EPTGiving out 2 beta keys - Page 3
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Etche
United States2 Posts
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Tajja
United States33 Posts
And violets are blue Then what the hell color is violet? | ||
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saint_fu
Canada61 Posts
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codac
Sweden3 Posts
I will be glued if a key, imbued to the game pursued does not ellude I'm in the mood to command the brood | ||
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skyeyesattelite
Canada56 Posts
violets are blue; fudge is sweet; so lets have some fudge ! | ||
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enk1
Uganda14 Posts
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Tajja
United States33 Posts
"This is a proud day for both Canada and Bosnia-Herzegovina," said the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence. "Over the last two decades, Canadians have worked with the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and our UN and NATO partners, to secure a brighter future for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada and the CF can be proud of having helped make Bosnia-Herzegovina a safer and more stable place." "What dramatic changes Canadians have seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the last twenty years," said General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff. "When Canadians first deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, we were helping secure peace and stability in their nation. Now members of the Bosnian armed forces are serving as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan." The primary focus of Operation BRONZE was defence reform, especially to facilitate the re-integration of veterans of the Balkan wars into civil society, and the entry of Bosnia-Herzegovina into NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Since September 1991, more than 40,000 members of the Canadian Forces have served in the Balkan region in a variety of missions and roles. Over the years, 23 Canadian Forces members lost their lives while serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada still has a military presence in the Balkan region with Operation KOBOLD (Task Force Pristina), which comprises five senior officers of the Canadian Forces serving with the NATO mission supporting the Kosovo Security Force. | ||
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Tajja
United States33 Posts
Bosnia now: the past and the future facing each other. Jump to Comments On the same day that the trial of Radovan Karadzic began in the Hague, war criminal Biljana Plavsic, who succeeded Karadzic as President of Republika Srpska was released from prison, after having served seven of the eleven years to which she had been convicted by the ICTY for her role on the war in Bosnia. These two events occurred just a few days after the failure of the Butmir talks, the latests initiative to overcome the current political situation in Bosnia, which some define as crisis, but I prefer to define as deadlock, because, unlike in a crisis, the current situation perfectly serves on of the parts involved. While the current situation doesn’t satisfy anyone, doing nothing, leaving things as they are is clearly beneficial for the leadership of the Serb entity. Headed by Milorad Dodik, the government of the Republika Srpska is actively working towards the disintegration of Bosnia by systematically obstructing the process of decision making, proving by its behaviour that any power-sharing is worthless when the actors are not willing or at least complied to share power. Upon her release from prison in Sweden, Bijlana Plavsic flew to Belgrade in the jet of the government of the Republika Srpska, and upon her arrival, was warmly received by Milorad Dodik. The image of this encounter are striking: the past and the future holding hands, like a mother and her son. Both were, at a certain point, considered by the international actors involved Bosnia as moderate politicians worth backing. This tells a lot about the fallacy of the opposition between moderates and hardliners when it comes to Serb nationalism. Their moderation, Plavsic’s as well as Dodik’s, proved to be merely tactical. Through their seemingly moderate policies, when compared to those of Radovan Karadzic and his supporters, they gave a very important contribution to advance the cause of pursuing with the goal of disintegrating Bosnia and reinforcing the homogeneous ethnic composition of the serb entity. During the war, Plavsic, aka the ‘iron lady’, was known by her extreme nationalism and her outright racism. A Professor of Biology, Plavsic had no problem in abusing the authority of science to justify her racism, by presenting ‘ethnic cleansing’ as “a perfectly natural phenomenon” and claiming that the Bosnian Muslims were “genetically deformed material”: “That’s true [i.e. her imagination that the Bosnian Muslims were originally Serbs]. “But it was genetically deformed material that embraced Islam. And now, of course, with each successive generation this gene simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse and worse, it simply expresses itself and dictates their style of thinking and behaving, which is rooted in their genes…“ This was the ‘moderate’ politician who, after the war the international actors chose to back. And when she voluntary surrendered after being indicted by the ICTY, her ‘moderation’ seemed to be confirmed. Thus, Plavsic had as her defense witnesses prominent figures such as Madeleine Albright and Carl Bildt, whose testimony was an important mitigating factor for the judges (here, see note 20). Plavsic went as far as showing remorse and appealing for reconciliation, and the sincerity of her words was confirmed by the statement of the witness Elie Wiesel. In fact, by pleading guilty on the count of persecutions as a crime against humanity, she managed to obtain a bargain in which the prosecution dropped all other charges, including two counts of genocide. Her plea thus represented not a positive step towards reconciliation, but a lost opportunity to prove that a genocide was committed in Bosnia, by the Serb forces against the Muslims. Early this year, Plavsic retracted her confession, in an interview to the Swedish Vi magazine : “I sacrificed myself. I have done nothing wrong. I pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity so I could bargain for the other charges.” By pleading guilty on crimes against humanity so that she could get away with genocide, Biljana Plavsic sacrificed herself for the sake of the Nation, but her sacrifice was obviously not as hard as the one she thought it was right to impose on her own co-nationals. Indeed, for the sake of ‘Greater Serbia’ considered that the dead of as much as half the total ethnic Serb population would be a worthy sacrifice: “There are 12 million Serbs and even if six million perish on the field of battle, there will be six million to reap the fruits of the struggle“. So, through her ‘sacrifice’, not only she managed to get her sentence substantially reduced, but she also avoided a conviction of genocide that would contribute to highlight the illegitimacy of the very existence of Republika Srpska. If we look at the concept of legitimacy as springing from the founding act of any politically organized society, what do we see? We see the need to deny genocide, because legitimacy is the glue that binds people together in a politically organized society, while genocide is the ‘original sin’ upon which Republika Srpska was built. If someone like Bijlana Plavsic, or Milorad Dodik for that matter, chose to oppose the warmongering faction led by Karadzic, it was because they understand that violence was merely an instrument among others to achieve a goal. Until now, the only conviction on the account of genocide by the ICTY was the case of General Radislav Krstic, the commander of the Drina Corps. However, his conviction for genocide covered solely the case of the Massacre of Srebrenica. The chance to get a conviction for genocide on a wider area than Srebrenica was also missed at the trial of Momcilo Krajisnik, in which the prosecution failed to establish the Krajisnik genocidal intent ( read Bosnia’s ‘accidental’ genocide, by Edina Becirevic. Krajisnik was convicted to 27 years in prison, but acquitted of genocide, and as a result of his appeal, the sentence was reduced to 20 years, overturning the convictions in several charges. This appeal revealed major flaws in the prosecution’s strategy and sparked the fear that similar or even greater difficulties will be faced to convict Radovan Karadzic of genocide(about this debate, read ‘What Karadzic Prossecutors learnt from Krajisnik Trial’, by Simon Jennings). Thus, bearing in mind the failure of the International Court of Justice (about this, read ‘The ICJ and the decriminalisation of Genocide‘, by Marko Attila Hoare, and ‘Vital Genocide documents concealed‘, by Florence Hartmann), and the fact that Ratko Mladic is still at large and most likely will never be captured, the trial of Radovan Karadzic represents the last chance to establish through international law, the full extent of the genocidal character of the aggression against Bosnia-Hercegovina (about this, it’s worth reading this post by Kirk Johnson at Americans for Bosnia). The stakes are high. The result of this trial cannot but have an important impact on the Republika Srpska. It is not at all a matter of ‘collective guilt’, since guilt is always individual, but it is a matter of political legitimacy. The political identity of the serb entity is being built now as if it was an alien land, but the past keeps coming back and the urge for justice won’t go away so easily, as the case of the Spanish Civil war highlights. However, for something to change in the current trend of ‘smooth’ disintegration, it is necessary that what is called the international community, meaning the relevant international players in Bosnia, should make a serious reflection on what went wrong on their approach both of the conflict and of the post-conflict phase. That reflection is not at all happening and the result is clearly shown in the predictable failure of the Butmir talks. Nonetheless, I do believe there are grounds for hope, for the simple reason that the future is not written in the stars but is rather built in the present and can always be changed. I believe real change must come from within the Bosnian society. Imposed solutions have already proved their limits, but international support for change will always play a crucial role. But for change to happen, we must stop waiting for a miracle, because time is not working on our side. | ||
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Jyvblamo
Canada13788 Posts
My builds don't mess around Because I time them so And this I know for sho... But do you really expect to withstand my armies knocking at your door... Don't try to fight the macro Because the a-move alone is killing you right now... Uh, thank god for Korean gamers For sticking builds together Cause we don't know how... Uh! Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa You think you've micro Ohh, you think you've micro But micro just won't cut it Cause you've got no units at aaaaalll... We play together Oh, we play together But my skill's always better when there's stakes invooooolllved... If what they say is "His build's always better" Then what makes, then what makes, then what makes, Then what makes my build the exception? So macro macro, oh you gotta macro, macro till you're maxed, and then I'll just attack-move heeerrrreee... Y'all don't know how to make goons dance. Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa.. Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa.. Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa.. Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa.. Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa.. Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa.. Heeeyyy... Yaaaaaaa.. Heeyy Yaaaaaaaa.. | ||
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PineappleSage
Canada109 Posts
i love how you zigzag and zoom to consume but not to forget to press 4sh5sh6sh although it is hard when your movements are memorizing zisforpineapple@hotmail.com | ||
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maggalo
United States77 Posts
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Tajja
United States33 Posts
History Early History The area was part of the Roman province of Illyricum. Bosnia was settled by Serbs in the 7th cent.; it appeared as an independent country by the 12th cent. but later at times acknowledged the kings of Hungary as suzerains. Medieval Bosnia reached the height of its power in the second half of the 14th cent., when it controlled many surrounding territories. Bosnia also annexed the duchy of Hum, which, however, regained autonomy in 1448 and became known as Herzegovina. During this period the region was weakened by religious strife among Roman Catholics, Orthodox, and Bogomils. Thus disunited, Bosnia fell to the Turks in 1463. Herzegovina held out until 1482, when it too was occupied and joined administratively to Bosnia. The nobility and a large part of the peasantry accepted Islam. Foreign Domination Under Turkish rule, Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy declined. Physical remoteness facilitated the retention of medieval social structure, including serfdom (remnants of which lasted until the 20th cent.). Refusal by the Turkish to institute reforms led to a peasant uprising (1875) that soon came to involve outside powers and led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. After the war, the Congress of Berlin (1878) placed Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian administration and occupation, while recognizing the sovereignty of the Turkish sultan. Austria-Hungary improved economic conditions in the area but sought unsuccessfully to combat rising Serb nationalism, which mounted further when Bosnia and Herzegovina were completely annexed in 1908. The assassination (1914) of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist in Sarajevo precipitated World War I. In 1918, Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed to Serbia. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia during World War II led to Bosnia and Herzegovina's incorporation into the German puppet state of Croatia. Much partisan guerrilla warfare raged in the mountains of Bosnia during the war. In 1946, Bosnia and Herzegovina became one of the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia. Under the Communist regime Bosnia remained relatively undeveloped. Economic problems and ethnic quarrels during the 1980s led to widespread dissatisfaction with the central government. Independence and Civil War In Oct., 1991, following the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia, the Croats and Bosniaks of Bosnia and Herzegovina, fearing Serbian domination, voted for a declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. In 1992, the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the European Community (now the European Union) and the United States, and it entered the United Nations. Many Bosnian Serbs opposed the new republic, in which they were a minority, and Serb troops, both from Serbia and Bosnia, began to carve out the Serb-populated areas and declared the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croats in Bosnia, also fearing Bosniak domination, declared their own Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. An arms embargo reinforced the disparity between the well-armed Serbs and their foes, and Bosniaks were forced from their homes and towns as part of an “ethnic cleansing” policy carried out mostly by the Serbs. Thousands were killed, many were placed in detention camps, and many more fled the country. (Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić was among a number of Serbs later indicted in absentia by a United Nations tribunal for war crimes; he went into hiding after the Dayton Accord, and was finally arrested and extradited to The Hague by Serbia in 2008.) The major Western powers rejected military intervention but endorsed the establishment of six “safe areas” with a United Nations presence, where Bosniaks would supposedly not be attacked. Fighting between Bosniaks and Croats intensified in 1993. Shelling, mainly by Serb forces, destroyed much of Sarajevo and laid waste to other cities throughout the country. In 1994, Yugoslavian and Croatian forces fought in support of Bosnian Serbs and Croats, respectively. The Bosnian government army launched major offensives from Bihac and elsewhere, and the balance of power among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks shifted from time to time. In 1994, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats agreed to a cease-fire and established a joint Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During 1995, Serb forces shelled the besieged Sarajevo and launched attacks on the UN-proclaimed “safe areas” of Tuzla, Zepa, and Srebrenica. There were mass deportations of Bosniaks and widespread instances of rape and execution of civilians, especially in Srebrenica. Croat and Bosniak forces later made heavy inroads against Serbs in western Bosnia. An estimated 97,000 to 110,000 persons died during the years of fighting; roughly two thirds of those who died were Bosniaks. In late 1995, the Bosniak-dominated Bosnian government and the leaders of Croatia and Serbia met under U.S. auspices in Dayton, Ohio, and negotiated a peace accord. It called for a Bosnian republic with a central government and two semiautonomous regions, roughly equal in size, one dominated by Serbs, the other by Bosniaks and Croats in federation. The accord provided for the dispatch of NATO-led troops for peacekeeping purposes; the forces originally were to stay until June, 1998. In addition, a high representative of the Peace Implementation Council (the nations overseeing the peace process) is the final authority on the civilian aspects of the settlement, and has the power to dismiss elected Bosnian officials. The accord was implemented and conditions have slowly improved. Bosnian disillusionment with the moderates who had held power since 1998 resulted in electoral victories for the ethnic nationalist parties in the 2002. The peacekeeping forces Bosnia were transferred in 2004 from NATO's leadership to the European Union's. In 2006 the International Court of Justice began hearing Bosnia's genocide case against Serbia. The charges, which were first filed in 1993, accused Serbia of state-planned genocide against Bosnian Muslims. The court, which had limited access to internal Serbian evidence, did not find Serbia guilty of genocide (which would have required proving intent on the part of Serbia's leaders) but did find (2007) that Serbia had violated international law when it failed to prevent or prosecute those responsible for genocide against the Bosniaks. Bosnian political leaders agreed in Mar., 2006, to constitutional revisions that would establish a single-person presidency and move the country toward a strong-prime-minister parliamentary system. The changes, designed to strengthen the central government, were also intended to promote Bosnia's accession to the European Union and NATO. The following month, however, the reforms failed to win the required two-thirds majority in the parliament. Much distrust remains among Bosnia's three communities, whose members now typically live in areas that are largely ethnically homogeneous, and the Oct., 2006, presidential and parliamentary elections for the central government reinforced and even exacerbated ethnic divisions. Slovakian diplomat Miroslav Lajčák has been the international high representative since July, 2007. In Apr., 2008, the parliament approved the unification of Bosnia's police forces, but the watered-down law largely left Serb police forces outside central control. | ||
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Pablols
Chile517 Posts
i am very sorry give me the key and he might smile again | ||
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Kegs.aus
Australia133 Posts
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Tajja
United States33 Posts
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Hot_Bid
Braavos36375 Posts
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