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On September 18 2017 03:04 ChristianS wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 02:51 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 01:57 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 01:24 ChristianS wrote:
If the US had cared less about controlling the power dynamic in the Asian Pacific, how would that have caused NK to fall and/or not get nukes? Many of the agreements that could have been formed that would eliminate or reduce the NK threat would have required that the US give up on a few of its interests in the area. China wanting a buffer zone against a potential US enemy on its soil is definitely a genuine concern. On September 18 2017 01:21 KwarK wrote:On September 18 2017 01:04 LegalLord wrote:
It is of course the US's obsession with desiring to control the power dynamic in the Asia Pacific region that allowed this to continue for decades until NK finally got themselves nuclear weapons. And ironically the involvement in the Ukraine that helped lead to the North Koreans being able to get their hands on high-quality rocket engines. No sympathy, you reap what you sow, and now we all have to pay the price. this is wrong no What interests are those? And what agreement could have been formed that wouls have eliminated NK without the total destruction of Seoul? ...or is that one of the "interests" the US was too stubborn to give up? Interests being a foothold in the region. SK is an important part of that foothold, along with Japan and a number of outerlying nations. Developing a base of support in that region is rightfully seen as important to a US FP strategy that includes significant Asia interests. SK is a critical part of that strategy. The two means for dealing with NK are military and diplomacy. The former was tried and led to a stalemate because China would have none of it; Seoul's destruction aside that would be ineffective. The latter depends on being able to put pressure on NK to relent, which is terribly difficult to do when the countries who are actually capable of extracting concessions from NK are rightfully more concerned that the US is trying to shore up their influence in the region than to dispose of a dangerous foe. Oh well, you reap what you sow. On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:
Edit: I'm relatively uninformed on this and most military issues, but my understanding was that as long as we weren't willing to sacrifice Seoul, nothing could be done about NK. China is friends with them sometimes, but even if they weren't they couldn't do anything about it because NK was always going to be ideologically committed to obtaining nukes and ICBMs. Where do you think this analysis fails? In assuming a military solution as the only option. Though NK is diplomatically troublesome even for countries with which it is on good terms, they are not so insane that they could not be brought to the negotiating table. So your plan involves negotiating with NK to stop it. I'm gonna assume earlier when you said we could have gotten agreements to "eliminate or reduce" NK, you just meant "reduce," because obviously they wouldn't be negotiated into their own elimination. So what stick do you threaten NK with? Or what carrot do you offer them? The leadership doesn't care about the economic hardship of its people, and they're ideologically committed to being strong enough to defend themselves, not depending on another country to defend them. And what concession do you think we would have been able to extract? A cessation of their nuclear program? Disarming their artillery pointed at Seoul?
Negotiating with NK and with its closest diplomatic partners - most notably China and to a lesser but important extent Russia. Yes, it's true that neither of them really have control over the rogue country that is China, but influence they do have. NK may be rogue but it is definitely not suicidal; they do want to ensure the stability of their own country, even if that just means keeping the Kim dynasty alive for another century. Defending against the US threat, even if it makes them a bit more of a pariah than they already are, is a reasonable decision from the part of both NK and its partners. But if they were to tell NK to stuff it with enough threat of force then it just might lead to results.
The best way to get them to ease off is by removing that threat. Unfortunately that "threat" is also US presence in the region and its ability to deploy its military tech close to the border of China, so the US is not so willing to do that. The result ends up being that there is little reason to negotiate and it's best to just tell the US to fuck off. And while I can see why everyone put it off, now it's going to take one hell of a concession to get NK to give up its nukes. Again, you reap what you sow.
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United States43869 Posts
On September 18 2017 03:21 LegalLord wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 03:04 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 02:51 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 01:57 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 01:24 ChristianS wrote:
If the US had cared less about controlling the power dynamic in the Asian Pacific, how would that have caused NK to fall and/or not get nukes? Many of the agreements that could have been formed that would eliminate or reduce the NK threat would have required that the US give up on a few of its interests in the area. China wanting a buffer zone against a potential US enemy on its soil is definitely a genuine concern. On September 18 2017 01:21 KwarK wrote:On September 18 2017 01:04 LegalLord wrote:
It is of course the US's obsession with desiring to control the power dynamic in the Asia Pacific region that allowed this to continue for decades until NK finally got themselves nuclear weapons. And ironically the involvement in the Ukraine that helped lead to the North Koreans being able to get their hands on high-quality rocket engines. No sympathy, you reap what you sow, and now we all have to pay the price. this is wrong no What interests are those? And what agreement could have been formed that wouls have eliminated NK without the total destruction of Seoul? ...or is that one of the "interests" the US was too stubborn to give up? Interests being a foothold in the region. SK is an important part of that foothold, along with Japan and a number of outerlying nations. Developing a base of support in that region is rightfully seen as important to a US FP strategy that includes significant Asia interests. SK is a critical part of that strategy. The two means for dealing with NK are military and diplomacy. The former was tried and led to a stalemate because China would have none of it; Seoul's destruction aside that would be ineffective. The latter depends on being able to put pressure on NK to relent, which is terribly difficult to do when the countries who are actually capable of extracting concessions from NK are rightfully more concerned that the US is trying to shore up their influence in the region than to dispose of a dangerous foe. Oh well, you reap what you sow. On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:
Edit: I'm relatively uninformed on this and most military issues, but my understanding was that as long as we weren't willing to sacrifice Seoul, nothing could be done about NK. China is friends with them sometimes, but even if they weren't they couldn't do anything about it because NK was always going to be ideologically committed to obtaining nukes and ICBMs. Where do you think this analysis fails? In assuming a military solution as the only option. Though NK is diplomatically troublesome even for countries with which it is on good terms, they are not so insane that they could not be brought to the negotiating table. So your plan involves negotiating with NK to stop it. I'm gonna assume earlier when you said we could have gotten agreements to "eliminate or reduce" NK, you just meant "reduce," because obviously they wouldn't be negotiated into their own elimination. So what stick do you threaten NK with? Or what carrot do you offer them? The leadership doesn't care about the economic hardship of its people, and they're ideologically committed to being strong enough to defend themselves, not depending on another country to defend them. And what concession do you think we would have been able to extract? A cessation of their nuclear program? Disarming their artillery pointed at Seoul? Negotiating with NK and with its closest diplomatic partners - most notably China and to a lesser but important extent Russia. Yes, it's true that neither of them really have control over the rogue country that is China, but influence they do have. NK may be rogue but it is definitely not suicidal; they do want to ensure the stability of their own country, even if that just means keeping the Kim dynasty alive for another century. Defending against the US threat, even if it makes them a bit more of a pariah than they already are, is a reasonable decision from the part of both NK and its partners. But if they were to tell NK to stuff it with enough threat of force then it just might lead to results. The best way to get them to ease off is by removing that threat. Unfortunately that "threat" is also US presence in the region and its ability to deploy its military tech close to the border of China, so the US is not so willing to do that. The result ends up being that there is little reason to negotiate and it's best to just tell the US to fuck off. And while I can see why everyone put it off, now it's going to take one hell of a concession to get NK to give up its nukes. Again, you reap what you sow.
no, your analysis is all wrong, as are your starting premises and assumptions.
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On September 18 2017 03:21 LegalLord wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 03:04 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 02:51 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 01:57 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 01:24 ChristianS wrote:
If the US had cared less about controlling the power dynamic in the Asian Pacific, how would that have caused NK to fall and/or not get nukes? Many of the agreements that could have been formed that would eliminate or reduce the NK threat would have required that the US give up on a few of its interests in the area. China wanting a buffer zone against a potential US enemy on its soil is definitely a genuine concern. On September 18 2017 01:21 KwarK wrote:On September 18 2017 01:04 LegalLord wrote:
It is of course the US's obsession with desiring to control the power dynamic in the Asia Pacific region that allowed this to continue for decades until NK finally got themselves nuclear weapons. And ironically the involvement in the Ukraine that helped lead to the North Koreans being able to get their hands on high-quality rocket engines. No sympathy, you reap what you sow, and now we all have to pay the price. this is wrong no What interests are those? And what agreement could have been formed that wouls have eliminated NK without the total destruction of Seoul? ...or is that one of the "interests" the US was too stubborn to give up? Interests being a foothold in the region. SK is an important part of that foothold, along with Japan and a number of outerlying nations. Developing a base of support in that region is rightfully seen as important to a US FP strategy that includes significant Asia interests. SK is a critical part of that strategy. The two means for dealing with NK are military and diplomacy. The former was tried and led to a stalemate because China would have none of it; Seoul's destruction aside that would be ineffective. The latter depends on being able to put pressure on NK to relent, which is terribly difficult to do when the countries who are actually capable of extracting concessions from NK are rightfully more concerned that the US is trying to shore up their influence in the region than to dispose of a dangerous foe. Oh well, you reap what you sow. On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:
Edit: I'm relatively uninformed on this and most military issues, but my understanding was that as long as we weren't willing to sacrifice Seoul, nothing could be done about NK. China is friends with them sometimes, but even if they weren't they couldn't do anything about it because NK was always going to be ideologically committed to obtaining nukes and ICBMs. Where do you think this analysis fails? In assuming a military solution as the only option. Though NK is diplomatically troublesome even for countries with which it is on good terms, they are not so insane that they could not be brought to the negotiating table. So your plan involves negotiating with NK to stop it. I'm gonna assume earlier when you said we could have gotten agreements to "eliminate or reduce" NK, you just meant "reduce," because obviously they wouldn't be negotiated into their own elimination. So what stick do you threaten NK with? Or what carrot do you offer them? The leadership doesn't care about the economic hardship of its people, and they're ideologically committed to being strong enough to defend themselves, not depending on another country to defend them. And what concession do you think we would have been able to extract? A cessation of their nuclear program? Disarming their artillery pointed at Seoul? Negotiating with NK and with its closest diplomatic partners - most notably China and to a lesser but important extent Russia. Yes, it's true that neither of them really have control over the rogue country that is China, but influence they do have. NK may be rogue but it is definitely not suicidal; they do want to ensure the stability of their own country, even if that just means keeping the Kim dynasty alive for another century. Defending against the US threat, even if it makes them a bit more of a pariah than they already are, is a reasonable decision from the part of both NK and its partners. But if they were to tell NK to stuff it with enough threat of force then it just might lead to results. The best way to get them to ease off is by removing that threat. Unfortunately that "threat" is also US presence in the region and its ability to deploy its military tech close to the border of China, so the US is not so willing to do that. The result ends up being that there is little reason to negotiate and it's best to just tell the US to fuck off. And while I can see why everyone put it off, now it's going to take one hell of a concession to get NK to give up its nukes. Again, you reap what you sow.
You keep ignoring the situation of South Korea, bordering a hostile militarized nation being backed by the regional 'super' power...
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On September 18 2017 03:29 Gorsameth wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 03:21 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 03:04 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 02:51 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 01:57 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 01:24 ChristianS wrote:
If the US had cared less about controlling the power dynamic in the Asian Pacific, how would that have caused NK to fall and/or not get nukes? Many of the agreements that could have been formed that would eliminate or reduce the NK threat would have required that the US give up on a few of its interests in the area. China wanting a buffer zone against a potential US enemy on its soil is definitely a genuine concern. On September 18 2017 01:21 KwarK wrote:On September 18 2017 01:04 LegalLord wrote:
It is of course the US's obsession with desiring to control the power dynamic in the Asia Pacific region that allowed this to continue for decades until NK finally got themselves nuclear weapons. And ironically the involvement in the Ukraine that helped lead to the North Koreans being able to get their hands on high-quality rocket engines. No sympathy, you reap what you sow, and now we all have to pay the price. this is wrong no What interests are those? And what agreement could have been formed that wouls have eliminated NK without the total destruction of Seoul? ...or is that one of the "interests" the US was too stubborn to give up? Interests being a foothold in the region. SK is an important part of that foothold, along with Japan and a number of outerlying nations. Developing a base of support in that region is rightfully seen as important to a US FP strategy that includes significant Asia interests. SK is a critical part of that strategy. The two means for dealing with NK are military and diplomacy. The former was tried and led to a stalemate because China would have none of it; Seoul's destruction aside that would be ineffective. The latter depends on being able to put pressure on NK to relent, which is terribly difficult to do when the countries who are actually capable of extracting concessions from NK are rightfully more concerned that the US is trying to shore up their influence in the region than to dispose of a dangerous foe. Oh well, you reap what you sow. On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:
Edit: I'm relatively uninformed on this and most military issues, but my understanding was that as long as we weren't willing to sacrifice Seoul, nothing could be done about NK. China is friends with them sometimes, but even if they weren't they couldn't do anything about it because NK was always going to be ideologically committed to obtaining nukes and ICBMs. Where do you think this analysis fails? In assuming a military solution as the only option. Though NK is diplomatically troublesome even for countries with which it is on good terms, they are not so insane that they could not be brought to the negotiating table. So your plan involves negotiating with NK to stop it. I'm gonna assume earlier when you said we could have gotten agreements to "eliminate or reduce" NK, you just meant "reduce," because obviously they wouldn't be negotiated into their own elimination. So what stick do you threaten NK with? Or what carrot do you offer them? The leadership doesn't care about the economic hardship of its people, and they're ideologically committed to being strong enough to defend themselves, not depending on another country to defend them. And what concession do you think we would have been able to extract? A cessation of their nuclear program? Disarming their artillery pointed at Seoul? Negotiating with NK and with its closest diplomatic partners - most notably China and to a lesser but important extent Russia. Yes, it's true that neither of them really have control over the rogue country that is China, but influence they do have. NK may be rogue but it is definitely not suicidal; they do want to ensure the stability of their own country, even if that just means keeping the Kim dynasty alive for another century. Defending against the US threat, even if it makes them a bit more of a pariah than they already are, is a reasonable decision from the part of both NK and its partners. But if they were to tell NK to stuff it with enough threat of force then it just might lead to results. The best way to get them to ease off is by removing that threat. Unfortunately that "threat" is also US presence in the region and its ability to deploy its military tech close to the border of China, so the US is not so willing to do that. The result ends up being that there is little reason to negotiate and it's best to just tell the US to fuck off. And while I can see why everyone put it off, now it's going to take one hell of a concession to get NK to give up its nukes. Again, you reap what you sow. You keep ignoring the situation of South Korea, bordering a hostile militarized nation being backed by the regional 'super' power...
Do you mean that in a feels-based "we can't let anything happen to SK" sense or some other sense? Frankly, when nukes are involved and potentially going to be fired rather than just kept for deterrence, Seoul getting leveled is the least of my concerns. But it does fall under the general range of problems involving reducing the NK threat.
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On September 18 2017 03:31 LegalLord wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 03:29 Gorsameth wrote:On September 18 2017 03:21 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 03:04 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 02:51 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 01:57 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 01:24 ChristianS wrote:
If the US had cared less about controlling the power dynamic in the Asian Pacific, how would that have caused NK to fall and/or not get nukes? Many of the agreements that could have been formed that would eliminate or reduce the NK threat would have required that the US give up on a few of its interests in the area. China wanting a buffer zone against a potential US enemy on its soil is definitely a genuine concern. On September 18 2017 01:21 KwarK wrote:On September 18 2017 01:04 LegalLord wrote:
It is of course the US's obsession with desiring to control the power dynamic in the Asia Pacific region that allowed this to continue for decades until NK finally got themselves nuclear weapons. And ironically the involvement in the Ukraine that helped lead to the North Koreans being able to get their hands on high-quality rocket engines. No sympathy, you reap what you sow, and now we all have to pay the price. this is wrong no What interests are those? And what agreement could have been formed that wouls have eliminated NK without the total destruction of Seoul? ...or is that one of the "interests" the US was too stubborn to give up? Interests being a foothold in the region. SK is an important part of that foothold, along with Japan and a number of outerlying nations. Developing a base of support in that region is rightfully seen as important to a US FP strategy that includes significant Asia interests. SK is a critical part of that strategy. The two means for dealing with NK are military and diplomacy. The former was tried and led to a stalemate because China would have none of it; Seoul's destruction aside that would be ineffective. The latter depends on being able to put pressure on NK to relent, which is terribly difficult to do when the countries who are actually capable of extracting concessions from NK are rightfully more concerned that the US is trying to shore up their influence in the region than to dispose of a dangerous foe. Oh well, you reap what you sow. On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:
Edit: I'm relatively uninformed on this and most military issues, but my understanding was that as long as we weren't willing to sacrifice Seoul, nothing could be done about NK. China is friends with them sometimes, but even if they weren't they couldn't do anything about it because NK was always going to be ideologically committed to obtaining nukes and ICBMs. Where do you think this analysis fails? In assuming a military solution as the only option. Though NK is diplomatically troublesome even for countries with which it is on good terms, they are not so insane that they could not be brought to the negotiating table. So your plan involves negotiating with NK to stop it. I'm gonna assume earlier when you said we could have gotten agreements to "eliminate or reduce" NK, you just meant "reduce," because obviously they wouldn't be negotiated into their own elimination. So what stick do you threaten NK with? Or what carrot do you offer them? The leadership doesn't care about the economic hardship of its people, and they're ideologically committed to being strong enough to defend themselves, not depending on another country to defend them. And what concession do you think we would have been able to extract? A cessation of their nuclear program? Disarming their artillery pointed at Seoul? Negotiating with NK and with its closest diplomatic partners - most notably China and to a lesser but important extent Russia. Yes, it's true that neither of them really have control over the rogue country that is China, but influence they do have. NK may be rogue but it is definitely not suicidal; they do want to ensure the stability of their own country, even if that just means keeping the Kim dynasty alive for another century. Defending against the US threat, even if it makes them a bit more of a pariah than they already are, is a reasonable decision from the part of both NK and its partners. But if they were to tell NK to stuff it with enough threat of force then it just might lead to results. The best way to get them to ease off is by removing that threat. Unfortunately that "threat" is also US presence in the region and its ability to deploy its military tech close to the border of China, so the US is not so willing to do that. The result ends up being that there is little reason to negotiate and it's best to just tell the US to fuck off. And while I can see why everyone put it off, now it's going to take one hell of a concession to get NK to give up its nukes. Again, you reap what you sow. You keep ignoring the situation of South Korea, bordering a hostile militarized nation being backed by the regional 'super' power... Do you mean that in a feels-based "we can't let anything happen to SK" sense or some other sense? Frankly, when nukes are involved and potentially going to be fired rather than just kept for deterrence, Seoul getting leveled is the least of my concerns. But it does fall under the general range of problems involving reducing the NK threat.
So we are back to 'fuck South Korea'. Only in your scenario it is significantly more likely to get fucked and for no foreseeable gain since North Korea would not stop its weapon programs as it is a requirement for their own protection.
Additionally a brutal dictatorship will always find a looming powerful enemy that must be opposed in order to keep their subjects in line. So they will still be openly hostile to everyone around them, including the US. Be in their Japan bases or anywhere else.
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On September 18 2017 03:21 LegalLord wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 03:04 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 02:51 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:On September 18 2017 01:57 LegalLord wrote:On September 18 2017 01:24 ChristianS wrote:
If the US had cared less about controlling the power dynamic in the Asian Pacific, how would that have caused NK to fall and/or not get nukes? Many of the agreements that could have been formed that would eliminate or reduce the NK threat would have required that the US give up on a few of its interests in the area. China wanting a buffer zone against a potential US enemy on its soil is definitely a genuine concern. On September 18 2017 01:21 KwarK wrote:On September 18 2017 01:04 LegalLord wrote:
It is of course the US's obsession with desiring to control the power dynamic in the Asia Pacific region that allowed this to continue for decades until NK finally got themselves nuclear weapons. And ironically the involvement in the Ukraine that helped lead to the North Koreans being able to get their hands on high-quality rocket engines. No sympathy, you reap what you sow, and now we all have to pay the price. this is wrong no What interests are those? And what agreement could have been formed that wouls have eliminated NK without the total destruction of Seoul? ...or is that one of the "interests" the US was too stubborn to give up? Interests being a foothold in the region. SK is an important part of that foothold, along with Japan and a number of outerlying nations. Developing a base of support in that region is rightfully seen as important to a US FP strategy that includes significant Asia interests. SK is a critical part of that strategy. The two means for dealing with NK are military and diplomacy. The former was tried and led to a stalemate because China would have none of it; Seoul's destruction aside that would be ineffective. The latter depends on being able to put pressure on NK to relent, which is terribly difficult to do when the countries who are actually capable of extracting concessions from NK are rightfully more concerned that the US is trying to shore up their influence in the region than to dispose of a dangerous foe. Oh well, you reap what you sow. On September 18 2017 02:34 ChristianS wrote:
Edit: I'm relatively uninformed on this and most military issues, but my understanding was that as long as we weren't willing to sacrifice Seoul, nothing could be done about NK. China is friends with them sometimes, but even if they weren't they couldn't do anything about it because NK was always going to be ideologically committed to obtaining nukes and ICBMs. Where do you think this analysis fails? In assuming a military solution as the only option. Though NK is diplomatically troublesome even for countries with which it is on good terms, they are not so insane that they could not be brought to the negotiating table. So your plan involves negotiating with NK to stop it. I'm gonna assume earlier when you said we could have gotten agreements to "eliminate or reduce" NK, you just meant "reduce," because obviously they wouldn't be negotiated into their own elimination. So what stick do you threaten NK with? Or what carrot do you offer them? The leadership doesn't care about the economic hardship of its people, and they're ideologically committed to being strong enough to defend themselves, not depending on another country to defend them. And what concession do you think we would have been able to extract? A cessation of their nuclear program? Disarming their artillery pointed at Seoul? Negotiating with NK and with its closest diplomatic partners - most notably China and to a lesser but important extent Russia. Yes, it's true that neither of them really have control over the rogue country that is China, but influence they do have. NK may be rogue but it is definitely not suicidal; they do want to ensure the stability of their own country, even if that just means keeping the Kim dynasty alive for another century. Defending against the US threat, even if it makes them a bit more of a pariah than they already are, is a reasonable decision from the part of both NK and its partners. But if they were to tell NK to stuff it with enough threat of force then it just might lead to results. The best way to get them to ease off is by removing that threat. Unfortunately that "threat" is also US presence in the region and its ability to deploy its military tech close to the border of China, so the US is not so willing to do that. The result ends up being that there is little reason to negotiate and it's best to just tell the US to fuck off. And while I can see why everyone put it off, now it's going to take one hell of a concession to get NK to give up its nukes. Again, you reap what you sow.
I mean, so you're Monday morning quarterbacking the last 70 years of US Asian Pacific FP, but even aside from that, I'm just trying to figure out what this negotiation stance would have looked like. Because your claim is that a peaceful resolution to the conflict was totally possible, but the US wasn't prepared to pursue it, therefore you're laying all the blame for the present situation at the US's feet.
But what does that hypothetical resolution look like? Suppose we somehow convinced China to fully agree with us that NK was dangerous and needed to be kept in check. Then China threatens force against NK... then what? Even if we pulled all our military bases out of the Asian Pacific and pushed through all the critics crying "appeasement," do you really think NK would stop wanting nukes? That China could convince them to stop pursuing them?
Every indication I've seen is that NK's desire for world-ending military power isn't conditional on a US threat, it's ideologically central to their state's philosophy. A hypothetical US-China coalition could have beat them in a conventional war even more easily than we could have alone, but not without the same destruction to their enemies we were unwilling to accept. Unless you mean that we should have negotiated with China to prevent NK from existing in the first place, it still boils down to the fact that if we offer a carrot they don't want it nearly as much as they want nukes, if we threaten with a stick it just reinforces the need for nukes, and if we invade them they blow up SK on their way out. That equation doesn't fundamentally change if China is also pressuring them.
The US made plenty of FP mistakes in the 20th century, you're just not making a very compelling case that this is among them.
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On September 18 2017 04:07 ChristianS wrote:
Every indication I've seen is that NK's desire for world-ending military power isn't conditional on a US threat, it's ideologically central to their state's philosophy.
I suppose that's really the core dispute here, and everything else is just dependent on the answer to the question of what NK and its leadership is actually after. It would perhaps be interesting to discuss that motivation. But for now I'd rather leave it for another time; it seems a bit too speculative and convoluted a discussion to be something I'm in the mood for engaging in right now.
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On September 18 2017 04:20 LegalLord wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 04:07 ChristianS wrote:
Every indication I've seen is that NK's desire for world-ending military power isn't conditional on a US threat, it's ideologically central to their state's philosophy. I suppose that's really the core dispute here, and everything else is just dependent on the answer to the question of what NK and its leadership is actually after. It would perhaps be interesting to discuss that motivation. But for now I'd rather leave it for another time; it seems a bit too speculative and convoluted a discussion to be something I'm in the mood for engaging in right now.
Let me just clarify this. Your hypothetical agreement the US could/should have pursued involved placating China by giving up some geopolitical influence in the Asian Pacific, thus prompting them to join with us in threatening NK if they don't back off their nuclear program. Then they either agree to stop pursuing nukes, or the US and China join together to go kick their ass, with whatever damage they manage to inflict on SK before they're defeated being collateral damage.
Do I at least have you approximately right here?
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Sort of. That account of events sort of lessens the emphasis on providing diplomatic incentives to NK to stop their program, in terms of economic support being given or withheld based on active cooperation, and perhaps in terms of non-nuclear technological support towards nuclear disarmament. No illusions that the result would be anything but painful and difficult for all sides involved, but less dangerous than a nuclear ICBM equipped North Korea.
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America celebrates constitution day today.
We're largely in a post-constitutional society, but the part that survives sustains us still. It was signed on September 17th, 1787.
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United States43869 Posts
On September 18 2017 05:19 Danglars wrote:
We're largely in a post-constitutional society
in your opinion
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On September 18 2017 05:19 Danglars wrote:America celebrates constitution day today. https://twitter.com/molratty/status/909505897218666498We're largely in a post-constitutional society, but the part that survives sustains us still. It was signed on September 17th, 1787.
With all this talk of statues and history, maybe we can compromise and swap out Columbus Day with Constitution Day as a federal holiday.
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On September 18 2017 05:39 Introvert wrote:With all this talk of statues and history, maybe we can compromise and swap out Columbus Day with Constitution Day as a federal holiday.
constitution day sounds potentially better; doubtful it's really worth an actual day off holiday though.
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On September 18 2017 05:39 Introvert wrote:With all this talk of statues and history, maybe we can compromise and swap out Columbus Day with Constitution Day as a federal holiday.
Indigenous Peoples' Day works as a good substitute for Columbus, I think Constitution Day doesn't need to be a federal holiday, particularly when it still doesn't seem to be applying to everyone.
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Canada11479 Posts
Change Columbus Day to Viking Day: Vikings are cooler, and they made landfall in North America much earlier than Columbus.
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Did we already discuss TIllerson looking to closing the US Embassy in Cuba?
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On September 18 2017 05:21 KwarK wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 05:19 Danglars wrote:
We're largely in a post-constitutional society in your opinion
well we clearly don't care about article one section 9 clause 8 anymore.
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On September 18 2017 05:21 KwarK wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 05:19 Danglars wrote:
We're largely in a post-constitutional society in your opinion
I should've added "my posts do not represent the opinion of Victor or any other member of TeamLiquid."
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United States43869 Posts
On September 18 2017 06:26 Danglars wrote:Show nested quote +On September 18 2017 05:21 KwarK wrote:On September 18 2017 05:19 Danglars wrote:
We're largely in a post-constitutional society in your opinion I should've added "my posts do not represent the opinion of Victor or any other member of TeamLiquid."
Or the opinion of, say, the SCOTUS who probably know a little more about the constitution than you do.
It was a really outlandish statement you made which is why I specifically qualified it for you.
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EPT
