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In June 1940 the French government made peace with Germany and was replaced (in the south) by an authoritarian state led by Philippe Pétain. As part of the armistice, Germany and Italy agreed to allow France to keep it's naval fleets and would not attempt to capture said fleets for use against the Allies. Despite this and personal assurances from the French, the British remained skeptical of whether or not Germany would maintain it's end of the agreement.
If the Germans seized control of the French fleet, the balance of [naval] power would tip in favor of the Germans. The British felt that the risk was too great and gave the French an ultimatum. The ultimatum was that the French should either assist the British (Free French Forces) during the war or surrender their ships to the British, who would then allow the French crew to return home (to France). A third option of transferring ownership of the ships to the United States and returning the French crews home was originally supposed to be offered, but the British liaison went against orders omitted the option when delivering the ultimatum to the French.
The ultimatum was it was supposed to be delivered is below:
It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;
(a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.
(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.
If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.
(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans unless they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance — where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.
If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have the orders from His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German hands.
After receiving the ultimatum, the British and French entered into talks over the future of the French fleet and it's crew, however both sides felt as though little progress had been reached. Negotiations were thereafter ended and the British began dropping anti-ship to prevent the French fleet from fleeing. Viewing the dropping of anti-ship mines as an act of aggression, the French shot down one of the British planes, killing it's two-man crew. After the loss of British lives, Winston Churchill ordered that the British eliminate the French fleet.
The battle was a decisive British victory, with the French fleet suffering a major loss of assets and life. Nearly 1300 Frenchmen were killed in the attack and around 350 were wounded; they also completely lost one ship, while taking severe damage to six other vessels. The British on the other hand only lost six aircraft and the aforementioned two lives. The French later retaliated by bombing the British city of Gibraltar.
The battle is a matter of some controversy, especially for the French. There is some disagreement over whether or not it was necessary for the British to attack the French fleet to begin with. The British argue that the risk of the fleet falling into German hands was too great and would have been devastating for the British war effort. Others criticize the British officers for not relaying the entire ultimatum as they had been ordered to, and that the French may have accepted the undelivered terms, avoiding over a thousand deaths. What do you think, was the British attack on the French fleet justified?
Poll: Was the attack justified?American/Other: The attack was justified. (51) 37% American/Other: The attack wasn't justified. (35) 26% British: The attack was justified. (25) 18% French: The attack was justified. (14) 10% British: The attack wasn't justified. (6) 4% French: The attack wasn't justified. (6) 4% 137 total votes Your vote: Was the attack justified? (Vote): British: The attack was justified.
(Vote): British: The attack wasn't justified.
(Vote): French: The attack was justified.
(Vote): French: The attack wasn't justified.
(Vote): American/Other: The attack was justified.
(Vote): American/Other: The attack wasn't justified.
User was banned for this post.
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Having no information on this other than what is posted in this thread, it seems clear to me that since negotions ended the British were justified in mining the french fleet, and after the shooting of their planes they were justified in the attack.
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Why is this in general forum?
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You really can't discuss this without bringing up the fact that the French did indeed latter scuttle their fleet at Toulon. That is to say, the British didn't know whether or not the French would allow their navy to fall into Nazi hands, but the answer in real life is that, no, they did not, and the British fear that they might was factually incorrect. Even so, one can argue that the British had no way of knowing this for sure and were still justified. It really was not a case where there was clear communication and understanding on both sides, so it's quite a gray area. That said, war is full of grayer areas than this, so I'm not sure this decision warrants any particular handwringing (unless you're wondering about whether for example it contributed to France not integrating better with NATO).
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The answer would be no the if the stakes weren't so high. When you have war on a global scale then everyone in the world is a participant, whether they want to be or not.
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lol, you make such random threads.
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On May 05 2013 05:40 HunterX11 wrote:
You really can't discuss this without bringing up the fact that the French did indeed latter scuttle their fleet at Toulon. That is to say, the British didn't know whether or not the French would allow their navy to fall into Nazi hands, but the answer in real life is that, no, they did not, and the British fear that they might was factually incorrect. Even so, one can argue that the British had no way of knowing this for sure and were still justified. It really was not a case where there was clear communication and understanding on both sides, so it's quite a gray area. That said, war is full of grayer areas than this, so I'm not sure this decision warrants any particular handwringing (unless you're wondering about whether for example it contributed to France not integrating better with NATO).
Yes, but the French scuttled their fleet at Toulon two years later. As you said, the British had no way of knowing that the French could be trusted, especially since they had just surrendered and were now somewhat collaborating with the Germans.
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On May 05 2013 05:40 HunterX11 wrote:
You really can't discuss this without bringing up the fact that the French did indeed latter scuttle their fleet at Toulon. That is to say, the British didn't know whether or not the French would allow their navy to fall into Nazi hands, but the answer in real life is that, no, they did not, and the British fear that they might was factually incorrect. Even so, one can argue that the British had no way of knowing this for sure and were still justified. It really was not a case where there was clear communication and understanding on both sides, so it's quite a gray area. That said, war is full of grayer areas than this, so I'm not sure this decision warrants any particular handwringing (unless you're wondering about whether for example it contributed to France not integrating better with NATO).
Can you really say whether a decision was right or wrong based on a future event that we have no way of predicting? The fact that the French scuttled their ships before letting them fall into Nazi hands shouldn't have much impact here because the British didn't have the benefit of that hindsight.
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There's so many miscellaneous history threads ~_~.
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Is there going to be a Thread like this about the Dresden Bombing? ;D
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On May 05 2013 05:55 Daumen wrote:
Is there going to be a Thread like this about the Dresden Bombing? ;D
You can go ahead and make one if you want, might prove to be an interesting conversation.
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On May 05 2013 05:59 Arctic Daishi wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 05:55 Daumen wrote:
Is there going to be a Thread like this about the Dresden Bombing? ;D You can go ahead and make one if you want, might prove to be an interesting conversation.
Too much hassle/work for me, I wouldnt be able to make a nice OP ;D But the conversation would be interesting indeed...
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Justified? Hell no. Necessary? Of course. It happened long ago should we discuss every little war crime in WW2? There are too many to count. Germany would have done worse in the same situation I imagine. Especially considering what happened to our "allies" the italians when they surrendered.
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I've never understood why people try to mix war and moral justifications. Just strikes me as naive as fuck.
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On May 05 2013 06:03 Yuljan wrote:
Justified? Hell no. Necessary? Of course. It happened long ago should we discuss every little war crime in WW2? There are too many to count. Germany would have done worse in the same situation I imagine. Especially considering what happened to our "allies" the italians when they surrendered.
I would think if something is necessary it is therefore a justifiable action...
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You can reframe the question as "Is X an element of the set Y" where X = "the attack on the fleet by the British" and Y = "things that are just". In order to answer this question you simply have to define X and Y clearly enough and your answer becomes apparent without any further work. Any other approach has no use.
It'd be like if someone came up to you and asked if 363 was an element of the set Z. You'd ask "What are the rules that govern set Z"? If they told you "all odd integers" you'd know that 363 was a member of that set. If they told you "I don't know" you'd say "then there is no way to determine whether 363 is a member of that set or not, given the information that is available." Same thing for this thread question, except it's not about numbers, but set theory still applies.
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British fleet had a major problem: Italy. To be able to hold mediterrean sea on both sides, UK had to maintain a fleet the size of italy's in the eastern mediterrian sea (to be able to hold alexandria and suez) and another fleet the same size at the gibraltar. So the pretty small fleet of italy managed to hold two fleets double the size only due to its existance.
Now add french fleet into this problem: It was so big, that if the germans would have aquired it, together with italian fleet, the UK Royal Navy would have no way to secure both, suez and gibraltar, no supplys from the colonies would reach UK and vice versa, While german /italian forces were nearly conquering Egypt, while threatening atlantic traffic with submarines.
Whilest this, london was bombed on a daily basis, and UK was the only unoccupied allied at that time. And running very short on food, oil, supplys, especially Pilots (polish exile, indian, aussie pilots saved UK back than) everything. All had to be imported from the Colonies (india, australia, New zealand, and so on).
Without ruling the mediterrian sea, , the american /british landing in north africa, and later italy would have never happened if this fleet would have existed. Basically said, the germans would have won.
The french should have destroyed their fleet themselves, or put it on sleepmode in a neutral country (perhaps argentinia), or to help against axis, even put it under allied command (what germany would have retaliated on vichy regime for sure).
The French were stubborn to keep their fleet in algeria, and gave UK no choice.
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When I clicked the link I seriously thought it was some peaceful village in the Middle East that Obama droned because it refused to hand over some important resistance leader.
Pleasantly surprised.
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On May 05 2013 06:19 Craze wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 06:03 Yuljan wrote:
Justified? Hell no. Necessary? Of course. It happened long ago should we discuss every little war crime in WW2? There are too many to count. Germany would have done worse in the same situation I imagine. Especially considering what happened to our "allies" the italians when they surrendered. I would think if something is necessary it is therefore a justifiable action...
yeah... I would say it's more like: Justified? Hell no. Understandable? yep...
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I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference.
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On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference.
With the fleet Briton/America could have never landed in Italy and Germany could have avoided fighting their after Italy surrendered which may have helped them vs the russians. But it might not have made a difference to the overall result.
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It was most certainly justified. Simply the CHANCE of the French fleet falling into German hands at that point in time was obviously reason for concern, especially considering that the US wasn't directly involved in the war yet, nor had the USSR invasion started, drawing German attention to the east. It was the (rather scary) German war machine against a very, very isolated UK, and they could not take the chance of anything cutting them off completely. Unfortunate? Yes. Foolish by the French? Yes. Justified? Yes.
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The main issue is that they probably could have convinced the French to take an option other than open hostility with the UK. It's not really a matter of whether it were justifiable in general, but whether the British impatience in giving the French little chance other than to be sunk was really justifiable. Even this is still further complicated because the British tried to do this but bungled it rather badly.
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Remember that after the french surrender, there was a sense amongst many frenchmen of being abandoned by the british, and a sense of anglophobia that was almost as intense as the hatred for the germans. There was also a nationalistic movement against communism to unite the Vichy french... afaik there were even french volounters on the eastern front.
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On May 05 2013 07:24 Zaros wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference. With the fleet Briton/America could have never landed in Italy and Germany could have avoided fighting their after Italy surrendered which may have helped them vs the russians. But it might not have made a difference to the overall result.
You're undervaluing what that fleet would have done especially for Germany and Italy. With that fleet maybe Italy doesn't back down. With that fleet supplies are able to be received and Germany did suffer in supplies. With that fleet the US could not freely navigate the waters with only U-boats to worry about. It might have not completely changed the overall result, but it would have greatly affected how long the war went on and perhaps even changed the tide of war.
Now, was it justified? I don't know it seems like Britain was looking for an excuse to rid France of it's navy instead of attempting to secure the waters. I don't think with such a strong demand you let fuck-ups happen where an entire option is left of the table. Makes me think that Britain just wanted to secure their status post-war.
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On May 05 2013 06:42 Holo82 wrote:
British fleet had a major problem: Italy. To be able to hold mediterrean sea on both sides, UK had to maintain a fleet the size of italy's in the eastern mediterrian sea (to be able to hold alexandria and suez) and another fleet the same size at the gibraltar. So the pretty small fleet of italy managed to hold two fleets double the size only due to its existance.
Now add french fleet into this problem: It was so big, that if the germans would have aquired it, together with italian fleet, the UK Royal Navy would have no way to secure both, suez and gibraltar, no supplys from the colonies would reach UK and vice versa, While german /italian forces were nearly conquering Egypt, while threatening atlantic traffic with submarines.
Whilest this, london was bombed on a daily basis, and UK was the only unoccupied allied at that time. And running very short on food, oil, supplys, especially Pilots (polish exile, indian, aussie pilots saved UK back than) everything. All had to be imported from the Colonies (india, australia, New zealand, and so on).
Without ruling the mediterrian sea, , the american /british landing in north africa, and later italy would have never happened if this fleet would have existed. Basically said, the germans would have won.
The french should have destroyed their fleet themselves, or put it on sleepmode in a neutral country (perhaps argentinia), or to help against axis, even put it under allied command (what germany would have retaliated on vichy regime for sure).
The French were stubborn to keep their fleet in algeria, and gave UK no choice.
Historical decisions, like contemporary ones, must be accounted for on the basis of sympathy with the environment, and can not be justified solely because of one side's estimation of a worst-case scenario. While British actions under the circumstances were understandable, you breach the ridiculous when you claim that the French 'should' have destroyed the fleet themselves, without understanding the realities of the contemporary scene.
1) Admiral Darlan, like much of the Vichy government and the French population at large felt no particular loyalties to Britain, and not in July 1940 when they felt betrayed and abandoned by the British for their (from the French perspective) questionable decisions during the French campaign. The men who came to the forefront in Vichy: Laval and Darlan were largely anglophobe and experienced something of a Schadenfreude in 1940, when they were almost eager to see the British punished for her perfidy. To expect such men to destroy their own nation's fleet for the sake of Britain is tantamount to saying that Hitler should have suddenly surrendered due to a sudden ethical epiphany. To this day, we tend to forget how unpopular the British were in France during the war years, and how easily the majority of the French population collaborated with the Germans. Nonetheless, any insinuations that Darlan would have actively collaborated with the Germans, or permitted his ships to fall into German hands is grossly improbable.
2) In retrospect, Mers-El-Kebir was a mistake, both political and psychological. What was shocking about Mers-El-Kebir was that in this case, in a world which was quickly revolving away from the ethical norms of Victorian legality, with its culture of the sacrosanctity of treaties and correct diplomatic behaviour, the British violated the very thing they seemed to stand for in the world. Their ruthlessness made a rather good impression on Berlin, where the Diplomatic corps was busy trying to bring the British to the peace table. The fallout damage on Anglo-French relations, as well as the political future of France itself would later make itself felt at Casablanca.
3) The action was militarily unnecessary, and perhaps even counter-productive, if one were to take the sum of British actions in 1940-1941. Mers-El-Kebir was not an isolated incident, but one in a sequence of British attacks on French assets across the world. At the same time, French crews whose ships had taken refuge in British ports were fallen upon and interned, with some casualties committed in the process. The Richelieu, escaping from Algeria docked in Dakar was subject to an aerial attack, followed up by a failed ground operation in September. The following year, with the British unable to make any decisive gains in any theatre of war, her slim resources were frittered away in the conquest of Madagascar, while in Syria the British and Vichy France had come to a virtual state of war with hard fighting over a month-long campaign.
4) As we know, the Italian OOB in June 1940 had four modern and semi-modern Battleships: 2 Littorio-class (Littorio and Vittorio Veneto) which were only then completing their sea trials, as well as two of the Andrea Doria class (Andrea Doria and Caio Diulio) with 12.5 in caliber guns, and therefore outgunned by every British front-line ship. In addition, there were the two older Cavour-classes with a main battery of 12-inchers. The Kriegsmarine's capital line consisted of the two completed surface-raiders Gneiseneau and Scharnhorst. Bismarck was undergoing trials and Tirpitz was as of yet incomplete. As it turned out, none of the Axis surface combatants ever imposed a serious Trafalgar-type action on the British, and neither fleet had any intention of doing so, preferring asymmetrical warfare on the high seas.
5) The French OOB consisted of Three WW1-era Bretagne-class Battleships, 2 Lorraine-class Fast Battleships, as well as the mostly-completed modern Richelieu-class: Richelieu and Jean Bart.
Of the seven mainstays, 1 Bretagne-class was sunk at Mers-El-Kebir, and another was interned at Alexandria with the armistice. The most powerful units, Richelieu and Jean-Bart, were stranded at Dakar and Casablanca respectively with limited mobility. The remaining 3 French ships were part of the Toulon concentration in spring 1942, along with most of France's remaining light units. In all, the Mers-El-Kebir attack made sure of one French battleship, and prevented the concentration of two others. However, even with their combined battle lines, the German-Italian-French fleets would have come up considerably short of the RN in gross tonnage, firepower and unit count alike.
6) What was more shocking to the Free French then in London than even the attacks, were the triumphal overtones with which the attacks were met in the British Press. In July, the British had suffered a string of unmitigated defeats, and taking Mers-El-Kebir as a minor propaganda victory was psychologically necessary, but still instantly distasteful.
7) In favour of British measures, it may well be said that she was in a struggle for national survival in a war which, to objective observers of the time, she had already lost. In July 1940 the British had not a single combat-ready division in the British isles to face a German invasion. It is still forgotten today how the Germans gave her a two-month interval in which no serious preparations were made for Sealion, due to Hitler's disbelief that the British would carry on the war. No one knew all this at the time, however.
8) As atavistic as this may sound, the manner of engagement was somewhat unsporting, as to the last moment the French crews in the Algerian squadron did not believe that the British would actually fire on them, and were therefore completely unprepared when the first shells hit.
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United Kingdom36161 Posts
On May 05 2013 08:03 NoobSkills wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 07:24 Zaros wrote:On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference. With the fleet Briton/America could have never landed in Italy and Germany could have avoided fighting their after Italy surrendered which may have helped them vs the russians. But it might not have made a difference to the overall result. You're undervaluing what that fleet would have done especially for Germany and Italy. With that fleet maybe Italy doesn't back down. With that fleet supplies are able to be received and Germany did suffer in supplies. With that fleet the US could not freely navigate the waters with only U-boats to worry about. It might have not completely changed the overall result, but it would have greatly affected how long the war went on and perhaps even changed the tide of war. Now, was it justified? I don't know it seems like Britain was looking for an excuse to rid France of it's navy instead of attempting to secure the waters. I don't think with such a strong demand you let fuck-ups happen where an entire option is left of the table. Makes me think that Britain just wanted to secure their status post-war.
I have less than zero idea what you're thinking if you think Britain was worrying about its post-war status in 1940.
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On May 05 2013 07:58 KaiserJohan wrote:
Remember that after the french surrender, there was a sense amongst many frenchmen of being abandoned by the british, and a sense of anglophobia that was almost as intense as the hatred for the germans. There was also a nationalistic movement against communism to unite the Vichy french... afaik there were even french volounters on the eastern front.
There were quite a number of volunteers fighting in the SS and Wehrmacht not only the French and in comparison the number of French volunteers was neglible.
In comparison (just quickly copied from the german wikipedia so not to be taken as accurate numbers just to underline my point):
+ Show Spoiler +
Finnland - 1.200
Italy - 19.000
Yugoslavia - 31.000 (just the pure croatian divisions, muslim and arab volunteers got spread among the normal divisions)
Hungary - 120.000 (80.000 forced)
Romania - 54.000
Belgium - 40.000
Denmark - 7.800
France - 8.000
Norway - 3.800
Serbia - 22.000
Latvia - 110.000
Estonia - 70.000
Ukraine - no definite number given but they talk about 84.000 volunteers in 1943
Soviet Union (Wlassow-Army) - 125.000
Soviet minorities - 40.000-100.000
So as you can see the French were in no way leaning to Nazi Germany. Heck even the indian legion had 4.000 volunteers. Compare that to the exposure to Nazi drafts and propaganda in France and you can see that they had one of the lowest number of volunteers out of all occupied nations.
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On May 05 2013 08:09 marvellosity wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 08:03 NoobSkills wrote:On May 05 2013 07:24 Zaros wrote:On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference. With the fleet Briton/America could have never landed in Italy and Germany could have avoided fighting their after Italy surrendered which may have helped them vs the russians. But it might not have made a difference to the overall result. You're undervaluing what that fleet would have done especially for Germany and Italy. With that fleet maybe Italy doesn't back down. With that fleet supplies are able to be received and Germany did suffer in supplies. With that fleet the US could not freely navigate the waters with only U-boats to worry about. It might have not completely changed the overall result, but it would have greatly affected how long the war went on and perhaps even changed the tide of war. Now, was it justified? I don't know it seems like Britain was looking for an excuse to rid France of it's navy instead of attempting to secure the waters. I don't think with such a strong demand you let fuck-ups happen where an entire option is left of the table. Makes me think that Britain just wanted to secure their status post-war. I have less than zero idea what you're thinking if you think Britain was worrying about its post-war status in 1940.
That depends on whether peace with Germany was an option. If the British government thought the war may possibly end soon then they would be thinking about post war. If they were completely committed to winning the war then they could not afford to think about anything else at that time. We will never know.
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On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference.
They could just put German crews on the ships, its not like Germany had no sailors ready to go.
Also, Vichy France did fight for the Germans on several occasions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dakar
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gabon
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Madagascar
I'm pretty well versed in WW2, but I'd never heard of the Battle of Madagascar. Pretty interesting, Japan and Vichy France vs Britain.
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On May 05 2013 08:34 Millitron wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference. They could just put German crews on the ships, its not like Germany had no sailors ready to go. Also, Vichy France did fight for the Germans on several occasions. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dakarhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gabonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_MadagascarI'm pretty well versed in WW2, but I'd never heard of the Battle of Madagascar. Pretty interesting, Japan and Vichy France vs Britain.
In all these battles Vichy France defended itself not Germany. Just because they fought against Britains doesnt mean they fought for Germany.
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arctic daishi, you post way too many threads.
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On May 05 2013 08:42 Yuljan wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 08:34 Millitron wrote:On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference. They could just put German crews on the ships, its not like Germany had no sailors ready to go. Also, Vichy France did fight for the Germans on several occasions. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dakarhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gabonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_MadagascarI'm pretty well versed in WW2, but I'd never heard of the Battle of Madagascar. Pretty interesting, Japan and Vichy France vs Britain. In all these battles Vichy France defended itself not Germany. Just because they fought against Britains doesnt mean they fought for Germany.
Not in the Battle of Madagascar. They fought alongside Japanese forces. Though you're right, should've said "Axis", not just Germany.
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Very interesting! I was not aware of this piece of history. I concur with British actions. The French did their surrendering thing, decisive actions to prevent an invasion of Britain was imperative.
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You have to look at the situation through the eyes of England, the war is going very badly. Hardware losses alone made the situation dire especially in terms of aircraft. The last thing Churchill could do was to give the French any benefit of the doubt that they(the Free French) could get the ships out in time and away from Nazi hands.
Add to the fact that the Battle for France was not only a military disaster but on the ally front it was fast coming to a crumble. Poor communication, rivalries about command etc. Add to the fact that British simply did not tell the French, according to the French, that they were evacuating leaving French forces to be further bloodied.
Hitler has reached the channel, France has made peace while forces still fighting are very small in number and poorly equipped and need time to reorganize. You play it safe and sink those ships.
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On May 05 2013 07:24 Zaros wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.
I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.
And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference. With the fleet Briton/America could have never landed in Italy and Germany could have avoided fighting their after Italy surrendered which may have helped them vs the russians. But it might not have made a difference to the overall result.
If the invasion of Normandy never happened, then it is entirely possible (and likely) that the Soviets would have kept pushing into Germany and possibly beyond.
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The irony is of course, that the French Navy survived the war with the highest percentage of her Battleship line intact of any warring power. Only 1 out of 7, excluding the ancient Courbet-class Battleships, was sunk in action. The RN lost 7 out of 21 Battleships/Battlecruisers. The USN lost 4 out of 27. The German Navy lost 3 out of 4, if you ignore the Panzerschiffe and the ancient pre-Dreadnoughts. The IJN lost 10 of 12 of her first-rates. The Italian RN lost 2 of 7, and the Soviets 1 of 3.
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On May 05 2013 08:08 MoltkeWarding wrote:Show nested quote +On May 05 2013 06:42 Holo82 wrote:
British fleet had a major problem: Italy. To be able to hold mediterrean sea on both sides, UK had to maintain a fleet the size of italy's in the eastern mediterrian sea (to be able to hold alexandria and suez) and another fleet the same size at the gibraltar. So the pretty small fleet of italy managed to hold two fleets double the size only due to its existance.
Now add french fleet into this problem: It was so big, that if the germans would have aquired it, together with italian fleet, the UK Royal Navy would have no way to secure both, suez and gibraltar, no supplys from the colonies would reach UK and vice versa, While german /italian forces were nearly conquering Egypt, while threatening atlantic traffic with submarines.
Whilest this, london was bombed on a daily basis, and UK was the only unoccupied allied at that time. And running very short on food, oil, supplys, especially Pilots (polish exile, indian, aussie pilots saved UK back than) everything. All had to be imported from the Colonies (india, australia, New zealand, and so on).
Without ruling the mediterrian sea, , the american /british landing in north africa, and later italy would have never happened if this fleet would have existed. Basically said, the germans would have won.
The french should have destroyed their fleet themselves, or put it on sleepmode in a neutral country (perhaps argentinia), or to help against axis, even put it under allied command (what germany would have retaliated on vichy regime for sure).
The French were stubborn to keep their fleet in algeria, and gave UK no choice. Historical decisions, like contemporary ones, must be accounted for on the basis of sympathy with the environment, and can not be justified solely because of one side's estimation of a worst-case scenario. While British actions under the circumstances were understandable, you breach the ridiculous when you claim that the French 'should' have destroyed the fleet themselves, without understanding the realities of the contemporary scene. 1) Admiral Darlan, like much of the Vichy government and the French population at large felt no particular loyalties to Britain, and not in July 1940 when they felt betrayed and abandoned by the British for their (from the French perspective) questionable decisions during the French campaign. The men who came to the forefront in Vichy: Laval and Darlan were largely anglophobe and experienced something of a Schadenfreude in 1940, when they were almost eager to see the British punished for her perfidy. To expect such men to destroy their own nation's fleet for the sake of Britain is tantamount to saying that Hitler should have suddenly surrendered due to a sudden ethical epiphany. To this day, we tend to forget how unpopular the British were in France during the war years, and how easily the majority of the French population collaborated with the Germans. Nonetheless, any insinuations that Darlan would have actively collaborated with the Germans, or permitted his ships to fall into German hands is grossly improbable. 2) In retrospect, Mers-El-Kebir was a mistake, both political and psychological. What was shocking about Mers-El-Kebir was that in this case, in a world which was quickly revolving away from the ethical norms of Victorian legality, with its culture of the sacrosanctity of treaties and correct diplomatic behaviour, the British violated the very thing they seemed to stand for in the world. Their ruthlessness made a rather good impression on Berlin, where the Diplomatic corps was busy trying to bring the British to the peace table. The fallout damage on Anglo-French relations, as well as the political future of France itself would later make itself felt at Casablanca. 3) The action was militarily unnecessary, and perhaps even counter-productive, if one were to take the sum of British actions in 1940-1941. Mers-El-Kebir was not an isolated incident, but one in a sequence of British attacks on French assets across the world. At the same time, French crews whose ships had taken refuge in British ports were fallen upon and interned, with some casualties committed in the process. The Richelieu, escaping from Algeria docked in Dakar was subject to an aerial attack, followed up by a failed ground operation in September. The following year, with the British unable to make any decisive gains in any theatre of war, her slim resources were frittered away in the conquest of Madagascar, while in Syria the British and Vichy France had come to a virtual state of war with hard fighting over a month-long campaign. 4) As we know, the Italian OOB in June 1940 had four modern and semi-modern Battleships: 2 Littorio-class (Littorio and Vittorio Veneto) which were only then completing their sea trials, as well as two of the Andrea Doria class (Andrea Doria and Caio Diulio) with 12.5 in caliber guns, and therefore outgunned by every British front-line ship. In addition, there were the two older Cavour-classes with a main battery of 12-inchers. The Kriegsmarine's capital line consisted of the two completed surface-raiders Gneiseneau and Scharnhorst. Bismarck was undergoing trials and Tirpitz was as of yet incomplete. As it turned out, none of the Axis surface combatants ever imposed a serious Trafalgar-type action on the British, and neither fleet had any intention of doing so, preferring asymmetrical warfare on the high seas. 5) The French OOB consisted of Three WW1-era Bretagne-class Battleships, 2 Lorraine-class Fast Battleships, as well as the mostly-completed modern Richelieu-class: Richelieu and Jean Bart. Of the seven mainstays, 1 Bretagne-class was sunk at Mers-El-Kebir, and another was interned at Alexandria with the armistice. The most powerful units, Richelieu and Jean-Bart, were stranded at Dakar and Casablanca respectively with limited mobility. The remaining 3 French ships were part of the Toulon concentration in spring 1942, along with most of France's remaining light units. In all, the Mers-El-Kebir attack made sure of one French battleship, and prevented the concentration of two others. However, even with their combined battle lines, the German-Italian-French fleets would have come up considerably short of the RN in gross tonnage, firepower and unit count alike. 6) What was more shocking to the Free French then in London than even the attacks, were the triumphal overtones with which the attacks were met in the British Press. In July, the British had suffered a string of unmitigated defeats, and taking Mers-El-Kebir as a minor propaganda victory was psychologically necessary, but still instantly distasteful. 7) In favour of British measures, it may well be said that she was in a struggle for national survival in a war which, to objective observers of the time, she had already lost. In July 1940 the British had not a single combat-ready division in the British isles to face a German invasion. It is still forgotten today how the Germans gave her a two-month interval in which no serious preparations were made for Sealion, due to Hitler's disbelief that the British would carry on the war. No one knew all this at the time, however. 8) As atavistic as this may sound, the manner of engagement was somewhat unsporting, as to the last moment the French crews in the Algerian squadron did not believe that the British would actually fire on them, and were therefore completely unprepared when the first shells hit.
Brilliant post right there, it really makes me want to consider changing my vote now. Thanks for this!
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