The TL Debate Thread - Page 6

Speaker 1, ChairmanRay

If all nations are granted the right to develop nuclear weapons, the responsibility falls on the world’s current nuclear powers to facilitate that their nuclear programs adhere to specific standards. This is especially critical when it comes to security. Nuclear weapons developed by any country must be impervious to any sort of physical or virtual attack. Looking at the multiple occurrences of Iran’s nuclear facilities falling victim to cyber-attacks, allowing nations to develop their own security simply is not feasible. If nuclear weapons were to fall in the hands of terrorists or hackers, this is a direct infringement on the rights to prosperity of every single nation on the globe. In order to grant every nation the right to develop nuclear weapons, their nuclear program must be supported by one of the world powers. A nuclear weapon program that is non-facilitated has no bearing as to whether or not the security is adequate. Therefore it can and will be perceived as a threat to global prosperity. Under these circumstances, it is not only the right, but the obligation of any nation, the UN, and NATO to take action. It stands to reason that all developing nuclear programs must receive direct support from a world power; however, this leads to numerous issues:

• Firstly, we cannot force world powers to support the development of nuclear weapons. We feel that every nation’s freedom of trade and association should be maintained. If no agreement can be established between a world power and a state to facilitate the development of nuclear weapons, then the development should no longer occur. Having a strongly secured nuclear weapon program is not an entitlement that can feasibly be granted. Therefore the development of nuclear weapons cannot be established as a right of a nation.
  
  
• Secondly, world powers may not voluntarily support the development of nuclear weapons due to Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which states that signed nations must not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear weapons. Every nation has signed this treaty minus four. North Korea withdrew from the treaty, but their nuclear program is only partially complete. India is in effect a part of this treaty, but chose not to sign on the grounds of ambiguity. Pakistan and Israel remain. In order to grant nations the right to nuclear arms, this treaty must be overturned, or nations must forge a nuclear alliance with either Pakistan or Israel. Both options are highly problematic.
  
  
• Thirdly, nations supporting the development of nuclear weapons are able to dictate the use and location of the nuclear weapons. For example, if the US were to support another nation’s nuclear program, it is reasonable to assume that the nuclear weapons may not be used to threaten the US, its allies, or to be placed in Cuba. Therefore, granting nations the right to develop nuclear weapons forces coercive alliances between nations, and may even deepen any military, economic, or political disadvantages that the nation was attempting to alleviate through nuclear arms in the first place.

In order to grant nations the right to nuclear weapons, nations must either independently establish security against rogue organizations and rogue states, or receive support from a world power in a nuclear alliance. As formerly stated, both options result in undesirable outcomes. In the former case, without proper measurement of security, the uncertainty of whether nuclear arms will fall into the hands of rogue organization establishes itself as a vital threat. In the latter case, the condition that nuclear programs must be facilitated prevents it from being a right.

In any method and condition in which rights are granted to all nations to develop nuclear weapons, the current state of technology and politics simply negates any possibility that nuclear weapons are able to be developed securely and justly. Because of the unfeasible position that granting nuclear rights puts the world in, it stands to reason that the right should not be granted in the first place.

Speaker 2, farvacola

The contemporary world of international relations and geo-political conflict is not as it once was; long gone are the days of the Iron Curtain and the threat of possible Russian missile attack from Cuba. The hard and definite lines of alliance that propped up the notion of a “Cold War” have given way to a myriad of interconnections, economic dependancies and international cooperation. No longer do the people of the United States sit glued to their radios and short-necked, picture tube televisions, listening and watching for the latest threat of nuclear attack. The entire world sat underneath the tremendous shadow cast by the recent memory of an ashy, desolate Hiroshima and Nagasaki, polarized by the continuous warnings from government leaders that disaster could strike at any moment. The lines had been drawn in the sand, and the silhouette of the “enemy” was supposedly quite clear.

No longer is this the case: the Internet, the effects of globalization and the international economy have seen to that. The discrete nature of national identity has been replaced with a perpetually evolving system of business, social, and diplomatic interrelation, as former enemies trade with one another and international coalitions seek to better the peace and status of even the most impoverished nation. Organizations such as NATO and the UN have taken on the responsibility of doing their best to prevent another world war through an emphasis on international economic and governmental diplomacy, as well as peacekeeping and energy production assistance. Our opposition to the resolution that “all governments should have the right to nuclear weapons.” is founded in part upon the fundamental difference in the contemporary geo-political environment when compared to the international political climate of the Cold War era that gave birth to the. Not only has the world become so interrelated as to render the utility of nuclear deterrence a non-factor or even a malefactor, the opportunities provided by converting standing nuclear arsenals into energy producing materials are undeniable. In any case, an insistence upon the “right” of nations to maintain a nuclear arsenal necessarily relies upon an outdated and spurious conception of international relations, one that we as a global society must overcome if we are to safely progress into the 21st century and beyond.

Cooperation now lies at the heart of contemporary national sovereignty rather than coercion via threat and militaristic puffery. Even the United States, the self-proclaimed “greatest country in the world”, relies upon mutual agreements between trading and diplomatic partners that stipulate that safety and security are to be preserved above all else (how else can an international economy operate?). National providence guaranteed via a doctrine of self-help and self-reliance has been rendered archaic; in fact, the focus of world powers in terms of global arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation stood at the center of the worlds progress from a state of “Cold War” into the stage of coadjutancy and reciprocity we now know today. Even the concept of proper national defense has changed; safety guaranteed via vigorous military activity and retribution is no longer as useful as the understanding that allies, neutrals, and even potential opponents rely upon the relationships engendered by coefficiency. As Harald Muller of the Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt suggests,

“Arms control, arms reductions, disarmament, and nonproliferation are humble servants of state security. They are not impediments to national defense, but rather they complement it, relieving defense efforts from un-necessary burdens. State security is contingent on the politico-economic environment within which states exist. For this reason, it would be parochial if the security community did not recognize that states face new and immense changes that call for Institutionalized security cooperation, particularly agreed nuclear weapons reductions.” Furthermore, considerations of national security are no longer confined to an acknowledgement of what is happening within ones' borders; instead, according to Helga Haftendorn of the Free University of Berlin, the nation-state has been superseded by the international coalition and association, and considerations of security ought to be more concerned with the borders of allies, partners, and even enemies than with those of ones' own nation. Such is the consequence of contemporary trade and diplomacy.

Flawed conceptions of national “rights” aside, the strictures of our contemporary world relegate an insistence on nuclear proliferation an outdated and silly proposition. Not only have a number of rogue states proven to the international audience that they cannot handle the responsibilities that come with nuclear weapons (Iran, North Korea, Somalia), but the supposed utility of nuclear deterrence is spurious in efficacy and no longer relevant. In the words of General George Lee Butler, a former commander-in-chief of the United States Strategic Command, “Nuclear deterrence was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence and fragile human relationships.”.

Speaker 3, sAsImre

Dealing with the rights of the governments immediately bring us into the field of international relations. A common agreement sees its creation in the late 18th century with the Enlightenment and one of the most important philosopher of modernity, Kant despite the influence of a more ancient legacy, notably with Hobbes and Locke. However the field only stabilized for the first time in the early 20th century and even then the WW2 and the cold war shook things up, deeply modifying the two dominant ideologies, realism and idealism. Dust and theories have been settle down on the main points nowadays and we should use it to understand the link between international relations, government rights and nuclear weapons.

This house consider that realism, under its newer acceptations should be the theory used when dealing with international relations. Old school realism comes from the analysis Carr and Niebhur made of Hobbes and Machiavelli masterpieces conjugated with an analysis of Versailles' treaty. The fact that the treaty only last for 10 years as far as details are concerned and 20 years as whole demonstrated the influence of the concepts of power and security. Without detailing it too much it is important to notice that the international society is Hobbes' anarchy and that states are supposed to act in a way they improve their power and manage to be safe at the same time which imply a race to power. A good example would be the race to weapons in the 30's or even the colonial race. Every state pursue its own interest, which doesn't mean you can't do compromises. Kissinger was a strong advocate of the strategic alliances which is a perfect example of the principle of reciprocity. Later on Morgenthau defined a rather complicated concept: “interest defined as power”, underlining the importance of both interest and power, and in the meanwhile he clearly separated moral and ethic from the international relations, considering them as external factors.
There is an underlying premise in order to ensure the functionality of the model: sovereignty. In order to define and understand it we need a bit of law, and we should use two European figures from the first half of the 20th century, Carré de Malberg and Kelsen. De Malberg stated that an institution was sovereign when it has the “competency of its competency”. It means that this particular institution is the one creating its own supreme rules (and every inferior rule in the norm hierarchy of course), creating its constitution and having the ability to amend it . In order to participate in the international society a state must be sovereign. But sovereignty does not imply equality in any way. Powerful states (USA anyone?) are able to impose their will onto the weaker states, however as long as its just a matter of influence and not a way to create a new constitution the weaker state is an independent participant in the international society. On our topic it means that big states, who are, surprisingly, the nuclear weapon owners, are able to prevent other states, like Iran, to get it if they want. It is merely a consequence of the anarchy that is the international society: the bigger bully the weaker, exactly what Hobbes describe for mankind without the creation of the coldest of all cold monsters.
Under its circumstances it is obvious that the only right states have is merely to be sovereign if nobody able to do it wants to invade them. Like in a state of nature, even the right to life does not mean anything when someone is able to take it away from you by slashing your throat or shooting a bullet at you.


In the realm of realism, states have no rights so the question of nuclear power is merely an annex question that you would not consider if you are not one of the “bullies”. The main alternative is idealism and liberalism which is a derivative based on the same principles, considering the state as an actor among others like individuals and international organisations. Before you will start yelling that my definition of liberalism is a bit strange, remember we are merely talking about international relations, not political or economical science.
Liberals and idealist are using a few key concepts to understand international relations. They view the competition between states as a source of progress since trade is a necessity. A state can not be in a permanent war with the other half of the world (a brief look at the US history is a good counter argument on this matter) and there is a need to separate the powers at an international level. For them, as long as the states have an interest they are able to renounce to a part of their sovereignty. However this interdependency, already analysed by Farvacola should prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main interesting concept in our case comes directly from someone I already mentioned, Kant, and its project of perpetual peace. It has been heavily modified to become the pax democratica. In a nutshell it is based on the fact that democratic states are less likely to declared war on their neighbours for several reasons. Democracy do not go to war between themselves because they have seats in international organisations used to settle peacefully the issues that might occur. It is harder for a democracy to go to war on a legal basis because you normally (Iraq anyone?) have to get a resolution from the UN and then accomplish your own national process which can be quite difficult.

The Iraqi example brings the main problem to the table regarding our matter: international organisations are not based on equality and they are not out of the world. That means that UN is based on the domination of the five permanent members of the security council (China, USA, France, UK, Russia) who can veto any resolution. It appears that they are all owners of the nuclear weapon and have zero intention to allow other country to get it in the name of the TNP. And even when you have a principle of equality like in the WTO, the power of influence exceed the strict frame of the institution. Foreign policies are global and it is evident that each institution is just a reflect of the relations of power between states.
This theoretical overview underlines the fact that since equality is a flawed concept in international relations, states have the rights they are able to seize, nothing is granted.

Speaker 4, heroyi

With the increase of globalization and interdependence between the states the usage of nuclear weapons does not seem viable. Analysis has also shown that following a nuclear proliferation program can be draining on the economy. Not only does it draw heavy attention from brilliant academic minds away from productive tasks in society, but also can be financially costly to produce and maintain nuclear warheads. Despite the study, are nuclear weapons program cost effective in order to secure a “threatening” profile for a nation?
In 1998 Brookings Institution’s study, despite the US Department of Defense’s lack of financial record, were able to find that between 1940 and 1996 the United States spent $5.5trillion on the nuclear weapons programs. In 1997, approximately 13% of the defense budget was dedicated to the nuclear weapons program. $26 billion were focused on the operation, maintenance, control and research of the arsenals of warheads and deliverance technology while $8 billion were focused on mainly security measures and nuclear waste management.
In 1993 the United States and Russia implemented the Megatons to Megawatts Program, a nonproliferation agreement, aiming to convert Russia’s 500 metric tons (equivalent to 20,000 warheads) of HEU (high-enriched uranium) into LEU (low-enriched uranium) for nuclear fuel in the United States. As of now 90% of the program (about 450 metric ton) has successfully completed estimating to conclude in the year 2013. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), US government’s executive agent, entered into the commercially-funded $8billion (total value of $12 billion), 20 year contract with Techsnabexport (TENEX), executive agent for Russia, in 1994 (after extensive debate). In the recent years the LEUs produced from the program have fueled nuclear power plants in the US enough to generate up to 10% of the nation’s electricity consumption. The fuel generated, to date, have been recorded to be equivalent to more than 193 billion gallons of gasoline, which is 17 months of the nation’s consumption. The program also remains as a steady and reliable source of LEUs for the US contributing to 50% of LEU supplies for the US power plants.
The program is seen to be one of the most successful key moments to a step toward a nonproliferation agreement for the world. The two key players of the Cold War, US and Russia, drew this agreement to show that not only is it commercially profitable and beneficial to utilize the uranium for civil use, at no cost to the taxpayers, but also to stand as an inspiration and model for others to follow toward the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and halting any future proliferation programs.

Speaker 1, Souma

The motion laid before us today is simple: the Proposition asserts the right of every nation to a nuclear arsenal. Let us stress that this is not a proposal requiring the world to arm itself with nuclear warheads, but an acknowledgement of the sovereignty of all nations and their right to self-governance. We believe that any nation infringing upon this right with coercive measures is violating said sovereignty and instigating tyranny in the façade of security, a tyranny that has brought war and destruction throughout the course of history. It is our belief that this obstruction of self-determination is not only unwarranted and unjust but also detrimental to the very security we claim to protect. It is for these reasons that the Proposition before you today is proud to propose this motion.

Sovereignty is not empty rhetoric; it is the sole inheritance of a people to ensure their unconstrained representation on the global stage. An infraction on a nation’s sovereignty is equivalent to silencing its citizens and imposing authoritative dominance over its government, a relic of a colonial era long past us. The Proposition believes that a nation’s sovereignty should only be encroached upon when its citizens have already lost their voice and fair representation in the face of unrelenting oppression (for humanitarian reasons and no other) or if it engages in deliberate acts of war, of which the production and storage of nuclear weapons is neither. Of the nine countries currently equipped with nuclear weapons (including the likes of North Korea), none have used their nuclear weapons as a pretense for war nor as a tool in the face of war with the exception of the United States.

Without sovereignty there are no nations, only puppets. Self-determination allows a country the ability to judge and be judged in accordance to actions undertaken autonomously. The impediment of another nation’s right to self-realization without proper justification embeds a wrench between agent and one’s decisions, the consequence of which causes the sufferer to lose agent and in turn limits one’s decisions and distorts one’s morality.

Take for example an instance in which a gun control activist holds your daughter hostage because you are a gun owner and forces you to either dispose of your weapon or risk both of your lives. In this situation you are still provided with the freedom of choice, but the choices are limited and coerced. If you toss aside your gun, you and your daughter will live. This is far from the ideal situation in which you keep your gun and your daughter has not experienced being taken hostage, but it will suffice; after all, no one has to die. However, the world is not that simple.

Take the above example and now add in uncertainty. You are uncertain whether or not the perpetrator will abide by their promise. You are worried that they may proceed with killing you and your daughter, or they may continue to keep your daughter hostage while forcing you to experience humiliation after humiliation even after you have succumbed to their ultimatum. You watch as your daughter struggles, her cries echoing in your ears and her face enveloped in tears. Your heart sinks, and your mind blanks. It is in this moment that you lose control of your body. With your hand on your gun and your finger on the trigger, you perform one of the most inexcusable acts known to man: you take his life.

And no one would blame you.

Let’s apply real-world actors to the above scenario. The hostage is the Iranian civilians, the father is the Iranian government, and the perpetrator is all nations currently imposing sanctions upon Iran. By chastising Iran’s sovereign right, holding its citizens hostage through sanctions (they can’t even play Blizzard games wtf), and clouding it with uncertainty, the perpetrators are inviting redemption. In this case, however, redemption is not simply murder; it is the justification of further sponsorship of terrorism by the Iranian government. And throughout all of this we have yet to address the most critical point:

The daughter will never forget the face of the man who took her hostage and forced her father to do the unspeakable. In other words, the younger generations, haunted by a state of economic despair and oppression, turn their eyes full of malice to the outside and lose all traces of rationality, prompting them to point their swords of justice towards the Western tyrants. In the end, tyranny breeds terror, terror fosters hate, and hate nurtures tyranny.

And the irony of the situation? The gun control activist has a gun.

Speaker2, Blazinghand

All governments should have the right to nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons deter war. On analytical level, a rational actor will choose to go to war if the benefits outweigh the costs. Typical costs for war include damage to the country, loss of trade with war enemies, loss of international goodwill, and internal pressure against the war. All these reasons to avoid war are certainly compelling, but the presence of war nonetheless indicates that they are not enough. Extending the right to nuclear weapons to all countries will lead to more countries possessing nuclear weapons. Attacking a country with nuclear weapons is more costly than attacking a country without nuclear weapons. Due to this increased cost, countries will be deterred from war with nuclear-armed points. Two countries with nuclear weapons will not go to war with each other, because the high cost of war will vastly outweigh the benefits. This nuclear peace is commonly referred to as mutually assured destruction.

A common criticism of nuclear peace is the instability of a mutually assured destruction scenario. MAD relies on the possibility of second-strike potential: the potential to retaliate with nuclear force against a nuclear attack. The development of a missile shield or some other system to stop nuclear attacks would remove the high cost of war for the developing nation. The argument of reduced second-strike potential posits that since second-strike potential could be overcome, MAD will not always be able to deter nuclear war, and by extension, conventional war. This criticism has some merit, but the development of a missile shield would lead to a post-nuclear-war era, as, like the nuclear bomb, the shield technology proliferated to other nations. The worst case scenario for second-strike potential being nullified is still acceptable. In fact, a world in which no nukes could ever be used would in fact be preferable to a world in which nukes could be used, no matter which nations had them.

Another criticism of nuclear peace attacks the rationality of the states controlling nuclear weapons. Although certainly a rational actor would never initiate a nuclear war, it is argued that an irrational actor would do so. States can be irrational due to internal politics, intrigue, or poor communication either within or without the apparatus of the government. The argument from irrationality posits that since governments are not always rational actors, MAD cannot be relied on to deter nuclear war, and by extension, conventional war. This criticism has some merit, but there are several real-world examples that directly contradict it. The first example is that of North Korea. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons and demonstrated ballistic missile capacities to easily strike its neighbor and enemy, South Korea. Furthermore, North Korea is notorious for its irrational dictatorship and unwillingness to co-operate on an international level. North Korea has not nuked any country since its development of nuclear weapons, and there are few countries that have a greater motivation or reputation for irrational military action. The second example is that of The United States of America. The United States of America has tested several nuclear weapons and has in fact used them against Japan in a conventional war. However, despite being involved in a long cold war against the Soviet Union, fought by proxy, the US did not use nuclear weapons to attack the Soviet Union or in its proxy wars in Vietnam and Korea against USSR-backed forces there. The historical evidence shows that nuclear-armed countries are willing to use their weapons against countries without nuclear arms, but will not use them against other countries.

A final criticism of nuclear peace via nuclear proliferation is the matter of non-state actors. MAD relies on rational states controlling the nuclear weapons and acting to prevent nuclear war. This criticism argues that with development of nuclear arms in more countries, the possibility of a terrorist organization acquiring a weapon increases. As a terrorist organization does not represent a country, it could and would use a nuclear weapon without fear of retaliation. This criticism is entirely without merit. Nuclear weapons vastly increase the stability of governments that hold them. Even during the break-up of the USSR, or the Cultural Revolution in China, nuclear weapons remained well-secured and accounted for. A government with control of nuclear arms, even in times of upheaval, keeps careful track of them and does not allow them to fall into the hands of non-government actors. Although one could imagine an incompetent government allowing a nuclear weapon to fall into the wrong hands, it is unimaginable that such an incompetent government would be able to fund the massive program needed to produce and test such a weapon in the first place. Our real-world examples of times of upheaval and weaker governments with nuclear weapons all point towards the safety of nuclear arms.

The benefits of nuclear proliferation in the realm of deterring conflict is historically tested and accurate. The United States and USSR did not engage in a direct military confrontation despite many long decades of tension, and both countries had nuclear arms. Neither government was willing to risk nuclear Armageddon in order to advance their political or economic goals. In fact, conventional wars between nuclear-armed countries are exceedingly rare. The possibility of escalation promotes caution in the governments involved. Allowing all countries the right to produce nuclear arms promotes nuclear proliferation and thereby promotes nuclear peace. At its very core, this argument is grounded in historical fact: the only nuclear weapons to ever be used in war were used by a nuclear state against a non-nuclear state. Despite many long conflicts since that initial deployment of nuclear arms, due to the proliferation of arms between states, nuclear weapons have not been used in war, and wars between nuclear states has been fewer and less violent.

Speaker 3, Shady Sands

Nukes make conventional warfare far less destructive in terms of civilian and military casualties.

Once a nation has nukes (or other nations think it has nukes), two questions become relevant:

1) How will that nation command and control its nuclear arsenal?
2) What valuable targets (cities or natural resources) is it protecting with that arsenal?

The answers to both questions show that nukes make conventional warfare more limited in scope.

For question 1), the answer is that nukes require considerable command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence networks (C4I) to be effective. Take out those command networks and you have a bunch of rusting rockets in silos. What command networks are we talking about?

• Satellites
  
• Fiber optic cables
  
• Routing and switching stations
  
• Radio, TV, and other wireless broadcast
  
• The Internet (and other intangible communications protocols)

Hence an attack on any of these within a nation puts that nation into a "use it or lose it" situation vis a vis their nuclear arsenal. Ergo attackers are likely to avoid striking these sorts of targets in a defending country, because it could quickly escalate what was previously a limited conflict.

Examples: the US and China are currently engaged in a long-term contest for supremacy over the Western Pacific. However, both sides will likely refrain from any large-scale conventional conflict, as any such conflict would necessitate the "finding and blinding" of deep C4I assets within both countries, inviting nuclear retaliation. This is also the reason why the Soviets never launched a conventional invasion of Western Europe, as they knew NATO's defense plan was intrinsically escalatory towards eventual MAD.

For question 2), the answer is that nukes protect cities and natural resources. Hence if an attacker ever takes out too many of those targets in the defending country, the defender is placed in a "nothing to lose" situation, and again is likely to go into nuke-mode. Hence wars will have to remain limited in terms of damage and casualties to civilian property/life, under threat of mutual annihilation.

The net effect that conventional war becomes, by default, limited to armies in the field and cannot result in significant territorial loss or loss of key cities; nor damage to "deep infrastructure", especially C4I infrastructure. This means the total war of WW2, with all its concordant suffering, is impossible under an affirmative world, as aggressors have no net gains through mutual annihilation.

Note that for both these points, actually having nukes is not necessary; all that is necessary is for all potential aggressors to percieve that their targets may have nuclear weapons. Without a world where every nation has the right to construct nukes, however, we automatically lose the chance to attain that universal perception. Therefore affirming the resolution is the only way to gain the benefit of limiting conventional war via a nuclear umbrella, and the benefits listed above.


Speaker 4, wherebugsgo

A key point regarding the production of nuclear weapons is that if a country wants to build nuclear weapons, it will try to build them regardless of what other nations have to say. This is true even now with nuclear proliferation treaties in effect, because these countries do not feel compelled to follow UN sanctions against building nuclear weapons. For example, let us consider Iran or North Korea. These two countries are known to be developing nuclear weapons despite numerous world powers imposing sanctions against them. It is clear that the governments of Iran and North Korea do not care about the opinions of foreign nations regarding their right to build nuclear weapons.Indeed, telling North Korea and Iran that they are allowed to build nuclear weapons is not comparable to giving them the materials to help them build nuclear weapons. Such a declaration does not affect a country's actual ability to produce nuclear weapons, just as the opposite declaration would also have no effect. Even if it may not be able to produce nuclear weapons now, the only type of actions that could stop a determined nation from producing or attempting to produce such weapons would be outright war. The lack of this measure would thus allow countries such as the United States to invade a substantially less powerful country on the pretense of stopping the invaded country from possessing nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, exactly what happened with the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

So, one might ask what the advantage is, then, of giving all countries the right to produce nuclear weapons. If this measure is passed, all countries will be on more even ground with respect to diplomatic influence. Instead of some countries having the ability to exert influence based on the mere right to possess nuclear weapons over other countries, all countries will be on even terms. The governments of countries such as Iran and North Korea are more likely to cooperate with international organizations such as UN and NATO if they believe that they are being considered seriously and on even terms with other nations, as opposed to being bullied into ceasing nuclear programs that they currently have no intentions of suspending. Accepting this fact would potentially open possibilities for diplomatic conversations between these countries and the rest of the world that are not heavily weighed down by implications of war in the case that one side is not satisfied. In addition, this would more easily allow universal sanctions on nuclear weapon use to be passed, allowing for the regulation of production and use of nuclear weapons that broadly encompasses everyone, instead of the current convoluted and unfair preference by the UN of nuclear powers over non-nuclear powers. These sanctions would be much easier to enforce than they are today because nuclear weapons would not have to be produced underground if every country has the basic right to be producing them in the first place. Production would be open, and discussion would be frank both internationally and internally regarding each country's decision to produce or not produce nuclear weapons.

Lastly, if all countries were to have the right to produce nuclear weapons, there would be an incredibly strong incentive for countries to both aid each other in the interest of mutual stabilization and in the interest of nuclear deterrence through technological and diplomatic advances. Self-interested groups such as terrorists have a much harder time undermining stable governments in the interest of not only obtaining nuclear weapons, but also to actually have any conventional power as well. Such organizations only have power if there are strong, unaddressed grievances that affect the population. If the measure is passed, countries will likely aid their neighbors to stabilize their respective regions and to reduce the power and destructive ability of self-interested groups such as terrorists. If countries aid each other and are more diplomatically friendly in the interest of preventing nuclear catastrophe, humans in general will be far safer than in today's world in which an unfair system allows some powerful, stable countries to possess nuclear weapons and bully those less stable, poorer countries which aren't allowed to possess them. Indeed, as this motivation for international aid and peace would be primarily out of self-interest and self-preservation, it would be incredibly strong. In addition, allowing countries to produce nuclear weapons would likely encourage research and production of anti-nuclear measures, as well as political campaigns for countries to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles in the interest of projecting an internationally peaceful image. If such measures can be developed, then the threat of nuclear war can be greatly diminished. Since this declaration would encourage the development of such peace-promoting measures, we must conclude that it is in the interest of the common good of all people to give every country the right to produce nuclear weapons.