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Yes, this is a thread on TL that involves religion, but I hate to think that our policy should be to blindly close every such thread. Sam Harris is a writer whose books are both insightful and have sparked many good discussions in the past and as long as the thread doesn't derail I'd like to leave it open. This should be the basic premise for every such thread, no matter how high the odds of it derailing. In that light, these posts that just predict the downfall of this thread (whether it be pre-determined or not) are 1) Not contributing to the discussion 2) Backseat moderating 3) Annoying 4) Actually contributing towards derailing it. I'll keep 2 daying people for this. |
On March 11 2012 14:43 kidcrash wrote:
Just a quick question from someone who is generally ill informed about quantum mechanics. If it is determined that QM is 100% random in nature, then why isn't the universe just one gigantic, incoherent blob of plasma mass?
It seems like if there were some structure in addition to the randomness that certain things could be explained. For example, the structure of the universe or things like evolution of species, etc.
There seems to be a confusion in the word random.
When we say random, we mean the "random" that is used in the definition of a "random variable" in probability theory. When applied to quantum mechanics, to say that a position of a particle is random is to mean that the position of the particle is unknown and unpredictable, but it does not mean that it is equally likely to be at any point in space (the word used to describe this is "uniform" instead of "random"). The particle is more likely to be in certain places than other places, i.e. the position of the particle is random but not uniform. So that in total, these random particles makes up the universe we observe.
As an analogy, if you use a random number generator to generate a normal random variable on a computer (say on Excel), the next generated number is completely unpredictable to you, i.e, random. But when you generate lots of random numbers, in total they make a very predictable shape, the shape of a bell curve. The same is true of the randomness in quantum mechanics, i.e. each particle is random, but in total, on the macro level, it doesn't look random anymore, they make the universe we observe.
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On March 11 2012 15:11 paralleluniverse wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 14:43 kidcrash wrote:
Just a quick question from someone who is generally ill informed about quantum mechanics. If it is determined that QM is 100% random in nature, then why isn't the universe just one gigantic, incoherent blob of plasma mass?
It seems like if there were some structure in addition to the randomness that certain things could be explained. For example, the structure of the universe or things like evolution of species, etc. There seems to be a confusion in the word random. When we say random, we mean the "random" that is used in the definition of a "random variable" in probability theory. When applied to quantum mechanics, to say that a position of a particle is random is to mean that the position of the particle is unknown and unpredictable, but it does not mean that it is equally likely to be at any point in space (the word used to describe this is "uniform" instead of "random"). The particle is more likely to be in certain places than other places, i.e. the position of the particle is random but not uniform. So that in total, these random particles makes up the universe we observe. As an analogy, if you use a random number generator to generate a normal random variable on a computer (say on Excel), the next generated number is completely unpredictable to you, i.e, random. But when you generate lots of random numbers, in total they make a very predictable shape, the shape of a bell curve. The same is true of the randomness in quantum mechanics, i.e. each particle is random, but in total, on the macro level, it doesn't look random anymore, they make the universe we observe.
So how come you state in the OP that they are a "fundamentally unpredictable random processes" but above in bold you state they create a predictable shape? Once again excuse my limited knowledge but I can only further understand this by asking questions.
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On March 11 2012 14:43 kidcrash wrote:
Just a quick question from someone who is generally ill informed about quantum mechanics. If it is determined that QM is 100% random in nature, then why isn't the universe just one gigantic, incoherent blob of plasma mass?
It seems like if there were some structure in addition to the randomness that certain things could be explained. For example, the structure of the universe or things like evolution of species, etc.
randomness is not uniform, and it's definitely not a uniform distribution. as i've mentioned before, it operates on extremely small scales. and at those scales, it's not as if their probability distributions are flat either, they're usually superpositions of sinusoids and exponential functions, just because of how the math turns out (with discrete quantum states of a certain number of properties). at the very beginning of the universe, when it existed at the scale quantum mechanics applied at, it's postulated that these processes, combined with the period of hyperinflation in which space stretched at incredible speeds (though not the energy/matter in space itself, so it's not in violation of that) created the large scale bumps of energies that eventually formed into stars and galaxies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Big_Bang
randomness also tends not to be perceived as random by humans, just because we're good at recognizing patterns in randomness http://muller.lbl.gov/teaching/physics10/old physics 10/chapters (old)/4-Randomness.htm
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On March 11 2012 11:12 mowglie wrote:
Another thread bashing religion. There are people (philosophers, theologians, historians, theists, atheists) way smarter than 99 % of us here that have debated this for decades and still continue to do so without ends.
And yet, have you ever heard one of these 'smart people' actually define Free Will or the mechanism by which it works? (the answer is no) People think they believe in Free Will because they never bother to ask themselves what 'Free Will' actually means. Explanations like 'Free Will is the ability to choose freely' aren't explanations at all but incoherent strings of words which have no meaning.
Surprisingly, it's not actually all that easy to recognise that you are debating the existence of something incoherent, regardless of which side you're on. I never even realised how vague 'Free Will' actually was until recently, and up until that point I was quite happy using arguments like the OP's, which wrongly place the onus on the non-believer to demonstrate Free Will's non-existence rather than firstly asking the believer what it is they actually mean when they say Free Will (and what evidence there is of said Free Will).
The whole debate is a complete reversal of the Scientific Process, and it only happens that way because belief in Free Will is something which existed before science, and thus the belief persists without very many people stopping to ask "WTF are we believing in?!". It's also relatively inneffectual (unlike belief in God, for e.g.), so there's really no hurry to be ridding ourselves of it in spite of its falsity.
This is of course ignoring compatibilist theories of Free Will such as Daniel Dennet's, which are so wound up in semantics that they fail to be useful in any real way (apart from providing the believer with relief from the scary idea that they may not have any control over the way things happen).
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You are free to think what you will. :>
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On March 11 2012 15:23 kidcrash wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 15:11 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 11 2012 14:43 kidcrash wrote:
Just a quick question from someone who is generally ill informed about quantum mechanics. If it is determined that QM is 100% random in nature, then why isn't the universe just one gigantic, incoherent blob of plasma mass?
It seems like if there were some structure in addition to the randomness that certain things could be explained. For example, the structure of the universe or things like evolution of species, etc. There seems to be a confusion in the word random. When we say random, we mean the "random" that is used in the definition of a "random variable" in probability theory. When applied to quantum mechanics, to say that a position of a particle is random is to mean that the position of the particle is unknown and unpredictable, but it does not mean that it is equally likely to be at any point in space (the word used to describe this is "uniform" instead of "random"). The particle is more likely to be in certain places than other places, i.e. the position of the particle is random but not uniform. So that in total, these random particles makes up the universe we observe. As an analogy, if you use a random number generator to generate a normal random variable on a computer (say on Excel), the next generated number is completely unpredictable to you, i.e, random. But when you generate lots of random numbers, in total they make a very predictable shape, the shape of a bell curve. The same is true of the randomness in quantum mechanics, i.e. each particle is random, but in total, on the macro level, it doesn't look random anymore, they make the universe we observe. So how come you state in the OP that they are a "fundamentally unpredictable random processes" but above in bold you state they create a predictable shape? Once again excuse my limited knowledge but I can only further understand this by asking questions.
Because it's fundamentally impossible to predict with certainty the position of any particular particle before it's observed.
See analogy above about RNGs on a computer. This analogy proves that it's possible that every individual observation (particle) be unpredictable, yet the big picture over millions of observations (particles) still has a predictable shape.
In short, the statements "the position of every particle is unpredictable" and "the position of billions of particles makes a predictable shape" is not contradictory. In fact, this is the basis of statistics or probability theory.
Another real world example is the release of gas and steam. The motion of a single gas particle is unpredictable, it bumps and turns and moves in random directions. But the motion of the entire stream of gas or steam is predictable, in total it moves up into the air and disperses.
On March 11 2012 15:59 SpiritoftheTunA wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 14:43 kidcrash wrote:
Just a quick question from someone who is generally ill informed about quantum mechanics. If it is determined that QM is 100% random in nature, then why isn't the universe just one gigantic, incoherent blob of plasma mass?
It seems like if there were some structure in addition to the randomness that certain things could be explained. For example, the structure of the universe or things like evolution of species, etc. randomness is not uniform, and it's definitely not a uniform distribution. as i've mentioned before, it operates on extremely small scales. and at those scales, it's not as if their probability distributions are flat either, they're usually superpositions of sinusoids and exponential functions, just because of how the math turns out (with discrete quantum states of a certain number of properties). at the very beginning of the universe, when it existed at the scale quantum mechanics applied at, it's postulated that these processes, combined with the period of hyperinflation in which space stretched at incredible speeds (though not the energy/matter in space itself, so it's not in violation of that) created the large scale bumps of energies that eventually formed into stars and galaxies. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Big_Bangrandomness also tends not to be perceived as random by humans, just because we're good at recognizing patterns in randomness http://muller.lbl.gov/teaching/physics10/old physics 10/chapters (old)/4-Randomness.htm
I don't think sinusoidals and exponentials would illuminate the explanation for a non-technical audience.
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On March 11 2012 15:59 Swede wrote:
And yet, have you ever heard one of these 'smart people' actually define Free Will or the mechanism by which it works? (the answer is no) People think they believe in Free Will because they never bother to ask themselves what 'Free Will' actually means. Explanations like 'Free Will is the ability to choose freely' aren't explanations at all but incoherent strings of words which have no meaning.
I'm sorry to sound crude, but this statement is horribly ignorant of the history of Western Philosophy. Do you really think that Harris, an honnest but quite lackluster and second-zone thinker, is the first one to measure himself seriously to the problem of free will? Have you ever read Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, just to name a few?
If you have, I'll be happy to discuss the matter with you.
The quarrel between American fundamentalist Christians and the like of Sam Harris is at best an adolescent dispute, restating (caricaturally) arguments that having been around since Medieval (if not Ancient Greek) philosophy, and adding sparkles of modern science to it.
The sad truth is that philosophy cannot grow in such a venimous environment. Philosophy is the opening of the mind, not the peremptory closing of one upon one side or the other. This is America's own problem. It's barely a part of World Philosophy.
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On March 11 2012 15:23 kidcrash wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 15:11 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 11 2012 14:43 kidcrash wrote:
Just a quick question from someone who is generally ill informed about quantum mechanics. If it is determined that QM is 100% random in nature, then why isn't the universe just one gigantic, incoherent blob of plasma mass?
It seems like if there were some structure in addition to the randomness that certain things could be explained. For example, the structure of the universe or things like evolution of species, etc. There seems to be a confusion in the word random. When we say random, we mean the "random" that is used in the definition of a "random variable" in probability theory. When applied to quantum mechanics, to say that a position of a particle is random is to mean that the position of the particle is unknown and unpredictable, but it does not mean that it is equally likely to be at any point in space (the word used to describe this is "uniform" instead of "random"). The particle is more likely to be in certain places than other places, i.e. the position of the particle is random but not uniform. So that in total, these random particles makes up the universe we observe. As an analogy, if you use a random number generator to generate a normal random variable on a computer (say on Excel), the next generated number is completely unpredictable to you, i.e, random. But when you generate lots of random numbers, in total they make a very predictable shape, the shape of a bell curve. The same is true of the randomness in quantum mechanics, i.e. each particle is random, but in total, on the macro level, it doesn't look random anymore, they make the universe we observe. So how come you state in the OP that they are a "fundamentally unpredictable random processes" but above in bold you state they create a predictable shape? Once again excuse my limited knowledge but I can only further understand this by asking questions.
I'd suggest you look up wave functions if you're interested in more information regarding this.
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On March 11 2012 17:23 Gegenschein wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 15:59 Swede wrote:
And yet, have you ever heard one of these 'smart people' actually define Free Will or the mechanism by which it works? (the answer is no) People think they believe in Free Will because they never bother to ask themselves what 'Free Will' actually means. Explanations like 'Free Will is the ability to choose freely' aren't explanations at all but incoherent strings of words which have no meaning. I'm sorry to sound crude, but this statement is horribly ignorant of the history of Western Philosophy. Do you really think that Harris, an honnest but quite lackluster and second-zone thinker, is the first one to measure himself seriously to the problem of free will? Have you ever read Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, just to name a few? If you have, I'll be happy to discuss the matter with you. The quarrel between American fundamentalist Christians and the like of Sam Harris is at best an adolescent dispute, restating (caricaturally) arguments that having been around since Medieval (if not Ancient Greek) philosophy, and adding sparkles of modern science to it. The sad truth is that philosophy cannot grow in such a venimous environment. Philosophy is the opening of the mind, not the peremptory closing of one upon one side or the other. This is America's own problem. It's barely a part of World Philosophy.
I'm pretty sure you misunderstood what I was saying. I wasn't even referring to Sam Harris, just giving my own thoughts on the Free Will debate. I'm not even sure what 'matter' it is that you want to discuss with me. Care to elaborate on what you meant?
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On March 11 2012 18:01 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 17:23 Gegenschein wrote:On March 11 2012 15:59 Swede wrote:
And yet, have you ever heard one of these 'smart people' actually define Free Will or the mechanism by which it works? (the answer is no) People think they believe in Free Will because they never bother to ask themselves what 'Free Will' actually means. Explanations like 'Free Will is the ability to choose freely' aren't explanations at all but incoherent strings of words which have no meaning. I'm sorry to sound crude, but this statement is horribly ignorant of the history of Western Philosophy. Do you really think that Harris, an honnest but quite lackluster and second-zone thinker, is the first one to measure himself seriously to the problem of free will? Have you ever read Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, just to name a few? If you have, I'll be happy to discuss the matter with you. The quarrel between American fundamentalist Christians and the like of Sam Harris is at best an adolescent dispute, restating (caricaturally) arguments that having been around since Medieval (if not Ancient Greek) philosophy, and adding sparkles of modern science to it. The sad truth is that philosophy cannot grow in such a venimous environment. Philosophy is the opening of the mind, not the peremptory closing of one upon one side or the other. This is America's own problem. It's barely a part of World Philosophy. I'm pretty sure you misunderstood what I was saying. I wasn't even referring to Sam Harris, just giving my own thoughts on the Free Will debate. I'm not even sure what 'matter' it is that you want to discuss with me. Care to elaborate on what you meant?
The matter of the definition of free will.
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On March 11 2012 18:26 Gegenschein wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 18:01 Swede wrote:On March 11 2012 17:23 Gegenschein wrote:On March 11 2012 15:59 Swede wrote:
And yet, have you ever heard one of these 'smart people' actually define Free Will or the mechanism by which it works? (the answer is no) People think they believe in Free Will because they never bother to ask themselves what 'Free Will' actually means. Explanations like 'Free Will is the ability to choose freely' aren't explanations at all but incoherent strings of words which have no meaning. I'm sorry to sound crude, but this statement is horribly ignorant of the history of Western Philosophy. Do you really think that Harris, an honnest but quite lackluster and second-zone thinker, is the first one to measure himself seriously to the problem of free will? Have you ever read Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, just to name a few? If you have, I'll be happy to discuss the matter with you. The quarrel between American fundamentalist Christians and the like of Sam Harris is at best an adolescent dispute, restating (caricaturally) arguments that having been around since Medieval (if not Ancient Greek) philosophy, and adding sparkles of modern science to it. The sad truth is that philosophy cannot grow in such a venimous environment. Philosophy is the opening of the mind, not the peremptory closing of one upon one side or the other. This is America's own problem. It's barely a part of World Philosophy. I'm pretty sure you misunderstood what I was saying. I wasn't even referring to Sam Harris, just giving my own thoughts on the Free Will debate. I'm not even sure what 'matter' it is that you want to discuss with me. Care to elaborate on what you meant? The matter of the definition of free will.
Ok. Well, like I said, I've never read a workable definition which wasn't completely compatibilist and worthless (including any by those philosophers you mentioned). Feel free to provide one, but I suspect that it isn't possible given that the human brain is severely limited in its ability to conceive of mechanisms other than cause and effect or randomness, and Free Will is seemingly impossible under either of these mechanisms.
Perhaps it is my knowledge of philosophy that is lacking, but I suspect that if a strong argument for Free Will had been made I would have heard about it.
And I'm not just close minded if that was the intended implication of your original reply.
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On March 11 2012 19:20 Swede wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 18:26 Gegenschein wrote:On March 11 2012 18:01 Swede wrote:On March 11 2012 17:23 Gegenschein wrote:On March 11 2012 15:59 Swede wrote:
And yet, have you ever heard one of these 'smart people' actually define Free Will or the mechanism by which it works? (the answer is no) People think they believe in Free Will because they never bother to ask themselves what 'Free Will' actually means. Explanations like 'Free Will is the ability to choose freely' aren't explanations at all but incoherent strings of words which have no meaning. I'm sorry to sound crude, but this statement is horribly ignorant of the history of Western Philosophy. Do you really think that Harris, an honnest but quite lackluster and second-zone thinker, is the first one to measure himself seriously to the problem of free will? Have you ever read Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, just to name a few? If you have, I'll be happy to discuss the matter with you. The quarrel between American fundamentalist Christians and the like of Sam Harris is at best an adolescent dispute, restating (caricaturally) arguments that having been around since Medieval (if not Ancient Greek) philosophy, and adding sparkles of modern science to it. The sad truth is that philosophy cannot grow in such a venimous environment. Philosophy is the opening of the mind, not the peremptory closing of one upon one side or the other. This is America's own problem. It's barely a part of World Philosophy. I'm pretty sure you misunderstood what I was saying. I wasn't even referring to Sam Harris, just giving my own thoughts on the Free Will debate. I'm not even sure what 'matter' it is that you want to discuss with me. Care to elaborate on what you meant? The matter of the definition of free will. Ok. Well, like I said, I've never read a workable definition which wasn't completely compatibilist and worthless (including any by those philosophers you mentioned). Feel free to provide one, but I suspect that it isn't possible given that the human brain is severely limited in its ability to conceive of mechanisms other than cause and effect or randomness, and Free Will is seemingly impossible under either of these mechanisms. Perhaps it is my knowledge of philosophy that is lacking, but I suspect that if a strong argument for Free Will had been made I would have heard about it. And I'm not just close minded if that was the intended implication of your original reply.
First we have to establish that there are basically two ways of going about this whole topic, the opposition of which constitutes a philosophical problem all by itself.
The first way asserts that knowledge is a priori bound by Nature (the knownable object), the other that it is a priori bound by the Mind (the knowing subject). Modern pure and applied science is almost purely positivistic (i.e. the first way). The other way is that of phenomenology: the science of conscience itself; that of Husserl and Heidegger most notably.
Positivism is naturally (i.e. at first) deterministic, since a Nature that's not an objective reality identical-to-itself is null and void. This is why the now-mainstream interpretation of quantum physics represents to some extent a scandal: how can we "do science" if the Universe is, in the end, unpredictable?
On the other hand, phenomenology is naturally non-deterministic. A mind that is not autonomous subjective movement is not the mind anymore, it's a pure fonction or a neural network, fixed by the natural laws of casuality. This is why the scientific discoveries that explain thoughts through biological considerations of the brain represent an opposite and equal scandal. What's the point of being, if we're absolutely devoid of true interiority, if we're simply a result of something else on which we can have no control?
But ultimatly neither of them can prove or disprove free will, become freedom can only reside in the effective relation between the subject and the object. This is why we need a third science which mediates the two first.
Hegel, who spent his life building such a science, defined freedom as the determination of the Self; i.e. auto-determination. Hegel didn't oppose freedom and necessity, he opposed necessity and randomness.
He used to say: "The random is the un-thought." The random is that which is outside of the Concept.
But to Hegel the Concept isn't the privilege of the conscious mind. The Universe in its entirety is the deployment of the Concept. This is why Nature, to him, is essentially the external manifestation of Logic (which is at the same that the auto-destruction of Logic, since Logic is a purely interior relation). And Nature, in return, is the becoming-the-Mind. The goal of Nature is to produce Understanding of Itself and to become free, since it is fully aware of the process that It is and is not blindly "stuck" in it anymore.
TL;DR: Reason makes you free, because Nature is the Concept.
Of course this is a pretty faulty and lame résumé, but what did you expect?
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I would like to propose a simple experiment for the extreme sceptics of free will. The only thing which you need to accept is that in order for me to do X, I need to be free do to X. I would say this holds true for any meaningful definition of "free", since by contradiction: if I am not free to do X it follows that I can't do X. "Hard determinists" can therefore solely argue that I am only ever "free" to do whatever I was predetermined to do, so that's no real freedom. If I was free to do X, I was only ever free to do X and nothing else (not Y, not Z, etc.), so since there is no 'real' choice involved, there is no free will in any relevant sense.
Now consider the following: Let me choose a set of simple actions ('raise left hand', 'raise right hand', 'scratch nose', etc.) which I hold I will be free to do in in a given situation (i.e., at a given point in time) and then write all of them on some slips of paper. Shuffle the slips, draw one and present it to me. Then watch how I perform this action in the given situation. Repeat a thousand times.
It does not take too much fantasy to imagine what the results of this experiment will be. I will be 'magically' able to perform any task that is 'randomly' chosen. How can you account for that? A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
The only way out that I see for the hard determinist is to declare that one cannot learn anything from this experiment since all components: its setup, its course of events and its results were predetermined. But notice that I could use the same argument against any causal inference out of any experiment ever made: "No, there just is no link that 'really' explains what happened, since whatever happened had to have happened anyway. There was no other way." Why is experimental science so damn successful then?
P.S.: The real sceptical hard determinist is then 'free' to repeat the experiment with 'a river' to see how that goes for him...
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On March 11 2012 20:55 MiraMax wrote:
I would like to propose a simple experiment for the extreme sceptics of free will. The only thing which you need to accept is that in order for me to do X, I need to be free do to X. I would say this holds true for any meaningful definition of "free", since by contradiction: if I am not free to do X it follows that I can't do X. "Hard determinists" can therefore solely argue that I am only ever "free" to do whatever I was predetermined to do, so that's no real freedom. If I was free to do X, I was only ever free to do X and nothing else (not Y, not Z, etc.), so since there is no 'real' choice involved, there is no free will in any relevant sense.
Now consider the following: Let me choose a set of simple actions ('raise left hand', 'raise right hand', 'scratch nose', etc.) which I hold I will be free to do in in a given situation (i.e., at a given point in time) and then write all of them on some slips of paper. Shuffle the slips, draw one and present it to me. Then watch how I perform this action in the given situation. Repeat a thousand times.
It does not take too much fantasy to imagine what the results of this experiment will be. I will be 'magically' able to perform any task that is 'randomly' chosen. How can you account for that? A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
The only way out that I see for the hard determinist is to declare that one cannot learn anything from this experiment since all components: its setup, its course of events and its results were predetermined. But notice that I could use the same argument against any causal inference out of any experiment ever made: "No, there just is no link that 'really' explains what happened, since whatever happened had to have happened anyway. There was no other way." Why is experimental science so damn successful then?
P.S.: The real sceptical hard determinist is then 'free' to repeat the experiment with 'a river' to see how that goes for him...
You answered your owned question.
As for why experiments are successful, they are successful because everything in the universe follows some laws of nature and the experiment is designed to measure those laws, so that it cannot be the case that the outcome tricks us with the "wrong observation".
And I'm sure compatiblists would not appreciate you mischaracterizing them as non-determinists, as compatiblist generally do believe in determinism, at least up to any randomness brought by quantum mechanics.
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On March 11 2012 21:15 paralleluniverse wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 20:55 MiraMax wrote:
I would like to propose a simple experiment for the extreme sceptics of free will. The only thing which you need to accept is that in order for me to do X, I need to be free do to X. I would say this holds true for any meaningful definition of "free", since by contradiction: if I am not free to do X it follows that I can't do X. "Hard determinists" can therefore solely argue that I am only ever "free" to do whatever I was predetermined to do, so that's no real freedom. If I was free to do X, I was only ever free to do X and nothing else (not Y, not Z, etc.), so since there is no 'real' choice involved, there is no free will in any relevant sense.
Now consider the following: Let me choose a set of simple actions ('raise left hand', 'raise right hand', 'scratch nose', etc.) which I hold I will be free to do in in a given situation (i.e., at a given point in time) and then write all of them on some slips of paper. Shuffle the slips, draw one and present it to me. Then watch how I perform this action in the given situation. Repeat a thousand times.
It does not take too much fantasy to imagine what the results of this experiment will be. I will be 'magically' able to perform any task that is 'randomly' chosen. How can you account for that? A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
The only way out that I see for the hard determinist is to declare that one cannot learn anything from this experiment since all components: its setup, its course of events and its results were predetermined. But notice that I could use the same argument against any causal inference out of any experiment ever made: "No, there just is no link that 'really' explains what happened, since whatever happened had to have happened anyway. There was no other way." Why is experimental science so damn successful then?
P.S.: The real sceptical hard determinist is then 'free' to repeat the experiment with 'a river' to see how that goes for him... You answered your owned question. As for why experiments are successful, they are successful because everything in the universe follows some laws of nature and the experiment is designed to measure those laws, so that it cannot be the case that the outcome tricks us with the "wrong observation". And I'm sure compatiblists would not appreciate you mischaracterizing them as non-determinists, as compatiblist generally do believe in determinism, at least up to any randomness brought by quantum mechanics.
Could you point me to where I said that compatibilists are non-determinists? Hmm ... didn't think so ...
You also just dodged the question. How do YOU explain the results of the proposed experiment given your stance on free will? I am afraid "The universe follows some laws of nature" does not really cut it. On what basis do you still hold that "You were not really able to do X instead of Y" since it was all predetermined, in light of the proposed results. What if I modify the experiment and note down beforehand which action I will choose to do and which not. How would you explain my predictive power when it comes down to my actions given my inability to calculate the future development of the whole universe from current conditions plus my inability to 'really' choose my actions? Your worldview needs to be able to account for these phenomena if you want to claim that it has a basis in reality, don't you think?
Your only offer is: "Well, it was all predetermined so it could not have been otherwise...move along folks, nothing more to see". Unfortunately, this doesn't explain anything.
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On March 11 2012 20:55 MiraMax wrote:
I would like to propose a simple experiment for the extreme sceptics of free will. The only thing which you need to accept is that in order for me to do X, I need to be free do to X. I would say this holds true for any meaningful definition of "free", since by contradiction: if I am not free to do X it follows that I can't do X. "Hard determinists" can therefore solely argue that I am only ever "free" to do whatever I was predetermined to do, so that's no real freedom. If I was free to do X, I was only ever free to do X and nothing else (not Y, not Z, etc.), so since there is no 'real' choice involved, there is no free will in any relevant sense.
Now consider the following: Let me choose a set of simple actions ('raise left hand', 'raise right hand', 'scratch nose', etc.) which I hold I will be free to do in in a given situation (i.e., at a given point in time) and then write all of them on some slips of paper. Shuffle the slips, draw one and present it to me. Then watch how I perform this action in the given situation. Repeat a thousand times.
It does not take too much fantasy to imagine what the results of this experiment will be. I will be 'magically' able to perform any task that is 'randomly' chosen. How can you account for that? A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
The only way out that I see for the hard determinist is to declare that one cannot learn anything from this experiment since all components: its setup, its course of events and its results were predetermined. But notice that I could use the same argument against any causal inference out of any experiment ever made: "No, there just is no link that 'really' explains what happened, since whatever happened had to have happened anyway. There was no other way." Why is experimental science so damn successful then?
P.S.: The real sceptical hard determinist is then 'free' to repeat the experiment with 'a river' to see how that goes for him...
That's a weak thought experiment...
You can't introduce as a postulate a process of randomization, if you precisely intend to prove that you can act randomly.
In other words, I could argue that you had no choice but to randomize that set of actions the way you did, and that this randomization process was bound the give the exact result it gave, because of the laws of nature.
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On March 11 2012 21:33 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 21:15 paralleluniverse wrote:On March 11 2012 20:55 MiraMax wrote:
I would like to propose a simple experiment for the extreme sceptics of free will. The only thing which you need to accept is that in order for me to do X, I need to be free do to X. I would say this holds true for any meaningful definition of "free", since by contradiction: if I am not free to do X it follows that I can't do X. "Hard determinists" can therefore solely argue that I am only ever "free" to do whatever I was predetermined to do, so that's no real freedom. If I was free to do X, I was only ever free to do X and nothing else (not Y, not Z, etc.), so since there is no 'real' choice involved, there is no free will in any relevant sense.
Now consider the following: Let me choose a set of simple actions ('raise left hand', 'raise right hand', 'scratch nose', etc.) which I hold I will be free to do in in a given situation (i.e., at a given point in time) and then write all of them on some slips of paper. Shuffle the slips, draw one and present it to me. Then watch how I perform this action in the given situation. Repeat a thousand times.
It does not take too much fantasy to imagine what the results of this experiment will be. I will be 'magically' able to perform any task that is 'randomly' chosen. How can you account for that? A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
The only way out that I see for the hard determinist is to declare that one cannot learn anything from this experiment since all components: its setup, its course of events and its results were predetermined. But notice that I could use the same argument against any causal inference out of any experiment ever made: "No, there just is no link that 'really' explains what happened, since whatever happened had to have happened anyway. There was no other way." Why is experimental science so damn successful then?
P.S.: The real sceptical hard determinist is then 'free' to repeat the experiment with 'a river' to see how that goes for him... You answered your owned question. As for why experiments are successful, they are successful because everything in the universe follows some laws of nature and the experiment is designed to measure those laws, so that it cannot be the case that the outcome tricks us with the "wrong observation". And I'm sure compatiblists would not appreciate you mischaracterizing them as non-determinists, as compatiblist generally do believe in determinism, at least up to any randomness brought by quantum mechanics. Could you point me to where I said that compatibilists are non-determinists? Hmm ... didn't think so ... You also just dodged the question. How do YOU explain the results of the proposed experiment given your stance on free will? I am afraid "The universe follows some laws of nature" does not really cut it. On what basis do you still hold that "You were not really able to do X instead of Y" since it was all predetermined, in light of the proposed results. What if I modify the experiment and note down beforehand which action I will choose to do and which not. How would you explain my predictive power when it comes down to my actions given my inability to calculate the future development of the whole universe from current conditions plus my inability to 'really' choose my actions? Your worldview needs to be able to account for these phenomena if you want to claim that it has a basis in reality, don't you think? Your only offer is: "Well, it was all predetermined so it could not have been otherwise...move along folks, nothing more to see". Unfortunately, this doesn't explain anything.
You said that:
A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
A compatibilist would probably argue something like: you have the ability to act according to your motivation to do what is on the piece of card, but the motivation arose through deterministic neural activities in your brain, and you had no choice in having those motivations.
Again, you've answered your own question: "Well, it was all predetermined so it could not have been otherwise...move along folks, nothing more to see". However, I would add to this that the universe is not deterministic, the universe is random because of quantum mechanics.
The explanation is that you do not have absolute free will, but you have the compatibilist's free will: you act according to your motivations, which if we were to ignore quantum mechanical effects, is deterministic. Your brain, through the culmination of your experiences, influences, environment and biology believes that free will exists, and decides to partake in this experiment, and to act out what is written on the card. Nowhere in this causal chain is there a choice, your brains motivation is determined by prior causes, as is the card that is drawn.
And nowhere do you have to calculate anything relating to all prior states of the universe, the motivation to do as the card says arose in your brain not out of your free will, but out of prior causes, and these causes eventually lead to the effect of doing what is specified on the card as if it were a self-fulfilling prophecy.
When you say that "The universe follows some laws of nature" doesn't cut it, I respond by saying "The universe usually follows the laws of nature, but not always" is clearly absurd.
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On March 11 2012 21:53 Gegenschein wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 20:55 MiraMax wrote:
I would like to propose a simple experiment for the extreme sceptics of free will. The only thing which you need to accept is that in order for me to do X, I need to be free do to X. I would say this holds true for any meaningful definition of "free", since by contradiction: if I am not free to do X it follows that I can't do X. "Hard determinists" can therefore solely argue that I am only ever "free" to do whatever I was predetermined to do, so that's no real freedom. If I was free to do X, I was only ever free to do X and nothing else (not Y, not Z, etc.), so since there is no 'real' choice involved, there is no free will in any relevant sense.
Now consider the following: Let me choose a set of simple actions ('raise left hand', 'raise right hand', 'scratch nose', etc.) which I hold I will be free to do in in a given situation (i.e., at a given point in time) and then write all of them on some slips of paper. Shuffle the slips, draw one and present it to me. Then watch how I perform this action in the given situation. Repeat a thousand times.
It does not take too much fantasy to imagine what the results of this experiment will be. I will be 'magically' able to perform any task that is 'randomly' chosen. How can you account for that? A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
The only way out that I see for the hard determinist is to declare that one cannot learn anything from this experiment since all components: its setup, its course of events and its results were predetermined. But notice that I could use the same argument against any causal inference out of any experiment ever made: "No, there just is no link that 'really' explains what happened, since whatever happened had to have happened anyway. There was no other way." Why is experimental science so damn successful then?
P.S.: The real sceptical hard determinist is then 'free' to repeat the experiment with 'a river' to see how that goes for him... That's a weak thought experiment... You can't introduce as a postulate a process of randomization, if you precisely intend to prove that you can act randomly. In other words, I could argue that you had no choice but to randomize that set of actions the way you did, and that this randomization process was bound the give the exact result it gave, because of the laws of nature.
You seem to misunderstand the experiment. It's not supposed to show that one can act "randomly" (how would this be done?). But instead to show that 'real' alternatives exist, i.e. at a given point in time I am 'really' able to do X and Y, so that I 'really' need to choose between X and Y (consciously or subconsciously).
Sure you can say that the whole experiment is predetermined and so nothing can be learned. But this would apply to any inference.
Take evolution for example: "In order for evolution to work fit organsims need to be able to be selected for in favour of less fit organsims. According to determinism this is not possible, since whatever organism procreates was determined at the beginning of the universe, so more fit organisms can never 'really' be selected for by external conditions since their survival is ultimately predetermined by the initial conditions of the universe and not by the external factors. Determinism therefore proves that 'real' evolution is false, there is only the 'illusion' of evolution."
Or gravity: "It might appear that masses attract each other but this is actually false, since it would presuppose that the position of any given object of mass could be anywhere else than it was predetermined to be by the initial conditions of the universe. So while there is the illusion of gravity, gravity is not really the cause of the observed positions of objects of mass, but the initial conditions of the universe are."
This is obviously all nonsense or better it misses the point of giving an "explanation" and analyzing "cause and effect". In my view, the moment of understanding that we are nothing but a collection of matter and so our constituents follow natural laws creates the strong cognitive illusion that this must mean that we cannot really choose our actions (I also thought that once). But this is mistaken. There is simply no connection. Just like from the possible fact that all positions of all objects of mass at any given point in time might be predetermined by the initial conditions of the universe, it does not follow that masses 'really' don't attract each other.
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On March 11 2012 22:11 MiraMax wrote:
Take evolution for example: "In order for evolution to work fit organsims need to be able to be selected for in favour of less fit organsims. According to determinism this is not possible, since whatever organism procreates was determined at the beginning of the universe, so more fit organisms can never 'really' be selected for by external conditions since their survival is ultimately predetermined by the initial conditions of the universe and not by the external factors. Determinism therefore proves that 'real' evolution is false, there is only the 'illusion' of evolution."
You act as if the universe was fine-tuned at creation in such a way that violates natural tendencies such as evolution.
Take the example of a pseudo random number generator on a computer that is used to generate from a standard normal distribution. This is a perfectly deterministic process, we only need to know the seed (actually we only need to know there is a seed, even if we don't know what the seed is), yet the outcome of this process still has a central tendency: to generate numbers around the mean of 0.
So it's not like at the start of the universe, it was specifically decided that this organism would procreate, and this one won't etc, in such a way that the outcome is rare and "unnatural", deliberately to spite experimenters who will live 13.7 billion years later. The laws of nature (like the pseudo RNG algorithm) produces central tenancies, such as biological organisms evolving or heavier elements in the early universe lumping together to form stars (or generating numbers around 0).
But the universe is not deterministic, the universe is random.
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On March 11 2012 22:11 MiraMax wrote:Show nested quote +On March 11 2012 21:53 Gegenschein wrote:On March 11 2012 20:55 MiraMax wrote:
I would like to propose a simple experiment for the extreme sceptics of free will. The only thing which you need to accept is that in order for me to do X, I need to be free do to X. I would say this holds true for any meaningful definition of "free", since by contradiction: if I am not free to do X it follows that I can't do X. "Hard determinists" can therefore solely argue that I am only ever "free" to do whatever I was predetermined to do, so that's no real freedom. If I was free to do X, I was only ever free to do X and nothing else (not Y, not Z, etc.), so since there is no 'real' choice involved, there is no free will in any relevant sense.
Now consider the following: Let me choose a set of simple actions ('raise left hand', 'raise right hand', 'scratch nose', etc.) which I hold I will be free to do in in a given situation (i.e., at a given point in time) and then write all of them on some slips of paper. Shuffle the slips, draw one and present it to me. Then watch how I perform this action in the given situation. Repeat a thousand times.
It does not take too much fantasy to imagine what the results of this experiment will be. I will be 'magically' able to perform any task that is 'randomly' chosen. How can you account for that? A compatibilist has no problem in explaining the outcome since I was free to do all of the actions (X,Y,Z,etc.) in the given situation and chose to perform the one presented to me. The incompatibilist does not have this option. According to him I was never really free to do X and Y and Z, but only ever the one action which I committed (either X or Y or Z), but why was it always the one presented to me?
The only way out that I see for the hard determinist is to declare that one cannot learn anything from this experiment since all components: its setup, its course of events and its results were predetermined. But notice that I could use the same argument against any causal inference out of any experiment ever made: "No, there just is no link that 'really' explains what happened, since whatever happened had to have happened anyway. There was no other way." Why is experimental science so damn successful then?
P.S.: The real sceptical hard determinist is then 'free' to repeat the experiment with 'a river' to see how that goes for him... That's a weak thought experiment... You can't introduce as a postulate a process of randomization, if you precisely intend to prove that you can act randomly. In other words, I could argue that you had no choice but to randomize that set of actions the way you did, and that this randomization process was bound the give the exact result it gave, because of the laws of nature. You seem to misunderstand the experiment. It's not supposed to show that one can act "randomly" (how would this be done?). But instead to show that 'real' alternatives exist, i.e. at a given point in time I am 'really' able to do X and Y, so that I 'really' need to choose between X and Y (consciously or subconsciously). Sure you can say that the whole experiment is predetermined and so nothing can be learned. But this would apply to any inference. Take evolution for example: "In order for evolution to work fit organsims need to be able to be selected for in favour of less fit organsims. According to determinism this is not possible, since whatever organism procreates was determined at the beginning of the universe, so more fit organisms can never 'really' be selected for by external conditions since their survival is ultimately predetermined by the initial conditions of the universe and not by the external factors. Determinism therefore proves that 'real' evolution is false, there is only the 'illusion' of evolution." Or gravity: "It might appear that masses attract each other but this is actually false, since it would presuppose that the position of any given object of mass could be anywhere else than it was predetermined to be by the initial conditions of the universe. So while there is the illusion of gravity, gravity is not really the cause of the observed positions of objects of mass, but the initial conditions of the universe are." This is obviously all nonsense or better it misses the point of giving an "explanation" and analyzing "cause and effect". In my view, the moment of understanding that we are nothing but a collection of matter and so our constituents follow natural laws creates the strong cognitive illusion that this must mean that we cannot really choose our actions (I also thought that once). But this is mistaken. There is simply no connection. Just like from the possible fact that all positions of all objects of mass at any given point in time might be predetermined by the initial conditions of the universe, it does not follow that masses 'really' don't attract each other.
In substance I agree with you. I just don't see any real pertinence in your thought experiment. It might be a good illustration of what's at hand, but it doesn't prove anything, since, as you show it yourself in the next paragraph, the deterministic position can still be defended.
But you do make a good point: epistemologically, pure determinism is content without form. And reciprocally pure non-determinism is form without content.
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EPT
