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First, just a few stylistic tips. Your paper overly verbose for the amount of content you have.
For example:
Consciousness is a name; firstly we have to acknowledge that. It is a name for something, it is the name we give the relatively indescribable awareness that humans have, although many people consider consciousness to be individual, that you have your consciousness and I have mine if you will. In many ways many humans have varying strength of their “consciousness”. Strength probably isn’t the right word, but the degree to which they exercise it
Can be rewritten more succinctly:
First one should acknowledge that consciousness is a name for the relatively indescribable awareness that humans have. Many people believe consciousness to be individualized, that each person has ownership of their distinct consciousness. People exercise their "consciousness" to varying degrees.
It can be tempting to throw out big words or use certain phrases to make your paper seem more voluminous than it actually is, but you want to avoid doing so if possible.
I am personally very much like this. Almost as if they are standing from an outside point of view watching themselves develop and feel emotions, except they are still fully experiencing these emotions and this process of development.
Don't switch between first and third person like this. If you can, don't use first person at all in formal papers, especially in scientific papers.
Let's discuss the content of your paper. Don't rely on Freud to adequately discuss the biological foundation of consciousness. I'm no psychologist, but the iceberg analogy has no implications for the biological nature of consciousness. There's a lot of legitimate research into what parts of the brain are active during tasks requiring critical thinking, long term memory, etc.. These would be more appropriate discussion for a science paper.
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On April 05 2012 03:58 PH wrote:Show nested quote +On April 04 2012 17:48 Umpteen wrote:On April 04 2012 12:56 PH wrote:
That's just a debate over the first proposition in the argument, then. The debate would have to shift over to there. I do remember Dennett making that same objection. The issue with that, though, is that you have to first prove that color experience is, in fact, entirely objective and reducible. To prove physicalism, sure. Something along the lines of molecular-level cloning of Mary, using the Brainalizer on one and showing the other the colour, then putting them in identical worlds and observing their subsequent behaviour - or something equally impractical. But I'm not trying to prove it. I'm just showing that the argument against it is not intractable. The strength and resilience of this thought experiment is that so many people intuited that she learns something new even if she had complete physical knowledge, as we understand it. You clearly had a different intuitive response. Your objection is a more basic and fundamental one, with respect to the thought experiment. To be fair, people are intuitively wrong about all kinds of things. While that does explain the resilience of wrong ideas, it doesn't make them right  Philosophy is entirely based around intuitive responses, though. Simply dismissing an intuition as wrong that doesn't agree with yours is very closed-minded. There's simply no such thing as an incorrect intuition until it has been worked through and decisively proven to be false. It would be safe to say that intuition is the foundation of modern philosophy.
Having never studied philosophy, I'll defer to your expertise in that respect. However, I wasn't dismissing the intuition that 'Mary is missing something until she actually sees colour'. I was disagreeing with the argument:
P1: Mary knows everything physical about seeing colour
P2: Mary learns something new when she sees it for herself
C: Not all knowledge about colour is physical in nature
In my opinion C does not follow from P1 and P2, because it neglects the possibility that Mary's physiology is entirely responsible for the discrepancy. She does have all the information, but her physiology causes her to store it differently from the persons she is observing.
The basis of your objection is one that would require the other side to agree to an assumption they really wouldn't. You simply disagree that there are facts that aren't physical, or rather, that there can exist something that can't be explained via physical facts.
Oh no, not at all. I'm absolutely not arguing that there can't be non-physical facts. I'm arguing that Mary's Room does not show that there are.
The idea of the subjective report is that there's something beyond the information that appears on a computer screen. In order to fully understand the existence of another individual, you need to not only know everything there is to know about them, but you also need to know what it is like to be that person as that person. The idea is that there is a "what it is like" to be you as an individual. Even if I had access to your physical state down to the most basic subatomic particle, I would still be examining the information from my own perspective. It would still be me looking over at you.
I appreciate that, and I don't disagree. I only disagree about what that is held to imply.
Something is objective when it can be understood by all at an equal and identical level. When no matter the circumstance and no matter the time, it will always be understood to the purest and most complete extent. Something is subjective when there is exactly one individual who will understand the information, and no others possibly can while they are not that one. Something is more objective the more individuals can identically understand the information, and something is more subjective the fewer who can.
Again, fully understood.
Even if we, as individuals, aren't ultimately atomic, as you say, we effectively are. We function day to day considering ourselves as a singular entity surrounded by other entities. When we see other individuals, we consider them just that, individuals. They are themselves as opposed to me, who I can immediately separate from anyone else.
No, we are effectively distinct - and not always that (empathy). By 'atomic store of knowledge' I was attempting to describe an indivisible, undifferentiated 'blank slate' into which knowledge can simply be put. We aren't. Information gets stored differently depending upon how it is input.
That to me is interesting in itself: is that the source of subjectivity? If information were stored in our brains in exactly the same way no matter how it was apprehended, what then? Is subjectivity a necessary part of being an individual, or just a quality we happen to enjoy?
This is what those supporting special consciousness have issue with. How do you extract something subjective from objective information? The "what is it like" seems like something fundamentally subjective.
I quite agree: the physiology of the 'knower' is integral to the 'knowing'. Only the number 2 can know what it's like to have 5 added and become 7, as it were But to me that implies nothing about the existence of non-physical facts. There remains the possibility that all the components of the fact are physical - but some are supplied by the knower and some by the knowledge.
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The objection comes off as very strange to me. Let me see if I can explain my problem.
If someone had the "brain state of having seen red" but they actually hadn't seen red, and then they saw red, you argue that they did not obtain additional knowledge. Such a person could have knowledge of red without actually seeing red. But I think this is impossible. If someone has the "brain state of having seen red" then knowledge of the experience of seeing red is already in your brain. Altering the brain in order to have that brain state has just given you access to the experience of seeing redness. So by altering the brain state, you give them knowledge of redness. The mistake is assuming that one can have a brain state of having seen red without having the experience of redness. I object.
If in fact having the the "brain state of having seen red" was not the same as actually experiencing red, then when Mary saw the color red she would not be able to recognize that she already had this knowledge.
I do not deny that Mary's argument does not prove physicalism false. In fact, nothing we can do can prove physicalism false. Or idealism true. But it can certainly lead us in certain directions.
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On April 05 2012 09:52 shinosai wrote: The mistake is assuming that one can have a brain state of having seen red without having the experience of redness. I object.
I'm not assuming that. My argument is that the exact opposite could be true: that the brain state is indistinguishable from the experience, and that howsoever that brain state is induced the end result is the same. Could be true, mind you - I'm not trying to prove it is.
Assuming for the sake of argument that physicalism is true, what I'm saying is that by studying another person, Mary can possess all the information about what seeing red is like. She knows that seeing red 'is like' having certain neural connections in the brain. The problem is, because of the peculiarities of her physiology, that knowledge is stored in her brain in a different form, using different neurons and different connections. The brainalizer is an attempt to overcome that.
Now, obviously there are ever-decreasing circles here. The brainalizer allows Mary to know what it's like for her to see red, thus reducing what she learns when the door to her room is opened to zero. Still, she can't know precisely what it was like for the person she scanned to see red, because the neural connections were constructed in a different context. So while Mary's Room (I think) fails in that respect, the subjective/objective distinction is not eliminated. She might like red; the person she scanned might not - as PH pointed out with scary movies and spicy foods.
Here's a question, though: is there anyone who doesn't like endorphins?
Immediately we can say 'yes' by imagining a creature to whom those chemicals are toxic or fatal, which begs the next question:
Is there anyone who doesn't like positive reinforcement?
Now the answer has to be 'no'. It's logically impossible for positive reinforcement to be anything other than it is, which makes (so far as I can see) postive and negative reinforcement the only truly objective experiences.
I haven't put any further thought into that yet, but it does throw up an interesting parallel with a discussion I had a while back with an advocate of intelligent design in nature. I'm going to ramble on a bit here, so feel free to stop reading
His thesis (shorn of fancy language) was that functionality cannot be selected for without a pre-assigned goal at the decision-node: an intelligent filter, in effect.
I postulated an iterative system in which the entities were permuted, and those with the best quality 'R' were preferentially kept by this intelligent filter and formed the basis of the next generation, and asked him if that would meet his criteria for improvement. He agreed. I pointed out that self-replication - uniquely - inherently performs the filtering process without the need for an assigned goal. He argued that I was assuming the existence of the functionality before it was selected for, and I responded that self-replication need not be a binary quality. Should an entity have the remotest chance of accurate self-replication it will ultimately dominate a world of non-replicators, and that it's not beyond the realms of possibility for a really, really bad self-replicator to arise through undirected permutation.
This got me thinking about the idea of objective 'right' and 'wrong', and I came to the (tentative) conclusion that self-replication (which is itself an objective truth - something either makes a copy of itself or it doesn't) in turn defines objective right and wrong, in that if a thing's behaviour inhibits self-replication, it must be wrong (since in the long run it will be supplanted by behaviour that promotes it). That creates tension when systems of replication overlap, eg. people and ideas (belief systems that spread themselves in part by promoting martyrdom etc), but it's still possible to state that no matter what we're talking about, be it an idea or an organism, more successful replication is always better than less. It's a shared truth, in that if you disagree, and act upon that disagreement, your opinion will sooner or later cease to exist. "Cake or death?" really does only have one answer.
I dunno - I just feel there's a connection there, between objective right and wrong as defined by self-replication, and objective experience as defined by positive and negative reinforcement. One space-like, one time-like.
Or maybe I'm just addled.
Thanks for wading through all that, if you took the time
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Well, as long as we have a distinction between subject and object, I'm not going to quibble too much. Anyways.... as far as the idea of objective right and wrong... making normative conclusions based on description cannot be valid. One cannot base any ethical system on natural or monological causes as such, for it presupposes the connection between somethings 'naturalness' and its 'rightness'. An ethical system must be justified by something else.
Your descriptions may be correct, but insufficient to provide prescription. One cannot conclude, for example, that the successful replication of the human species is objectively a good thing. Perhaps it would be better if the human species died out - one might justify this by noting the drastic imbalance between suffering and pleasure in the world. Necessity does not logically lead to prescription - only to a description of such a necessity.
Philosophers over the centuries have used such descriptions in ethics in order to justify their beliefs.... Mill famously with his utilitarianism. Everyone obviously seeks pleasure (positive reinforcement). And Plato with his highest good. But the question always is - why is pleasure good? Why is the human species thriving a good thing? It's an assumption. And whether or not those who disagree die out has no bearing on the normative question at hand.
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Why is talking to the reader bad? Other than that you have been taught this way? That's to everyone who has mentioned it.
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On April 06 2012 07:18 shinosai wrote:
Well, as long as we have a distinction between subject and object, I'm not going to quibble too much. Anyways.... as far as the idea of objective right and wrong... making normative conclusions based on description cannot be valid. One cannot base any ethical system on natural or monological causes as such, for it presupposes the connection between somethings 'naturalness' and its 'rightness'. An ethical system must be justified by something else.
Doesn't that set up an infinite recursion? Ethical system X must be justified by Y, which is good because...?
You distinguish 'naturalness' from 'rightness'. I think replication sidesteps that because replication is independent of what happens to be 'natural'. Do what you will with the physics of the universe, replication is still replication, and certain opinions about it will always be inherently favoured.
Your descriptions may be correct, but insufficient to provide prescription. One cannot conclude, for example, that the successful replication of the human species is objectively a good thing.
I didn't say it was I even drew attention to tensions between overlapping systems of replication. My point is that the universe - all possible universes, so far as I can see - inherently favour the opinion that behaviour leading to more successful self-replication is better than behaviour leading to less. It's an 'arrow of ethics' that's been implicit since the dawn of time, and would be in all worlds.
Perhaps it would be better if the human species died out - one might justify this by noting the drastic imbalance between suffering and pleasure in the world.
You could make the same argument about all species. I might argue in return that humanity has the best chance of managing and mitigating future suffering.
Necessity does not logically lead to prescription - only to a description of such a necessity.
I think necessity that is non-contingent - that cannot be other than true - could be construed as prescription.
Philosophers over the centuries have used such descriptions in ethics in order to justify their beliefs.... Mill famously with his utilitarianism. Everyone obviously seeks pleasure (positive reinforcement). And Plato with his highest good. But the question always is - why is pleasure good?
Why is positive reinforcement good? Because it can't be considered otherwise: positive reinforcement is, tautologically, what we are bound to seek, and would be in all possible worlds.
Like I (sort of) said at the beginning: any ethical system must suffer an infinite recursion of justifications, or ultimately rest on something that can't not be true. And I think the inescapable 'arrow of ethics' defined by replication and positive reinforcement might be that foundation.
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On April 06 2012 16:45 Trufflez wrote:
Why is talking to the reader bad? Other than that you have been taught this way? That's to everyone who has mentioned it.
your goal is to make a formal and objective essay. First and Second person add intimacy and makes it sound informal
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I think necessity that is non-contingent - that cannot be other than true - could be construed as prescription.
If that's the case, then a prescription would not be necessary. It would be pointless to make normative claims about such things. I do not need to tell you that you ought to behave in such and such a way if you are in fact going to behave this way regardless of what I tell you. In this case prescription becomes superfluous.
Like I (sort of) said at the beginning: any ethical system must suffer an infinite recursion of justifications, or ultimately rest on something that can't not be true. And I think the inescapable 'arrow of ethics' defined by replication and positive reinforcement might be that foundation.
You might like to read Hegel's Philosophy of the Right, which deals with normative issues without appeal to monological or natural causes but also without an infinite recursion of justification.
You could make the same argument about all species. I might argue in return that humanity has the best chance of managing and mitigating future suffering.
No, humans are definitely capable of the highest levels of suffering. It gets worse the smarter you get.
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On April 08 2012 13:06 shinosai wrote:Show nested quote +I think necessity that is non-contingent - that cannot be other than true - could be construed as prescription. If that's the case, then a prescription would not be necessary. It would be pointless to make normative claims about such things. I do not need to tell you that you ought to behave in such and such a way if you are in fact going to behave this way regardless of what I tell you. In this case prescription becomes superfluous.
Hmm. Since I wasn't saying disagreement is impossible (just ultimately self-defeating), I don't see how that applies.
Like I (sort of) said at the beginning: any ethical system must suffer an infinite recursion of justifications, or ultimately rest on something that can't not be true. And I think the inescapable 'arrow of ethics' defined by replication and positive reinforcement might be that foundation.
You might like to read Hegel's Philosophy of the Right, which deals with normative issues without appeal to monological or natural causes but also without an infinite recursion of justification.
I'm chewing through it now. Some of it I like, some of it (binary distinction between human and animals, for instance) makes me frown.
Show nested quote +
You could make the same argument about all species. I might argue in return that humanity has the best chance of managing and mitigating future suffering.
No, humans are definitely capable of the highest levels of suffering. It gets worse the smarter you get.
But we are also (in principle) the most capable of averting suffering, since we have the greatest powers of foresight.
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When in a science class and discussing the BIOLOGICAL BASIS for consciousness I don't think Freud is really your best example for someone intelligent on the matter.
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EPT
