argument. I would say, though, that experience and sense-experience are probably different. If I were to accept your proposition that a real experience and a fake one are different experiences even if they seem the same from the inside, it may not entirely refute Nozick's argument since we are talking about sense-experience specifically.
Externalism requires that the actual experience we are having is not entirely determined by what we can sense from the inside. However, I think this may not refute the experience machine argument if we only use it to suggest that sense-experience is not all-important, as Nozick does. This is because sense-experience cannot possibly be determined externally since our senses are not. So even if our experience is different according to your proposition, my response is that our sense-experience would not be different. And since Epicurus believes that "what has no sense-experience is nothing to us", I think Nozick's thought experiment still works, even if we accept the externalist view.
edit: (This is kind of shaky, though. It kind of depends on what kind of externalist you ask about this. One might disagree with me when I say that sense-experience is not externally determined, so I guess I would have more work to do in order to convince him.)
Just a quick note on your mentioning of Kant as well: Kant believes that we have a moral obligation to promote our own well-being. We have duties to ourselves which include the maintenance of our bodies and minds as moral agents. So I don't think it's fair to say that he prioritizes morality over well-being necessarily, though that's a separate discussion entirely.
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This essay lacks a central idea that you introduce and conclude, however i still believe it is an effective piece of philosophy. While reading I thought, "yes of course we try to optimize our pleasure, what else is there to do, i mean all we ever have is thoughts, emotions and sensations" but then the thought experiment with the pleasure machine really tested that opinion. I definitely do want more than just the feeling of doing something. I want to know that my actions have meaning to someone else. It is true that i want reality. What the fuuuuck, you know?? I want reality just for its own sake and that's kind of weird... because i thought i only wanted pleasure, but no i want... real life. This is because it has meaning just by itself. Very nice. very nice.. You could fix the paper.
Another thought I have is that i believe pleasure requires pain to exist, just like heat needs cold or light needs darkness.I strongly believe the only way to know pleasure is to know pain because the absence of either is nothingness which one cannot know.
Finally, I found the part about dogs presumptuous. When did you live as a dog? Dogs do not want to just sit and eat all day, have you ever seen how excited a dog is to go out for a walk? Have you seen him mark his territory with his piss? Have you seen him gnaw and hide his bone? Even purely instinctual beings are not hedonists, they get pleasure from the hunt. Look at the lifelessness of a tiger on a chain.
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Well, it's true that he might or might not have been a psychological hedonist after all, but even if he were, you do see how the statement I quoted kinda doesn't follow from what you talked about before, right? There's a bit of a break there, so you gotta watch out for that next time.
And yeah, you've already identified the objection to your answer to the externalist argument: The point of externalism is that all mental content is determined by the external world. A potential criticism of that could be something along the lines of arguing that if all mental content is determined by the world, why should not the value of my experiences be determined by the external world as well?
My point about the priority of morality (in Kant and basically everyone else) was the idea that if happiness were to require you to act badly in a situation, that happiness would have to be sacrificed.
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On May 28 2013 04:42 Japhybaby wrote: This essay lacks a central idea that you introduce and conclude, however i still believe it is an effective piece of philosophy. While reading I thought, "yes of course we try to optimize our pleasure, what else is there to do, i mean all we ever have is thoughts, emotions and sensations" but then the thought experiment with the pleasure machine really tested that opinion. I definitely do want more than just the feeling of doing something. I want to know that my actions have meaning to someone else. It is true that i want reality. What the fuuuuck, you know?? I want reality just for its own sake and that's kind of weird... because i thought i only wanted pleasure, but no i want... real life. This is because it has meaning just by itself. Very nice. very nice.. You could fix the paper.
Another thought I have is that i believe pleasure requires pain to exist, just like heat needs cold or light needs darkness.I strongly believe the only way to know pleasure is to know pain because the absence of either is nothingness which one cannot know.
Finally, I found the part about dogs presumptuous. When did you live as a dog? Dogs do not want to just sit and eat all day, have you ever seen how excited a dog is to go out for a walk? Have you seen him mark his territory with his piss? Have you seen him gnaw and hide his bone? Even purely instinctual beings are not hedonists, they get pleasure from the hunt. Look at the lifelessness of a tiger on a chain.
Way to stand up for the dog community. I feel they lack defenders these days. I apologize to any dogs I may have offended.
Edit: Also, I'm glad you liked the experience machine thing. I think it's good way to tell us that sense-experience probably isn't the only thing that matters to us. But of course, it can't be used to prove that to be the case. It's also a bit ambiguous to say that sense-experience isn't the only thing that "matters" to us. What does it mean for something to "matter" to us? That's something to think about I guess.
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On May 28 2013 06:05 Sauwelios wrote: Well, it's true that he might or might not have been a psychological hedonist after all, but even if he were, you do see how the statement I quoted kinda doesn't follow from what you talked about before, right? There's a bit of a break there, so you gotta watch out for that next time.
And yeah, you've already identified the objection to your answer to the externalist argument: The point of externalism is that all mental content is determined by the external world. A potential criticism of that could be something along the lines of arguing that if all mental content is determined by the world, why should not the value of my experiences be determined by the external world as well?
My point about the priority of morality (in Kant and basically everyone else) was the idea that if happiness were to require you to act badly in a situation, that happiness would have to be sacrificed.
Cool. I understand what you're getting at. Thanks for the feedback :D
Edit: Hmm.. I do think that my statement does follow from the previous paragraph though. Maybe not super smoothly, but I think it does. I'm talking about Epicurus spitting on those who try to be honorable and do good things whenever it produces no pleasure at the end of the previous paragraph. Then I say that the idea that the end of every action is pleasure is problematic. I do see a small disconnect where the previous sentence makes Epicurus seem like an ethical hedonist and then the statement you quoted makes him seem like a psychological hedonist. I suppose I could revise it to say something like "The idea that the end of every human action should be pleasure is problematic." Then there wouldn't be such a disconnect. But I guess I'll just leave it as it is so others can see my failure.
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Yes, but the whole paragraph would have to be rewritten to turn it into an argument against ethical rather than psychological hedonism. The rest is fine though.
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On May 28 2013 07:03 Sauwelios wrote: Yes, but the whole paragraph would have to be rewritten to turn it into an argument against ethical rather than psychological hedonism. The rest is fine though. Yeah. I gotcha.
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I'm actually getting some reasonable feedback here on TL... I have to admit I didn't expect much. Maybe I'll write some more essays on here if I feel like it.
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