Ask and answer stupid questions here! - Page 209

On March 26 2015 13:41 Thieving Magpie wrote:


What is false about it?

Pascal's argument is simple.

It posits that we exist. And that after we die--either nothing happens, or something happens.

If you believe nothing happens when you die--either you're right and nothing happens, or you're wrong and something happens.

If you believe that something happens when you die--either you're right and something happens, or you're wrong and nothing happens.

The cost being wrong when you don't believe something happens is that it happens.
The cost of being wrong when you believe that something happens is that nothing happens.

Believers have nothing to lose for being wrong.
Non-believers have nothing to gain for being right.

That is the core of Pascal's argument.

All the principles of skeptics, stoics, atheists, etc., are true. But their conclusions are false, because the opposite principles are also true.

On March 26 2015 16:18 Shiragaku wrote:
Second question and even stupider one. My head chef told me that he does not go after white girls because he said that if you stare into their face long enough, they look like men and since he is not gay or bi, he cannot feel any attraction towards them. Can anyone confirm such an experience and would my chef be gay if he was attracted towards white women, from, I guess a deontological perspective since he accepted them as guys?

On March 26 2015 22:38 Djzapz wrote:
Present the argument in a way that holds up and I'll respond to it if I can but every time I've heard the argument it was like this. I don't immediately see how the opposite of the principles I brought up are also true. It doesn't seem like they are.

On March 26 2015 22:30 MoltkeWarding wrote:
Pascal is actually ahead of farvacola by several hundred years.



Also, the Wager as represented in this thread is being recontextualised to suit the debater's predisposition to believe whatever they are inclined to believe. I'd recommend going through Pensees III personally (and not rely on wikipedia or any such nonsense) to see the argument in its native context.

On March 26 2015 23:17 MoltkeWarding wrote:


Two things: one is the framing, and the other the point.

In framing the argument, Pascal’s question is what is the more reasonable course of action? Belief vs unbelief. You are actually reading Christian assumptions into the question, which is of course a part of Pascal’s purpose, but it is not present in the argument itself. It’s not about Jesus vs Moses vs Mohammed, or even God vs non-God. It is actually what it says it is: whether it is more reasonable to spend the finite nature of our corporeal existence to focus upon finite or infinite things.

Secondly, Pascal’s point in the context of his entire chapter is that belief in God is not only valid, but desirable. His aim is a psychological one.

On March 26 2015 23:30 Djzapz wrote:

That changes nothing at all. Even if the argument is not about the plurality of options, it's a reality that is not considered (which is what you appear to be saying). It is a convenient omission for an argument brought up to people who were not aware of the other possibilities.

What I'm doing is I'm bringing these very importable variables back into the equation.

As for whether we should spend the finite nature of our corporal existence to focus on finite or infinite things, well no conditions are posed for doing one or the other. If I could choose infinite things, I would. But there is no set way to achieve that. Pascal presents us with one of many alleged ways to avoid hell (or whatever) and declares it is the only one. Not great.

It is very clear that this argument made sense in the pre-enlightenment 17th century, when faith was slowly leaving way to rationality and some philosophers still scrambled to justify their belief in God. As we've been saying, it's a false dichotomy and you can plainly see why. Pascal was chilling out in 17th century France where damn near everyone was christian, and the one alternative was disbelief. Today we know that there are other beliefs.

And Moltkewarding is perpetually likely to simply spin off this planet entirely. That little snippet and a close reading of Pascal does not change what I said at all. But, go on, make my stilted language look positively earthbound, I know you want to!

"You all misunderstand, l understand, read more closely," works in a classroom, not in an ask dumb questions thread. So lay it on us, daddy-o, hit us with the verbiage.

Belief vs unbelief is a false dichotomy.

On March 26 2015 22:00 Djzapz wrote:

Acrofales and farvacola explain both my arguments better than I, but to summarize further:

1- It is a false dichotomy because the argument is built off of two beliefs. The first, the belief that nothing after death, the second, the belief that something happens after death but more specifically the belief that the Christian afterlife is at stake. The condition for going to heaven is not "THE BELIEF IN SOMETHING", it is the belief in something like "Jesus Christ died for my sins".

As Acrofales said, this is not the only option. There are other religions out there which predict my going to hell. My belief in Jesus Christ's sacrifice does not prevent me from eternal damnation in the hell as described by other religions. Also, my simple in an afterlife in general certainly does not meet the criteria for "going to heaven" as posed by most Christians.

2- The belief in "Jesus Christ", as farvacola said, is not the simple engagement with an idea, it has to be genuine in some way. People don't decide to believe in something, they have to actually believe in it.

If I myself bought into the idea that somehow my chances were better if I believed in Jesus Christ for the sole purpose of increasing my odds, then I wouldn't really believe in it would I? I would just make the decision to tell myself that I believe it to protect my own interests.


Together both these arguments show very simply that Pascal's wager is inconsistent. It postulates two options when there are thousands and arguably an infinity, and it postulates to an extent that we should change our beliefs on the basis of an idea that is somewhat cleverly (yet transparently) disguised as rational.

So to lay it out further, I'm currently faced with Pascal's wager. There is everything to gain from believing, but the idea of the christian deity is, to my mind, incompatible with what I believe. If I chose right now to believe in God, I would be lying to myself. The processes that would go on in my brain wouldn't constitute "belief". But for argument's sake, let's say I believed in something other than Yahweh. Why not believe in Hinduism, which have a pretty appealing version of Heaven? Well that doesn't save me from the Christian hell, does it? I would be worshipping a false Idol, yet I would indeed be believing in some form of afterlife.

Pascal's wager is a cheap argument that was specifically designed for an evident purpose: playing on the fear that Christianity has essentially always mobilized to convince people that they should "join, or else".



So I pose this new problem to you: Carlito's wager.
+ Show Spoiler +

On March 27 2015 00:00 Thieving Magpie wrote:


But the core of Pascal's argument has nothing to do with Christianity--it has everything to do with giving Atheism a false cost value.

Carlito's Wager pales in comparison to my modern interpretation of Pascal's wager. While Carlito's wager represents 5 options, the example I brought suggests N examples. Carlito's Wager even has the same conclusion to be reached as my example in that of all examples, only one of them provides no reward for believing it while all other possible examples has the chance for a reward.

This quickly leads back to 1 choice rewarding nothing, and N-1 choices rewarding something. Logically, picking one of the N-1 choices will always reward at least as much as choosing disbelief with about X% (no matter how small) of them actually rewarding something.

At its core, Pascal's Wager is correct that believing that nothing happens after death gives no advantage over believing something happens after death. Where he gets it wrong is in the cost.

People who believe something happens after death--usually believe that its eternal _____. So to them, the cost is losing the first X% of life to gain a possible Y% of life where X < Y

But an Atheist believes that the totality comes before death, so instead of wagering a certain percentage of their total life they're being asked to sacrifice 100% of their existence to gain a possible Y% of life after death. That is called a false choice, and is where Pascal's Wager is flawed.

My example remains the same, ask a believer this question:

Choose to commit to hell for all of time, in case you're wrong OR choose to commit to heaven for all time, in case you're right.

No one would choose to live in hell 100% of the time in case they're wrong. Believers (no matter their belief) lean on the idea of pieced together lives. A percentage now, for a percentage later, and in that context Pascal's Wager leans heavily on the side of the believers. But change the nature in how we talk about the cost, and only then do things pan out differently.

Or, lets talk in math.

T = Total Life
X = Life
Y = Afterlife

X < Y

A believer believes X+Y=T
A non-beleiver believes X=T

A believer is willing to negotiate X since there's always Y to make up for it.
A non-believer is unwilling to negotiate X since X is all he has with nothing to make up for it.

Pascal's Wager requires we negotiate X in case our conclusions about T is true/false. But non-believers have nothing to negotiate with since they don't have a Y to fall back on.

On March 26 2015 23:52 MoltkeWarding wrote:
Which would be a valid argument if Pascal asked you to become a full-bodied Christian as a consequence of his argument, but he does not. Instead he asks you proceed from the desire to believe to finding the way to belief, namely, by taking a gamble on a specific course of action which seems to lead others to belief.

On March 27 2015 00:00 Thieving Magpie wrote:
But the core of Pascal's argument has nothing to do with Christianity--it has everything to do with giving Atheism a false cost value.

Fear -> belief, I get it. Coercing people into that stuff...

The conduct of God, who disposes all things kindly, is to put religion into the mind by reason, and into the heart by grace. But to will to put it into the mind and heart by force and threats is not to put religion there, but terror, terorrem potius quam religionem.

...

Men despise religion; they hate it, and fear it is true. To remedy this, we must begin by showing that religion is not contrary to reason; that it is venerable, to inspire respect for it; then we must make it lovable, to make good men hope it is true; finally, we must prove it is true.

On March 27 2015 00:36 Thieving Magpie wrote:
You're over complicating this DJ

The value of X and Y are irrelevant. Believers believe the totality of life is a sum of both values and by believing Y is bigger than X, they feel comfortable negotiating X. It doesn't matter if Y is infinity or if Y = X+1. If Y is bigger than X, then it's okay to negotiate X.

Non believers believe the totality of life is just X, and so no matter the value of X they cannot negotiate it because it's all they have. Being it is all they have, sacrificing or hindering X for a non-believer is the same as the threat of eternal damnation (-Y) is for a believer. The payments for T are very different for both.

Pascal's Wager asks us to use only the formula X + Y = T and for us to assume that atheist value Y at 0, but the core of atheist beliefs is not that there is no afterlife but that living = life. The reward of existence, to an atheist, is being alive. They already are living in T. They are now asked to put a Y in the equation and being asked to manipulate X but there is no Y variable to non-believers. Which is why the costs are different.

On March 27 2015 00:39 Djzapz wrote:

Why does the belief in Y change anything was the conclusion to my post.

If I believe in X=T, my lack of belief in Y doesn't necessarily change my ability to access it, unless it so happens that belief is the key to Y, which begs the question, what other keys to Y are there and why belief, a human construct, should be the key?

If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at all, for nothing is certain

On March 27 2015 00:55 Thieving Magpie wrote:

They have nothing to lean on for comfort as they negotiate X.