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On July 12 2023 22:40 {CC}StealthBlue wrote: edit: Seems that the US is adjusting its' message regarding Ukraine and NATO after the fallout of what Biden said.
Compared to WWI, the Russo-Ukrainian War is much smaller in scale. At Verdun, the German plan was to fire 300,000 artillery shells per day for the first week and 150,000 shells per day for the second week (). Compare that to the estimate of 20,000 shells per day from Russia and 5,000 per day from Ukraine (two sources from "russia ukraine shells per day" search). The sustained number of shells per day over 10 months seems be around 167,000 shells per day too, from russia at verdun. The number of soldiers was also much larger, at 5x to 8x for Russia, for the whole army.
A first question is, why don't both sides deploy more soldiers. From reading articles, the Ukrainian military command say they don't need more soldiers; Russia could also add 1 or 2 million more soldiers but hasn't done so beyond their ~1 million. I think this is because more under-trained soldiers don't translate to much more combat effectiveness, but does mean more deaths. From Ukraine's point of view, they're trying to win the war with least casualties, and a longer but much slower war might be the way. One of the lessons of WWI trench warfare was 'defense in depth', where your forces are spread out over multiple defense lines, rather than the naive strategy of bunching all the foot soldier at the front line, which concentrates fire power but gets shredded by AoE. I haven't done the calculations or further research, but maybe the optimal riflemen density over the whole battle line is already achieved with current forces; or more likely, you don't even want infantry + trenches in many places but instead a more mobile force (mechanized or combined arms) when on the offensive.
A second question is, what are the implications for the length and pace of the war? I think a crucial factor is that compared to WWI, this war is not so much a total war. We don't have a large percentage of Ukrainian citizens working in munitions factories; like, it's not >10%, when in theory ~50% is possible. Compared to WWI, when during Verdun and Somme the nature of trench warfare was not understood, both sides have that knowledge, leading to less of a skill gap and a longer war. I thought about comments here saying that it (the current Ukrainian offensive) might be like the end of WWI, in 1918, when the allies were on the offensive for months before a breakthrough. But that was at the end of the war, and there were years of stalemate before that. I found it surprising from the video that April 1916, even before the German offensive at Verdun and the Allies offensive at Somme happened, the German military strategists were aware that they would lose a protracted war of attrition, and hence had to make a breakthrough and win the war 'soon'. If we try to do a same calculation on the balance of material today, I think the result will be that American stockpiles and production are greater than Russian stockpiles and production. (Edit: I mean to claim that war materials that Americans are willing to supply are (will be) greater than all of Russia stockpiles and production. Not sure if this is true.) This isn't common knowledge, thought I feel it should be. The modern calculation is obfuscated by US shells being less in numbers and more accurate, as well as one side having HIMARS which is more of a quality advantage than a numerical advantage. Hence, from these two factors, the lack of a total war, and attrition being on Ukraine's side, I think the war will last longer. Previously I predicted that the chance of a Ukrainian breakthrough to slice Russia-held territory into two pieces was 50% by the end of this year; I'll update to 25% chance by 31 Dec 2023. The crowd prediction on a prediction website was well ahead of me on this, with their prediction at 30% since February and 20% now.
For Russia its not just more soldiers being inexperienced but supplies are also a major part. It takes a lot of logistics to feed an army. You can't just add 100.000 more soldiers to the front lines if you can't feed them.
On July 14 2023 19:30 Gorsameth wrote: For Russia its not just more soldiers being inexperienced but supplies are also a major part. It takes a lot of logistics to feed an army. You can't just add 100.000 more soldiers to the front lines if you can't feed them.
Exactly. And in addition to the logistics, you also need stuff. Modern warfare is a lot more about stuff than about people.
Three guys in a tank are orders of magnitude more dangerous than three guys with rifles, which are still a lot more dangerous than three naked guys.
People are important, of course, but industrial production is even more important.
Artillery today is considerably more precise with satellite and drone imagery. You want as few people as possible on each section of front, enough to shoot at anyone trying to advance but not enough to be a good target for a strike. That is what both sides have realized, putting more men in one spot doesn’t do anything but increase your losses. If every day both sides lose 0.5% of the men on the combat line, no matter what, then the optimal attrition strategy is to have as few of your men on the combat line as possible.
This could potentially be spicy, but also perhaps not. For those with bad memories (Like myself), Belarus had a pretty massive demonstration in 2020, after Lukashenko rigged the election in his favor (After arresting his opposition leader in the middle of the election, needing his wife to take over and continue). Russian soldiers had to rush in to save their puppet from being overthrown, which are now being pulled back. Unfortunately, it seems this correlates with Wagner soldiers, who have been spotted moving towards Belarus. So it could just be part of the deal between Prigozhin, Lukashenko and Putin, where Wagner will now operate out of Belarus instead of Russia.
It says they are burying their dead. Drinking a bit of alcohol - not a lot, though - is a tradition in this situation for many Slavic cultures. It's not surprising, but not in a sense "ahaha, we always knew Russians are alcoholics" but in a sense "yeah, it's a tradition".
On July 14 2023 19:17 datscilly wrote: Compared to WWI, the Russo-Ukrainian War is much smaller in scale. At Verdun, the German plan was to fire 300,000 artillery shells per day for the first week and 150,000 shells per day for the second week (https://youtu.be/UBuViX-FKoE?t=1025). Compare that to the estimate of 20,000 shells per day from Russia and 5,000 per day from Ukraine (two sources from "russia ukraine shells per day" search). The sustained number of shells per day over 10 months seems be around 167,000 shells per day too, from russia at verdun.
"from russia at verdun"?. But the main problem is that people tend to forget that during WW1 and even WW2 caliber of artillery in general was much smaller. The mainstay were 75-84mm field guns, and hundreds of millions shells fired is mainly their doing. But their shells, including charges, were around 8-10 kg. Mainstay in both Western and Russian armies is 152/155mm caliber now with total weight of the shell around 70 kg. Here are the numbers of total British munitions spent during WW1: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/firepower/firepower-14-new-technology-munitions-fuses-and-production-for-artillery-in-ww1/ I've calculated the total weigth of the ordnance, and it amounted to 2.5 million tons for 4,3 years, so around 580 000 tons a year. If we compare the average number to the mentioned average expenditure of 20 000 shells a day by Russia with an average weith of 70 kg (152-mm shell+charge) - will give 365*70*20000/1000 - 511 000 tons a year. Not that big of a difference.
On July 14 2023 19:17 datscilly wrote: The number of soldiers was also much larger, at 5x to 8x for Russia, for the whole army.
A first question is, why don't both sides deploy more soldiers. From reading articles, the Ukrainian military command say they don't need more soldiers; Russia could also add 1 or 2 million more soldiers but hasn't done so beyond their ~1 million.
Because armies now are much more complex than in WW1. In WW1 you would give an infantry battalion rifles, uniform, provisions, rifle ammo and grenades, maybe some MGs, binos and mortars. Now each battalion needs in additon dozens of IFV's/APCs, comms, drones, individual protection, ATGMs, MANPADs, optics etc. etc. And I'm not even going on higher level. Technology now allows to kill masses of poorly equippled infantry in thousands, that's what US showed in Iraq. Only hope for poorly equipped infantry is guerilla warfare in difficult terrain, and that's what it generally tries to do after WW2 (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Chechnya). Both sides are limited by their techical and logistical capacities.
On July 14 2023 19:17 datscilly wrote: From Ukraine's point of view, they're trying to win the war with least casualties
Nope.
On July 14 2023 19:17 datscilly wrote: and a longer but much slower war might be the way. One of the lessons of WWI trench warfare was 'defense in depth', where your forces are spread out over multiple defense lines, rather than the naive strategy of bunching all the foot soldier at the front line, which concentrates fire power but gets shredded by AoE. I haven't done the calculations or further research, but maybe the optimal riflemen density over the whole battle line is already achieved with current forces; or more likely, you don't even want infantry + trenches in many places but instead a more mobile force (mechanized or combined arms) when on the offensive.
No, you do. Lack of such lead to Russian collapse near Balakleya, because the line there was held by underequipped DPR reservists with like a squad per km of the front. After Russia filled the ranks with mobilized Ukraine wasn't able to achieve anything even close to that. Boots on the ground still matter and will be in forseeable future, especially when they alone have much longer arms than before (ATGMs, MANPADs, mortars with UAV correction, FPV drones - all that on a battalion, or even company level). As I've said before, main limit is supplies and equipment.
On July 14 2023 19:17 datscilly wrote: A second question is, what are the implications for the length and pace of the war? I think a crucial factor is that compared to WWI, this war is not so much a total war. We don't have a large percentage of Ukrainian citizens working in munitions factories; like, it's not >10%, when in theory ~50% is possible. Compared to WWI, when during Verdun and Somme the nature of trench warfare was not understood, both sides have that knowledge, leading to less of a skill gap and a longer war. I thought about comments here saying that it (the current Ukrainian offensive) might be like the end of WWI, in 1918, when the allies were on the offensive for months before a breakthrough. But that was at the end of the war, and there were years of stalemate before that.
It isn't a total war, I agree, but the reason for the lack of industy and population shift to wartime production is also that industries became much more specialized and complex. You can' no longer produce tanks on automobile plant, or rifle rounds on cigarette factory. There is also question of costs and means of production, like production areas, necessary materiel, equipment and qualified personnel. For aforementioned reasons, it's now much harder to come by. And this war is far from being correctly understood. This is basically first near-peer war where both sides use the most of the current technological advancements. Generally after WW2 only one side posessed definite tech advantage (that being Israel, UK, US or USSR, and neither of those entered in direct conflict with each other). Reasons for stalemate in WW1 and now are way different, and current problems (abundance of precision weapons, means of viewing the battlefield, and overall mechanization of the armies make WW2 armored offensives very hard to make). And there seem no solution to be found yet (besides overwhelming aerial superiority, which both sides currently lack). I also wouldn't draw comparisons between Ukraine and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Especially in terms of the end result.
On July 14 2023 19:17 datscilly wrote: I found it surprising from the video that April 1916, even before the German offensive at Verdun and the Allies offensive at Somme happened, the German military strategists were aware that they would lose a protracted war of attrition, and hence had to make a breakthrough and win the war 'soon'. If we try to do a same calculation on the balance of material today, I think the result will be that American stockpiles and production are greater than Russian stockpiles and production. (Edit: I mean to claim that war materials that Americans are willing to supply are (will be) greater than all of Russia stockpiles and production. Not sure if this is true.) This isn't common knowledge, thought I feel it should be. The modern calculation is obfuscated by US shells being less in numbers and more accurate, as well as one side having HIMARS which is more of a quality advantage than a numerical advantage.
In April 1916 Verdun was already at large. But the main difference is that Germany was in a tight blockade and completely surrounded by enemies, their only neutral trade partner being Sweden (and even this route was under threat by Russian Baltic fleet). They were also in a direct state of war with all of Entente. Ukraine's situation is more akin to North Korea or North Vietnam at this point. In both cases US was figting local (well, in case of Korea - Chinese) ground force, supplied and supported by external allies. Russia is also far from a complete blockade, being able to import most of required stuff, even military one. So the question isn't "how large the stockpiles and production are" but "how much US and allies will be willing and able to commit". Epecially considering other potential escalation points like Taiwan, Middle East, Pakistan etc. And about HIMARS - you could check out what Tornado-S is. Guided munitions is not some US know-how (though in terms of guided munitions and recoinaccanse they do posses an advantage, that's true).
On July 14 2023 19:17 datscilly wrote: Hence, from these two factors, the lack of a total war, and attrition being on Ukraine's side, I think the war will last longer. Previously I predicted that the chance of a Ukrainian breakthrough to slice Russia-held territory into two pieces was 50% by the end of this year; I'll update to 25% chance by 31 Dec 2023. The crowd prediction on a prediction website was well ahead of me on this, with their prediction at 30% since February and 20% now.
On "last longer" I'll agree, on a breakthrough results I will not. If we are placing bets in this thread, mine would be no war-ending, or even major gains by either side this year, at max couple of small towns and bunch of villages will change hands.
The alcohol is irrelevant since it's because of culture. The lack of ammunition and rifles is also almost irrelevant because this is a grad company. If they ever need to use a rifle something has gone horribly wrong already. It does affect morale, as shown.
The main thing is that they do NOT want to be in their vehicles and their superiors had them idling. That suggests that Ukraines counter battery fire is working and that something is broken in the Russian command lines.
These guys know what they are doing. They want to hide their gear, scoot out just in time to fire, drive the fuck away to reload and the relocate to another hiding spot. They are not mad just because they took losses and don't have enough AK's, they are mad because they are good enough artillerymen to know their command fucked them.
Ardias I'm curios on your perspective on how the different Russian forces have been doing in compared to expectations. From what I've seen I'd rate them something like this:
VDV - most failures were from dumb command decisions. Have carried the army on their backs multiple times despite doing things they really shouldn't be doing. Example: bailing out everyone from Kherson. BARS - Held Kreminna, war would look really different right now if they didn't. Generally seem to be performing way above expectations for reserve units. Wagner - even if you think Bakhmut was a dumb move the fact that they did it with newly recruited prisoners backed by veteran soldiers is something. LNR/DNR - Given their shit equipment seems to have way over performed early. Still do work even if they have taken a lot of shit through the conflict. Marine infantry - hyped up, seem competent. Not much to show for it because of dumb command decisions? Eastern military district units - Might be my ignorance but it seems like eastern units have been more competent than the other military districts. Other military districts (not west) - I don't know enough. Western military districts - 3rd army corps... Anything with "Guard" in it - Supposed to be the elite but...
The alcohol is irrelevant since it's because of culture. The lack of ammunition and rifles is also almost irrelevant because this is a grad company. If they ever need to use a rifle something has gone horribly wrong already. It does affect morale, as shown.
The main thing is that they do NOT want to be in their vehicles and their superiors had them idling. That suggests that Ukraines counter battery fire is working and that something is broken in the Russian command lines.
These guys know what they are doing. They want to hide their gear, scoot out just in time to fire, drive the fuck away to reload and the relocate to another hiding spot. They are not mad just because they took losses and don't have enough AK's, they are mad because they are good enough artillerymen to know their command fucked them.
Clearly they feel like they should have rifles and ammunition because they’re complaining that most of them don’t have rifles and the two that do have a handful of ammunition. The fact that their expected resupply didn’t show up to the point that their commander felt he needed to leave the front to personally requisition more ammo is a bad sign. The fact that he got stopped by barrier troops who had orders to stop anyone leaving the front for any reason is a bad sign. The fact that their morale is so bad that they’re complaining about all of this publicly online is a bad sign. The fact that despite having no ammo they’re still drinking is also not great.
This is not an army that is on its way to a glorious victory. This is an army that hates itself fighting for a country that hates it.
What frustrates me is that they can’t join the dots together. They know they’re mistreated and they know the Ukrainians don’t want to join Russia but they can’t connect the two. They can’t realize that they have a common enemy with the Ukrainian people, the Russian state that misuses and discards them.
On July 15 2023 04:02 CuddlyCuteKitten wrote: Ardias I'm curios on your perspective on how the different Russian forces have been doing in compared to expectations. From what I've seen I'd rate them something like this:
VDV - most failures were from dumb command decisions. Have carried the army on their backs multiple times despite doing things they really shouldn't be doing. Example: bailing out everyone from Kherson. BARS - Held Kreminna, war would look really different right now if they didn't. Generally seem to be performing way above expectations for reserve units. Wagner - even if you think Bakhmut was a dumb move the fact that they did it with newly recruited prisoners backed by veteran soldiers is something. LNR/DNR - Given their shit equipment seems to have way over performed early. Still do work even if they have taken a lot of shit through the conflict. Marine infantry - hyped up, seem competent. Not much to show for it because of dumb command decisions? Eastern military district units - Might be my ignorance but it seems like eastern units have been more competent than the other military districts. Other military districts (not west) - I don't know enough. Western military districts - 3rd army corps... Anything with "Guard" in it - Supposed to be the elite but...
Your estimates are pretty good actually. VDV indeed had a lot of good soldiers and NCOs, and high esprit de corps. They are basically what US Marines are, "Devil Dogs" and all that. That's why they were often sent on the heated directions instead of heavy mechanzied troops of poorer quality. However their quality did not go unnoticed, since they are were one of the first to recieve Lancet drones en masse to support their operations.
BARS - they differ a lot, and there is not much info about lot of their battalions (there are more than 20, the most number I know is BARS-23). Their finest hour was at Lyman, where BARS-13 and BARS-16 were holding Ukrainian forces for a week, allowing to build up Svatovo-Kreminna line. Battles in Kreminna forests were already more of a combined arms operation, with a lot of Central District and VDV units involved.
Wagner is good. They've build a lot of hype about themselves, yes, but still, Ukrainians had a ton of troops in Bakhmut and still couldn't hold it. There is a reason why Wagner initially was comprised of people who were at issues with regular army due to strict hierarchy often combined with incompetence and passiveness of their superior officers.
LDPR forces knew Ukrainians the best (they were in a low-level conflict for 8 years after all), though due to the lack of mobilization in Russia proper they've often faced the heaviest fighting (Mariupol, Peski, Maryinka, Avdeevka, Rubezhnoie, Severodonetsk etc.) hence the greater losses, especially among the most experienced and motivated troops fighting since 2014.
Marines in general are better than regulars, and had their moments (again, Mariupol). Ugledar failure was partially mistakes of command, partially the nature of current warfare with difficulty to attack prepared positions (what we see in current UA offensive).
About regular tank/motor rifle units - it's hard to point out the presize district, it comes down more to separate units. A lot of Southern/Central/Eastern Military District units performed well, despite having poor equipment. Elements of 90th Tank Division were the ones, who forced UA out of Lisichansk/Severodonetsk by breaking through southern line of defense. Units of 58th Army now hold the line against UA offensive for more than a month. 126th Coastal Defense brigade (actually being former UA 36th Marine brigade) basically allowed to take Kherson after UA established hastily defense after Russian first wave moved on to Nikolaev, and then held the northern flank of Kherson bridgehead for months. In the meantime 1st Guards Tank Army performed horribly, despite having the best equipment. A lot of other units of different districts suffered from high and low level commanders being incompetent or inept. But Western Military District is leading this list by far. Probably that's why its' commanding general was replaced at least three times already. 3rd Army Corps, to be fair, was comprised of mobilized, but yeah, it trained on WMD's grounds (like Mulino) and people from it described their officers in many different words, "retarded" being one of the kindest.
As for "Guards" units overall - many carry this name since WW2 days (like UK battalions often preserve their names since XVIII century), but not all deserve it. I would advise to look at the units, who recieved "Guard" citations after the start of the war.
The alcohol is irrelevant since it's because of culture. The lack of ammunition and rifles is also almost irrelevant because this is a grad company. If they ever need to use a rifle something has gone horribly wrong already. It does affect morale, as shown.
The main thing is that they do NOT want to be in their vehicles and their superiors had them idling. That suggests that Ukraines counter battery fire is working and that something is broken in the Russian command lines.
These guys know what they are doing. They want to hide their gear, scoot out just in time to fire, drive the fuck away to reload and the relocate to another hiding spot. They are not mad just because they took losses and don't have enough AK's, they are mad because they are good enough artillerymen to know their command fucked them.
Clearly they feel like they should have rifles and ammunition because they’re complaining that most of them don’t have rifles and the two that do have a handful of ammunition. The fact that their expected resupply didn’t show up to the point that their commander felt he needed to leave the front to personally requisition more ammo is a bad sign. The fact that he got stopped by barrier troops who had orders to stop anyone leaving the front for any reason is a bad sign. The fact that their morale is so bad that they’re complaining about all of this publicly online is a bad sign. The fact that despite having no ammo they’re still drinking is also not great.
This is not an army that is on its way to a glorious victory. This is an army that hates itself fighting for a country that hates it.
What frustrates me is that they can’t join the dots together. They know they’re mistreated and they know the Ukrainians don’t want to join Russia but they can’t connect the two. They can’t realize that they have a common enemy with the Ukrainian people, the Russian state that misuses and discards them.
Everyone in the army is supposed to have a gun. Everyone in the unit should also preferably have the same uniform and kit on at all times. But GRADs are rocket artillery with a range of 50 km. I was in a rear unit when I did my army service. Of course you train on rifles, machine guns and AT4s for self protection but you are well aware that if you ever get in a firefight in your position that means: a) either Spetznas got behind your lines and found you or even worse there's some kind of rapid breakthrough that you didn't have time to respond to and the mech inf is pounding at the door. b) your assigned close defence mech inf platoon just got their ass handed to them.
In that position your pretty much fucked, guns or no guns. If anything these guys should be protesting that they don't have flack jackets (maybe they took them off?) because 99 % probability they get killed by artillery. Of course if your actually in a GRAD when it hits your flack jacket is not doing much.
KYIV, Ukraine — A career military man, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny long ago confronted three questions: Am I ready to die? Am I ready to kill? Am I willing to send people to die and kill?
Now, Ukraine’s top commander in a war with a Russian force larger and better-equipped than his own is asking himself a new question: How can I reduce the loss of life? He starts each morning by learning how many soldiers were killed or wounded following his orders the day before. Sometimes he stumbles across a contact in his cellphone who is dead. He refuses to delete them.
Zaluzhny said he’s saving the grieving for later. Mourning now would distract him from his important work as the man Ukrainians trust to keep them safe and Western partners trust with billions in security assistance. Both expect him to re-create Ukraine’s earlier underdog success on the battlefield.
But if it were up to Zaluzhny alone, this is not how he would get the job done. He would fight with air superiority. He would fire back at least as many shells as the Russians are firing at his troops. And he would have cruise missiles that could match Moscow’s. Instead, modern fighter jets, such as the U.S.-made F-16, are not expected on the battlefield until next year. Ukraine’s ammunition supply is constrained, with the Russians often shooting three times as much in a day.
And Western allies, citing fears of escalating the war with Russia, have placed a condition on the longer-range missiles and other materiel they’ve so far provided: They can’t be used to strike Russian soil.
So, Zaluzhny said, he uses weapons made in Ukraine for the frequent strikes across the border that Kyiv never officially acknowledges as its own.
“To save my people, why do I have to ask someone for permission what to do on enemy territory?” Zaluzhny recently told The Washington Post in a rare interview. “For some reason, I have to think that I’m not allowed to do anything there. Why? Because [Russian President Vladimir] Putin will … use nuclear weapons? The kids who are dying don’t care.
“This is our problem, and it is up to us to decide how to kill this enemy. It is possible and necessary to kill on his territory in a war. If our partners are afraid to use their weapons, we will kill with our own. But only as much as is necessary.”
The challenges facing Zaluzhny and his forces are significant. Even after he orchestrated a series of military feats — a defensive stand that forced the Russians to retreat from around Kyiv and counteroffensives that expelled the invading troops from the northeast Kharkiv region and the southern regional capital of Kherson last year — large swaths of Ukraine’s east and south, about a fifth of the country, remain occupied.
Carrying out a counteroffensive to reclaim that territory, defeat Russia and minimize Ukraine’s casualties requires resources that Zaluzhny said he’s still lacking. Western officials have said Ukraine has enough to succeed, but Zaluzhny was sharply critical of counterparts who have argued that Kyiv doesn’t need F-16s. Their own militaries would never fight like this, he said in the interview.
Despite criticism that progress in the counteroffensive has been slow, Zaluzhny remains a popular if somewhat paradoxical figure in Ukraine. He has sought to be a driver of change in the military, eliminating legacies from the Soviet era and transforming it into a more Western, NATO-like force. Off the battlefield, the 50-year-old’s smiling face is painted on walls across the country, along with his hand in a peace sign. He has a Baby Yoda patch on his bulletproof vest and a patch with cartoon cats holding guns on the back of his helmet.
But behind the scenes, the worries and responsibility weigh on him.
“One question I get asked is, ‘How can you stand it?’” Zaluzhny said.
“I have to live with it,” he said. “Every day, it’s those who were killed. Every day, it’s the maimed, the missing. It’s tears.”
‘No longer a Soviet army’
Seven months before columns of Russian tanks streaked across Ukraine’s northern, southern and eastern borders, Zaluzhny was considering a transition to civilian life.
But the military was all he’d ever known; he was born while his father was stationed at a garrison in the country’s north, and he later attended a military academy. When President Volodymyr Zelensky called and offered Zaluzhny the top post in Ukraine’s armed forces, Zaluzhny quickly ditched the idea of retirement.
Among the first things he did was renovate his new office. Zaluzhny had always dreaded visiting previous commanders there. Each time reminded him of the thing he despised most about the Soviet army legacy — “that any commander who took his position was in fact a feudal lord over his subordinates,” he said. It represented exactly what he wanted to change about Ukraine’s military.
“These walls were soaked in this,” Zaluzhny said. “When you came in here, you immediately understood that it was a mistake to be born, it was a mistake to come here.”
In a General Staff headquarters building built in the 19th century, Zaluzhny’s office now stands apart — simple and modern with a large bookshelf where Zaluzhny stashes his collection, including Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “The Governance of China.”
The change wasn’t for aesthetics, but rather for the place, and the person in it, to feel more accessible. Rather than rule with an iron fist, Zaluzhny said, he frequently asks for input — and not just from his own circle of generals. Even now, soldiers on the front line can often directly reach out to Zaluzhny through social media.
Zaluzhny’s attempt at culture change can be seen on the battlefield, too. Years of training and deepening ties with NATO forces have made Ukraine’s forces more nimble than Russia’s in this war. Lower-level commanders on the ground often feel empowered to make decisions quickly rather than run each call up the chain of command — a Soviet mind-set.
“The assumption that this would be a war between a big Soviet army and a small Soviet army was wrong in many countries,” Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said. “That’s why they told us that Kyiv would fall in three days and Ukraine in three weeks. But this is no longer a Soviet army.”
After Reznikov learned that Russia had launched a full-scale attack on Feb. 24, 2022, he arrived at Zaluzhny’s office to find the general standing over large maps and answering multiple phones. Zaluzhny was receiving information from the battlefield and then responding with curt orders, Reznikov said. But Zaluzhny would also add a small term of endearment each time, calling his subordinate a “beauty” or telling him “good job.”
“This is humanity,” Reznikov said. “The guy is in a general’s uniform, but his humanity is what makes him special.”
The military still demands strict order and discipline, Zaluzhny said. He can be stern and demanding, but “I do not mock people, I do not oppress them, I do not humiliate them.”
The turn away from the Ukrainian military’s Soviet legacy is far from complete. More offices must be changed, Zaluzhny said. And more change will come with the new generation — soldiers Zaluzhny proudly described as knowing English and being well-read. “It’s a pity we’re losing them,” he said.
After fighting an internal Soviet ideological enemy, he now faces an external one that lauds the very heritage Zaluzhny wanted eradicated. But he still has respect for his adversary’s doctrine. He eagerly read everything Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s military chief, has ever written, describing it as “very, very interesting” and lamenting that he hasn’t published anything lately.
“He is an enemy — an enemy who is very smart,” Zaluzhny said. “Smart and therefore devious. He is still strong. So you have to respect him as such and look for ways to kill him. Because that is the only way to win.”
Beyond victory
Years before Zaluzhny could start shaping Ukraine’s military into his vision, a few hours in a jail cell motivated him to learn more about the world order.
It was 2019, and Zaluzhny, as one of Ukraine’s top commanders directing Kyiv’s forces against Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine, traveled to Brussels for a meeting with NATO counterparts.
As soon as he stepped off the plane, he said, he was surrounded by law enforcement. With their guns pointed at him, he was instructed to lie facedown on the floor and was handcuffed. Zaluzhny said he had just enough roaming minutes on his phone to call Ukraine’s ambassador to NATO, who eventually helped secure his release.
Russian authorities had placed Zaluzhny’s name on the Interpol wanted list without his knowing — a regular practice that has led to other Ukrainian commanders being briefly imprisoned. He was angry at himself for not knowing his legal rights in such a situation.
“I was in a bad mood, but then I realized that hypothetically I was a war criminal and most likely would remain one,” Zaluzhny said. “So I decided I should study international relations and international law.”
The episode inspired him to pursue a master’s degree, which he received in December 2020. He puts it to use in his current job, which calls on him not only to be a military strategist but also to regularly confront geopolitical considerations, such as allies’ fear of crossing Russian red lines by providing weapons such as longer-range missiles or modern fighter jets.
Zaluzhny, however, isn’t shy about his intent to reclaim Crimea, the peninsula Russia illegally annexed in 2014, even as some Western officials privately worry about what Putin’s response would be if Ukrainian troops ever reached the territory. “As soon as I have the means, I’ll do something. I don’t give a damn — nobody will stop me,” Zaluzhny said.
The figurative Western handcuffs on his military operations have prompted Zaluzhny to think more about Ukraine’s future — beyond this counteroffensive and this war — and how to make the country so strong that no one will dare attack it again. To accomplish that means producing weapons for defense rather than being reliant on others to provide them.
He lamented that Ukraine is dependent on other countries for ammunition as partners struggle to meet the demand. The more Ukraine can fire, pinning down Russian forces, the fewer casualties it will suffer, Zaluzhny said. But what happens if the precious resource becomes scarcer the longer the war lasts?
“I’ve been asking myself that since last March — and not just myself; I ask it everywhere I can ask it,” Zaluzhny said.
His vision for a formidable Ukraine is why he struggles to consider his own future after the war. Maybe he’ll take some time off. “But as my wife says: ‘Okay, three days. What’s next?’” he said with a laugh. He might write a book, he said. He’d like to travel, though his Brussels airport experience left him wary.
But Zaluzhny expects that even after the war, he’ll be busy. His concept of victory is more than just Ukraine restoring its full territorial integrity.
“Victory will be when we will have an army — maybe even a not-insignificant one — that will guarantee the safety of children who are now riding in baby carriages, so that they grow up knowing that this won’t happen again,” Zaluzhny said. “And that’s a tremendous amount of work. It has to start now.”
Regarding the artillery question. Even if they were firing 1/10 the payload as somebody claimed it would be much more lethal. Larger caliber, so it penetrates more. More accurate, so it actually hits where it does damage instead of the next field over.
Even disregarding the precision rocket artillery it is more accurate overall and the people firing actually know exactly where the target is and where they hit in comparison.
The biggest problem is most likely counter battery fire. If you set up and just fire for days on end you risk getting hit by something much longer range. The pure quantity poured out considering that is surprising.