Was the Attack on Mers-el-Kébir justified? - Page 2

On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.

I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.

And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference.

On May 05 2013 07:24 Zaros wrote:


With the fleet Briton/America could have never landed in Italy and Germany could have avoided fighting their after Italy surrendered which may have helped them vs the russians. But it might not have made a difference to the overall result.

On May 05 2013 06:42 Holo82 wrote:
British fleet had a major problem: Italy. To be able to hold mediterrean sea on both sides, UK had to maintain a fleet the size of italy's in the eastern mediterrian sea (to be able to hold alexandria and suez) and another fleet the same size at the gibraltar. So the pretty small fleet of italy managed to hold two fleets double the size only due to its existance.

Now add french fleet into this problem: It was so big, that if the germans would have aquired it, together with italian fleet, the UK Royal Navy would have no way to secure both, suez and gibraltar, no supplys from the colonies would reach UK and vice versa, While german /italian forces were nearly conquering Egypt, while threatening atlantic traffic with submarines.

Whilest this, london was bombed on a daily basis, and UK was the only unoccupied allied at that time. And running very short on food, oil, supplys, especially Pilots (polish exile, indian, aussie pilots saved UK back than) everything. All had to be imported from the Colonies (india, australia, New zealand, and so on).

Without ruling the mediterrian sea, , the american /british landing in north africa, and later italy would have never happened if this fleet would have existed. Basically said, the germans would have won.

The french should have destroyed their fleet themselves, or put it on sleepmode in a neutral country (perhaps argentinia), or to help against axis, even put it under allied command (what germany would have retaliated on vichy regime for sure).

The French were stubborn to keep their fleet in algeria, and gave UK no choice.

On May 05 2013 08:03 NoobSkills wrote:


You're undervaluing what that fleet would have done especially for Germany and Italy. With that fleet maybe Italy doesn't back down. With that fleet supplies are able to be received and Germany did suffer in supplies. With that fleet the US could not freely navigate the waters with only U-boats to worry about. It might have not completely changed the overall result, but it would have greatly affected how long the war went on and perhaps even changed the tide of war.

Now, was it justified? I don't know it seems like Britain was looking for an excuse to rid France of it's navy instead of attempting to secure the waters. I don't think with such a strong demand you let fuck-ups happen where an entire option is left of the table. Makes me think that Britain just wanted to secure their status post-war.

On May 05 2013 07:58 KaiserJohan wrote:
Remember that after the french surrender, there was a sense amongst many frenchmen of being abandoned by the british, and a sense of anglophobia that was almost as intense as the hatred for the germans. There was also a nationalistic movement against communism to unite the Vichy french... afaik there were even french volounters on the eastern front.

On May 05 2013 08:09 marvellosity wrote:


I have less than zero idea what you're thinking if you think Britain was worrying about its post-war status in 1940.

On May 05 2013 07:22 CrimsonLotus wrote:
I'm hardly a military expert, but somehow I doubt that the Germans could just take the french ships and have them operating in any reasonable ammount of time.

I don't think all the french sailors would have decided to fight for Germany so new sailors would have needed to be trained to use the french equipment, which I don't think could happen very fast. At least not to improve Germany's chance to knock Britain out of the war.

And once the war with Russia had started that fleet wouldn't have made any significant difference.

On May 05 2013 08:34 Millitron wrote:

They could just put German crews on the ships, its not like Germany had no sailors ready to go.

Also, Vichy France did fight for the Germans on several occasions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dakar
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gabon
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Madagascar

I'm pretty well versed in WW2, but I'd never heard of the Battle of Madagascar. Pretty interesting, Japan and Vichy France vs Britain.

On May 05 2013 08:42 Yuljan wrote:


In all these battles Vichy France defended itself not Germany. Just because they fought against Britains doesnt mean they fought for Germany.

On May 05 2013 07:24 Zaros wrote:


With the fleet Briton/America could have never landed in Italy and Germany could have avoided fighting their after Italy surrendered which may have helped them vs the russians. But it might not have made a difference to the overall result.

On May 05 2013 08:08 MoltkeWarding wrote:


Historical decisions, like contemporary ones, must be accounted for on the basis of sympathy with the environment, and can not be justified solely because of one side's estimation of a worst-case scenario. While British actions under the circumstances were understandable, you breach the ridiculous when you claim that the French 'should' have destroyed the fleet themselves, without understanding the realities of the contemporary scene.

1) Admiral Darlan, like much of the Vichy government and the French population at large felt no particular loyalties to Britain, and not in July 1940 when they felt betrayed and abandoned by the British for their (from the French perspective) questionable decisions during the French campaign. The men who came to the forefront in Vichy: Laval and Darlan were largely anglophobe and experienced something of a Schadenfreude in 1940, when they were almost eager to see the British punished for her perfidy. To expect such men to destroy their own nation's fleet for the sake of Britain is tantamount to saying that Hitler should have suddenly surrendered due to a sudden ethical epiphany. To this day, we tend to forget how unpopular the British were in France during the war years, and how easily the majority of the French population collaborated with the Germans. Nonetheless, any insinuations that Darlan would have actively collaborated with the Germans, or permitted his ships to fall into German hands is grossly improbable.

2) In retrospect, Mers-El-Kebir was a mistake, both political and psychological. What was shocking about Mers-El-Kebir was that in this case, in a world which was quickly revolving away from the ethical norms of Victorian legality, with its culture of the sacrosanctity of treaties and correct diplomatic behaviour, the British violated the very thing they seemed to stand for in the world. Their ruthlessness made a rather good impression on Berlin, where the Diplomatic corps was busy trying to bring the British to the peace table. The fallout damage on Anglo-French relations, as well as the political future of France itself would later make itself felt at Casablanca.

3) The action was militarily unnecessary, and perhaps even counter-productive, if one were to take the sum of British actions in 1940-1941. Mers-El-Kebir was not an isolated incident, but one in a sequence of British attacks on French assets across the world. At the same time, French crews whose ships had taken refuge in British ports were fallen upon and interned, with some casualties committed in the process. The Richelieu, escaping from Algeria docked in Dakar was subject to an aerial attack, followed up by a failed ground operation in September. The following year, with the British unable to make any decisive gains in any theatre of war, her slim resources were frittered away in the conquest of Madagascar, while in Syria the British and Vichy France had come to a virtual state of war with hard fighting over a month-long campaign.

4) As we know, the Italian OOB in June 1940 had four modern and semi-modern Battleships: 2 Littorio-class (Littorio and Vittorio Veneto) which were only then completing their sea trials, as well as two of the Andrea Doria class (Andrea Doria and Caio Diulio) with 12.5 in caliber guns, and therefore outgunned by every British front-line ship. In addition, there were the two older Cavour-classes with a main battery of 12-inchers. The Kriegsmarine's capital line consisted of the two completed surface-raiders Gneiseneau and Scharnhorst. Bismarck was undergoing trials and Tirpitz was as of yet incomplete. As it turned out, none of the Axis surface combatants ever imposed a serious Trafalgar-type action on the British, and neither fleet had any intention of doing so, preferring asymmetrical warfare on the high seas.

5) The French OOB consisted of Three WW1-era Bretagne-class Battleships, 2 Lorraine-class Fast Battleships, as well as the mostly-completed modern Richelieu-class: Richelieu and Jean Bart.

Of the seven mainstays, 1 Bretagne-class was sunk at Mers-El-Kebir, and another was interned at Alexandria with the armistice. The most powerful units, Richelieu and Jean-Bart, were stranded at Dakar and Casablanca respectively with limited mobility. The remaining 3 French ships were part of the Toulon concentration in spring 1942, along with most of France's remaining light units. In all, the Mers-El-Kebir attack made sure of one French battleship, and prevented the concentration of two others. However, even with their combined battle lines, the German-Italian-French fleets would have come up considerably short of the RN in gross tonnage, firepower and unit count alike.

6) What was more shocking to the Free French then in London than even the attacks, were the triumphal overtones with which the attacks were met in the British Press. In July, the British had suffered a string of unmitigated defeats, and taking Mers-El-Kebir as a minor propaganda victory was psychologically necessary, but still instantly distasteful.

7) In favour of British measures, it may well be said that she was in a struggle for national survival in a war which, to objective observers of the time, she had already lost. In July 1940 the British had not a single combat-ready division in the British isles to face a German invasion. It is still forgotten today how the Germans gave her a two-month interval in which no serious preparations were made for Sealion, due to Hitler's disbelief that the British would carry on the war. No one knew all this at the time, however.

8) As atavistic as this may sound, the manner of engagement was somewhat unsporting, as to the last moment the French crews in the Algerian squadron did not believe that the British would actually fire on them, and were therefore completely unprepared when the first shells hit.