US Politics Mega-thread - Page 1719

I'm going to reply to these posts collectively, since you [xDaunt] raise different points that are interconnected. You display a misunderstanding of the national interest of the U.S. in the region, of the most appropriate means to pursue that national interest, and of the relationship the U.S. should have with its allies in the region with regards to its national interest.

To begin, I'd like to point out that, even though you asserted you were thinking about this through Realpolitik lenses, you are paying little attention to the distribution of power in the region itself (beyond the global distribution of power, with regards to which you are correct that the U.S. is the superpower) and you seem to be forgetting that Realpolitik does not entail a preference among the means used to achieve the objective (what is in our national interest) - both diplomacy and the use of force are perfectly acceptable. I'll explain below how the objectives of the U.S. in the region with regards to Iran are twofold, but the point is that being tough on Iran and refusing to negotiate with them does not constitute Realpolitik if the diplomatic course of action pragmatically yields more results (in fact, that's why Kissinger, who espoused Realpolitik more than many of his predecessors, supported re-establishing relations between the U.S. and the PRC - the same pundits who are ignorantly crying that the Iran deal is "worse than Munich" would have held the same discourse back then). I'm sure you know all this and won't disagree with me here, but it's worth pointing out anyway since you seemed to be suggesting that negotiating with Iran was a "weak" course of action when it is very much a pragmatic and - given that we are following our national interest rather than the diverging interests of some of our allies (I'll come back to this later) - realist approach. If you have no problem with negotiating with Iran and are simply critical of the contents of the deal, then either you are not familiar with its contents or you simply don't understand them, because it's a very good deal (see below).

To come back to the national interest of the U.S. in the region as per the issue at hand, you seem to be thinking that it is to be keeping Iran isolated and weak. This is not the case. The national interest of the U.S. in the region is, like I said, twofold:

(1) To have a relatively stable Middle-East (this is the most fundamental point), for various reasons that I don't think I have to spell out - most notably, to ensure the security of energy routes and resources, as well as of trade routes (see the Suez canal, but also the Persian and Oman gulfs), and also for example in order for the U.S. to be able to focus more of its attention on other strategic areas (such as East Asia).

(2) To avoid an Iran with nuclear capabilities. Some might argue that it wouldn't matter to the U.S. if Iran did have nuclear capabilities, and I won't delve into the debate, but I think that you can make the case that having nuclear capabilities would significantly increase Iran's aggressive tendencies towards some of its neighbors (at least in the present state of the relations in the region), not necessarily in terms of actual direct attacks but through the financing and support of proxies (Hezbollah for example), in addition to the possibility of an arms race happening among states in the area. Note that this is related to the first point - many (and, in particular, most U.S. decision-makers) consider that a nuclear Iran would be a threat to Middle-Eastern stability (again, I acknowledge that not everyone agrees).

(Note that I include matters like a decline of terrorism and the prevention of the spread of WMD in the objective of a "stable Middle East")

Right now, the first point is far from being met. The Middle East is currently in quite a bad state. There's civil war in Syria (and even civil war among the opposition), with Islamist opposition groups slowly getting more traction than Western-oriented groups (the Northern part of the country is probably a bit more stable considering Assad has left it to the Kurds). Saudi Arabia is financing, supplying and sometimes training some rebel groups (in particular Jaysh al-Islam), and even though it is avoiding Al-Qaeda-related groups, not all of the groups it supports are exactly "moderates". Iran, meanwhile, is supporting Assad (I spoke with a Syria Desk Officer from the EU's EEAS a few days ago and he said there is no doubt whatsoever that Iran has boots on the group in Syria). Tensions are increasing in Lebanon, in particular due to the refugee crisis it is experiencing because of Syrian conflict (also, most of the refugees are Sunni, which is in a way threatening the religious "balance" in the country). Even though it is still relatively stable, the situation is not looking good and many Western countries are strongly advising their citizens to avoid traveling there - including in the southern part of Beirut itself. What's more, Hezbollah is active in the Syrian conflict. The rate of killings in Iraq is increasing as well - there are several hundred deaths every month and many of the people I’ve spoken to are very worried about possible further escalation. Tensions are still high in Egypt after the military coup. I don't think I need to go on (I'll tackle Iran itself later) - we are far from Middle Eastern stability.

Now for the link between the two points - how does an isolated and ostracized Iran contribute to Middle Eastern stability? The answer is simple: it doesn't. In fact, it has the opposite effect: it encourages Iran to pursue its interests through violent means and to meddle more actively in the affairs of neighboring states (for example in Lebanon, or even Syria) to fight the influence of others in the region. On the middle- and long-terms, therefore, it is not in the national interest of the U.S. to maintain Iran in its current situation. When you argue that the U.S. should simply wait until Iran comes crawling (ready to abandon all of its demands), you're completely missing the fact that the U.S. would very much gain from a less polarized opposition with Iran.

The problem, of course, is that the U.S. is currently being tough on Iran due to (2): it wants to prevent it from getting nuclear weapons. But again, being tough is a means, not an end, and it is, as I just explained, a means which runs contrary to our first objective. And that's why the news of the interim deal is a very good one: it goes in the direction of both objectives! Not only is it clearly and unambiguously a good deal with regards to the aim of preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons (and this is not up for debate - see this thorough analysis of its contents), it also allows us to move towards a path leading to a less ostracized Iran which will itself be interested in a more stable region (allowing it to compete with his neighbors on economic grounds).

Let's make one thing clear, though: the deal we reached does not guarantee success at all. First, and for the sake of argument, Iran could simply be "bluffing" and trying to buy time. Of course, the "buying time" hypothesis doesn't make sense based on the fact that the deal objectively pushes them further away from nuclear weapons, so they'd be in reality losing time, but them not being serious about their end of the deal is a possibility, albeit not a frightening one since the West would still not be worse off than it is without a deal.

Second, and this is the most serious problem, there are several forces that are opposed to the deal, and more generally to the idea of letting Iran leave its ostracized economically weakened state, forces which could prevent a more definitive deal from being reached despite this being the intentions of Washinton and Teheran.
[I did not have the time to go further than this - the forces I was referring to included radicals in Iran, Israel and many on the right in the US]